FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN

D-MINUS

JUNE 1959

Executive Office of the President
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D-MINUS

June, 1959
FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D-MINUS has been prepared in accordance with provisions of Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, (50 USC 404); Section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, (50 USC App. 2062); the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, (50 USC App. 2251-2297); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended, (5 USC 133Z-15 Note); Executive Order 10346 (17 F.R. 3477), as amended; and Executive Order 10480 (18 F.R. 4939), as amended.

The information contained herein provides direction and guidance for readiness planning and emergency operations to meet the described situation.

It is the responsibility of each department and agency to prepare operational plans through all organizational levels appropriate to its emergency functions. This includes taking necessary staffing, programming and budgetary actions, in accordance with the President's budget policy, sufficiently in advance so that a satisfactory condition of readiness, verified by periodic exercises, will exist at all times. Periodic reports of readiness condition will be submitted as requested.

This plan will remain under constant review and be subject to continual revision with consideration being given to such national and international factors as variations in the threats to national security, status of alliances, readiness of civil defense and defense mobilization and United States and Allied military capabilities.

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INTRODUCTION

1. FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D-MINUS prescribes policies and actions and provides for implementing documents that will be required by the Federal Government during and after crippling attack on the United States, its overseas bases and on its allies. This plan gives uniform guidance to the departments and agencies concerned not only in planning for post-attack activities, but also in current programming actions designed to improve readiness to meet the situation.

2. Part I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS. Statements to give uniform direction to the Planning process by describing the assumed situation.

3. Part II - MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES. Statements of Federal policies required to meet the described situation.

4. Part III - ACTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT. Summary Statements of Presidential Actions implementing MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES.

5. Part IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM. Summary statements of Actions required for the control of resources and for Federal direction of civil defense operations.

6. ANNEXES. Additions which are essential to completeness and understanding.

7. APPENDICES. Implementing plans.

8. IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTS. Actual documents or drafts of documents required to implement actions in Parts III and IV are distributed separately from the plan.
GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION

The Plan is based on an assumed international situation involving actual or imminent attack, with little or no warning, on the United States and its allies so crippling in effect as to impair governmental control, seriously reduce military strength, produce millions of casualties, disrupt industrial and agricultural production and endanger the existence of the nation and the free world.
PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

1. To prescribe policies and actions and to provide for implementing documents that will be required by the Federal Government during and after crippling attack on the United States, its overseas bases and on its allies. Objectives of planned policies and actions are:

   a. To maintain form and authority of government.

   b. To support military operations and military alliances.

   c. To ensure survival of the remaining population and recovery of the nation.

   d. To ensure most effective use of resources.

   e. To maintain free world unity.

2. To describe planning and operational functions.

3. To provide planning policies with which all directives delegations and assignments of responsibility to departments and agencies will be consistent.

4. To serve as a guide for coordinating individual agency current programming actions and other readiness measures in order that the total national effort will be unified and properly interrelated.

5. To describe emergency organizations which may be established as conditions warrant or require.
PART I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

A. CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS

CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS are statements of capabilities at this time of the USSR, and assumed advance warning capabilities of our own forces. CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS are not statements of intent. USSR CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS, as well as all other assumptions in Part I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS, are consistent with current intelligence. It is within the range and scope of the CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS that ATTACK and DAMAGE ASSUMPTIONS have been developed.

THE USSR IS CAPABLE OF:

1. Providing military aid to its allies such as production equipment and facilities; military equipment and supplies; research, development, engineering and training information and missions; and military intelligence.

2. Providing political aid to its allies such as financial and other assistance to the governing communist organizations; military assistance in suppression of internal disturbances; world-wide espionage; propaganda, psychological warfare and subversion; and support of their activities in the United Nations.

3. Providing economic aid to neutrals and to allies of the United States such as financial grants and loans; barter arrangements for international trade; production equipment and facilities; research, development, engineering and training information and missions; and commercial intelligence.

4. Supporting a large scale war effort.

5. Producing nuclear weapons of varying yields ranging from a few kilotons to several megatons of TNT equivalent, biological and chemical warfare agents, and incendiary and high explosive weapons.
6. Delivering these weapons anywhere within the United States and upon U.S. deployed forces and allies by various means including aircraft, submarines, missiles or by clandestine means.

7. Fusing these weapons for air or surface burst or for delayed action, and for detonation at appropriate altitude even though the vehicle is successfully attacked.

WARNING CAPABILITIES

1. Missiles may arrive without warning. Likewise, weapons emplaced by clandestine means may be set off without warning.

2. An air raid warning of an initial mass attack by aircraft can be received on the Canadian border and the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts from a few minutes to three hours before the aircraft reach those boundaries. Intelligence as to the probable time attacking aircraft will take to reach specific areas can be available through the Attack Warning System.

3. Interior areas can have one to three hours additional warning between the time an air defense warning is received and the time when they are under attack from aircraft.

4. Strategic warning is a possibility.
PART I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

B. ATTACK ASSUMPTIONS

The GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION (p. 5) assumes an international situation involving actual or imminent attack, with little or no warning, on the United States and its allies so crippling in effect as to impair governmental control, seriously reduce military strength, produce millions of casualties, disrupt industrial and agricultural production, and endanger the existence of the nation and the free world. The circumstances described in the GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION could result from various forms of enemy attack, involving the exercise by the enemy of some or all of its capabilities. For assistance in planning, however, the Attack Assumptions which follow describe a particular form of attack -- employing nuclear weapons in conjunction with biological and chemical warfare agents -- which is representative in that its consequences could be of the magnitude described in the GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION.

1. The USSR has made attacks with large numbers of nuclear weapons on the United States and on its territories, possessions, bases overseas, and on its allies. Attacks also have been made with unidentified biological and chemical warfare agents in unidentified amounts. The domestic air raid warning for the first attack was disseminated two hours before USSR aircraft appeared over U. S. frontiers. At the same time as the air raid warning was announced, missiles arrived and weapons emplaced by clandestine means were detonated. However, the major weight of attack has been delivered by aircraft.

2. Air defense operations in North America and overseas have destroyed a substantial portion of the attacking aircraft but half of those destroyed had reached the bomb release lines and had released their weapons. U. S. and allied military operations have resulted in casualties and damage to the enemy at least as great as those received. Notwithstanding severe losses of military and civilian personnel and materiel, air operations against the enemy are continuing and our land and naval forces are heavily engaged. Both sides are making use of nuclear weapons for tactical air support in land and sea operations.
3. The USSR is expected to use its remaining capability to launch additional strategic air attacks and has considerable air power for tactical and air defense operations. The USSR submarine fleet is active in both the Atlantic and Pacific and serious losses to U.S. and allied controlled ocean shipping are being incurred. Intensive propaganda is being directed against the U.S. and its allies. Clandestine activities and sabotage are being conducted.

4. Both on the North American Continent and overseas, the major weight of the attacks appears to have been directed on U.S. and allied military installations including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities and facilities producing nuclear weapons, coastal naval bases, concentrations of ground and air defense forces, and ports and airfields servicing international transportation. In addition, the District of Columbia and many population and industrial centers remote from military facilities have been attacked. Due to actions of Air Defense Forces and to aiming and other errors of the attacking forces, many weapons resulted in random surface bursts.

5. The weapons employed range from a few kilotons TNT equivalent to several megatons. All of the weapons in the megaton range burst on the surface. The great majority of the weapons in the kiloton range were air bursts. Blast and thermal radiation damage extends from five miles to as much as fifteen miles from ground zeros. Severe fire storms and mass fires have occurred in heavily built-up cities and many rural fires were started involving growing crops and forests. The surface bursts have resulted in widespread radioactive fallout of such intensity that over substantial parts of the U.S., the taking of shelter for considerable periods of time is the only means of survival. Prior to assurance of safety anywhere on the surface, radiological intelligence is essential.
C. DAMAGE ASSUMPTIONS

1. GENERAL. The attacks have almost completely paralyzed the functioning of the economic system, causing disruption of organized governmental activities, fragmentation of society into local groups, deterioration of our social standards, breakdown in our financial system, and complete disruption of normal production processes. The proportion of human casualties exceeds the proportion of material losses. In spite of the magnitude of the catastrophe and the possibility of additional but lighter attacks, about 120,000,000 uninjured people and substantial material resources remain. Consequently, there is ultimate recuperative potential to meet the requirements of the surviving population. Restoration of our society and its economy is possible in spite of the existence of confusion, despair, bereavement and psychological deterioration.

2. TYPES OF AREAS. Some areas of the United States have been completely destroyed; others are undamaged; and casualties in the remaining areas vary in intensity from place to place. The ability of a locality to recuperate from the attacks and support national objectives, depends on whether it is in a:

   a. Damaged Area: An area suffering from blast and thermal damage including secondary fires. This area, or part of it will usually be heavily contaminated by residual radiation.

   b. Fallout Area: An area subject to residual nuclear radiation causing death and sickness, and thus preventing free movement of personnel. However, the pressure of elemental needs will drive many of the sheltered survivors out to face remaining radiation hazards.

   c. Undamaged Area: An area free of blast and thermal damage and relatively free of residual nuclear radiation. Personnel may move freely without acquiring disabling radiation sickness, although in some instances personnel would be required to spend non-working time in shelters.
3. DAMAGED AREAS. In these areas the loss and damage to property is severe, and the death toll is high. Most of the remaining population is either sick or injured. The surviving injured outnumber the surviving uninjured. In the early post-attack period, contamination and debris prevent operations in and through the area and make surviving resources inaccessible. Communications have been destroyed or are inoperative, organized commercial, financial and industrial activities have ceased, the existing local government has been destroyed or greatly weakened and the morale of the surviving people is very low. Fires in rural areas have blocked or hindered rail, highway and air transportation routes, damaged power transmission systems and cut off many evacuation routes. The damaged areas urgently need and are completely dependent upon outside aid and assistance. Whatever capability for control of resources might exist would be limited to the simplest forms of allocation and rationing of basic goods and services essential to survival. Weeks, months and in some cases years will elapse before remaining facilities can be safely used.

4. FALLOUT AREAS. These areas are largely free from property damage but suffer many radiation casualties. The sickness ratio is high and morale very low. Although commercial, financial and industrial facilities may be intact, activities are seriously affected by radioactive contamination and manpower losses, and by disrupted relations with other business interests in the damaged areas. Communication and transportation services are unreliable. Local governments in many places are ineffective. In many cases resources, although intact, will require decontamination before they can be used. Crops such as fresh fruits and vegetables cannot be used without washing or peeling, and further use of some land may be restricted to grazing of beef-type cattle, hogs and sheep, or to the growing of non-food crops or crops with low calcium content. Radiation casualties and fear of the population to subject itself to further radiation hazards, limit or prevent movement of personnel and support of military forces or damaged areas. In many areas relatives, friends and neighbors furnish the only medical care available to the sick and injured. Controls which may be imposed on resources will have little effect until confidence is restored and the fear of radiation sickness overcome.

5. UNDAMAGED AREAS. In these areas there is no property damage or loss of life, and no sickness directly due to the attack. Those state and local governments which are still functioning in these areas are taking measures within Federal policies to
assure the maintenance of law and order and continued survival of the uninjured population, and to provide aid to those on the fringes of the damaged and fallout areas. Industrial, financial and commercial activities are seriously affected by the destruction of resources located in damaged areas, and by the disruption of business relations with customers, suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors, etc., located in damaged or fallout areas. Transportation and communication services within the area are in operation but connections to other areas are interrupted or destroyed. Although morale has been shaken by reports from outside the area, it is much better than exists in damaged and fallout areas. It is in these areas, that programs can be undertaken to aid and assist the damaged and fallout areas, to support military operations, and to reorganize and expand national resources. Conservation and allocation of resources in these areas are necessary to insure maximum availability of essential items to care for evacuees and to meet the needs of the severely stricken areas and the armed forces.

6. FEDERAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. Central direction is seriously impaired and many of the highest government officials are casualties. The relocated Presidential office is functioning, is providing national leadership, and is working to reconstitute effective nationwide direction and control. Washington has been so severely damaged that no operations there are possible. Some pre-attack complements of personnel were at the relocation sites of those governmental agencies that had them; however, even if they have remained well, their numbers are inadequate to carry out all required essential functions. As it is, the great majority of the sites have escaped direct effects of the attacks, but because of residual radiation, many personnel are sick and some are sure to die. Nevertheless, it is expected that some personnel (including executive reservists) who evacuated during the warning period or waited out the radiation hazard in adequate shelter may be available to augment the relocated complements. The problems of reestablishing national direction and control of field installations by Federal executive departments and agencies were complicated by inadequate communications and transportation between the Federal relocation centers and the field.

7. HEALTH. Health resources are in a critical state, both from high concentration of these resources in the attacked areas, and from the unprecedented requirements for the surviving resources. Even with the most stringent selection of patients to
be treated, rationing of supplies from the outset, and maximum support of industrial restoration, remaining supplies will be inadequate by D/7 to D/10 days.

a. The general level of casualties throughout the U.S. is extremely serious. In many localities it is catastrophic. The following is an estimate of the millions of casualties which have occurred or will occur as a direct result of the attacks:

**MILLIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed and Fatally</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Injured Recovery Possible</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blast &amp; Thermal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Radiation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The 12,000,000 surviving casualties require emergency medical care. Of this number 3,000,000 are suffering from blast and thermal injuries and have an immediate and evident need for treatment. Of the 9,000,000 surviving radiation casualties, one-half will require hospitalization at some time during the period from D/1 week to D/12 weeks, with the peak, 4,500,000 being reached between D/2 weeks and D/6 weeks. Many surviving casualties have been injured by two or more of the weapons' effects, rendering treatment more difficult and recovery more doubtful. Because health personnel and medical supplies and facilities are lacking or are in very short supply, several million people will die who otherwise might have recovered.

c. Many more radiation casualties will occur from the cumulative effects of exposure to residual radiation and the consumption of contaminated food-stuffs and water due to the lack of thorough radiological defense monitoring and the application of adequate protective measures.
d. Many of the supplies remaining are either inaccessible or unusable because of contamination or because of lack of transportation. The production potential for health supplies and equipment is almost completely inoperable for an extended period. Most of the plants which remain are seriously damaged or unusable due to contamination and lack of materials and skilled personnel.

e. From a pre-attack total of 1.6 million hospital beds, approximately 100,000 are available for use at D+7 days. Where medical care is possible, most patients are being treated under improvised arrangements including the utilization of civil defense emergency hospitals as available.

f. Besides the casualties resulting from the direct effects of attack, blast, thermal and initial nuclear radiation, there are 120 million surviving of which there is a daily census of 9 million requiring some type of medical care. The medical care requirements are greater than in the pre-attack period, because of displacement of people, disruption of normal medical and sanitation services, pollution of food and water supplies, environmental exposure, physical and emotional stress, malnutrition and overcrowding. Included in the 9 million above, the numbers afflicted with communicable diseases are increasing rapidly and half a million require hospital beds. These diseases include typhoid fever, influenza, smallpox, diphtheria, tetanus, infectious hepatitis, and diarrheal and streptococcal diseases. There are some reports of outbreaks of yellow fever and other tropical diseases in the south and of plague, cholera and typhus in coastal cities. Diseases transmitted by insect, rodent and other animal vectors are on the increase. Reserve stocks of vaccines are practically non-existent or are inaccessible. Epidemics of certain of these and of other communicable diseases are anticipated.

8. FOOD. The total food supply is generally adequate to meet the nutritional needs of the remaining population. There are large remaining stocks of usable food, especially grain and livestock. In some areas serious local food shortages have resulted due to loss of
wholesale distribution facilities and to lack of transportation. In these areas and in areas affected by heavy fallout, survival depends to a large extent on the adequacy of home food stocks. Local shortages due to transportation or distribution problems are usually of one or several individual items, but not of all types of food. Day-to-day food production of such items as meat, eggs, dairy products and flour continues at a reduced level but adequate for the reduced population. Dairy production is moderately to severely curtailed in heavily contaminated areas. As transportation capability improves, the greatest remaining problem is in the distribution of food as a result of the extensive damage and destruction of wholesale warehouses, which were concentrated in attack areas.

a. When decay of radioactivity permits survivors located in heavily contaminated areas to leave the place where they have taken shelter, there will generally be usable stocks of food in local stores and warehouses adequate to meet needs until inshipments can be resumed. In some instances, local food shortages will occur. Salvage food stocks in evacuated areas will gradually become accessible and will usually be available to areas housing evacuees from such areas.

b. Food supplies in areas receiving little contamination are generally adequate. Rationing has been instituted by local authorities in many areas and will be instituted nationally as quickly as conditions permit. To conserve transportation for essential shipments, all localities have been directed to maximize the use of locally produced foods. Food surplus areas are receiving very limited inshipments of some types of food not produced or available locally.

c. Since existing food stocks cannot long take the place of continued new production, manpower and other resources must be made available in order to continue and, where necessary, restore essential production, processing and distribution.

d. No attempt is being made to give people their choice of the normal variety of food. Food items available in one area are not always available in another area. The real effort is to provide a diet adequate in quantity
and quality to maintain the health and vitality of an active population. Food deficit areas receive shipments of concentrated foods, with bulky items usually being used near where they are produced. National control is being established over all production, processing and shipments of food products to be used outside the immediate area in which they are produced.

9. WATER. The absolute necessity of potable water for survival is one of the most serious problems. Complete failure of the supply of potable water has resulted in attacked areas both because of the physical damage to systems and of power failures. Interruption of electric power has also disrupted water supply in other areas. It has been necessary to employ makeshift and primitive methods of supply and treatment. Supply of water in some evacuation areas is adequate and use of contaminated water is expected to result in additional casualties. Stopgap arrangements for providing potable water from local sources are in effect, but waste disposal is a serious health menace.

10. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES. Fire and blast have either completely destroyed or rendered unrepairable significant portions of the housing supply in and around attacked areas. The situation is further complicated by radiation which has made much of the remaining housing unusable for varying lengths of time and which precludes immediate repairs to damaged housing in contaminated areas. Only in isolated situations are the housing inventories adequate to rehouse survivors from adjoining attacked areas, and reentry into many target areas will not be possible for an indefinite period of time. Voluntary and enforced billeting measures and utilization of non-residential structures are being effected. Community facilities of all types have been extremely hard hit. Blast damage has not only disrupted major water and sewer networks, but has at the same time dangerously impaired the functioning of water and sewer facilities in peripheral areas otherwise unaffected by blast and fire damage.

11. MONETARY AND CREDIT SYSTEMS. The monetary and credit systems have collapsed in damaged areas and are under severe pressure in those areas overrun with refugees and in the areas where evacuees are concentrated. In transactions occurring in these areas the price structure is rising sharply as to some essentials while collapsing as to other goods and services. Bartering, unorganized confiscation
and looting are in evidence and threaten further any restoration of an orderly degree of economic activity. Because of the breakdown of interrelationships between the financial and banking system and the production and distribution functions, personal and business financial transactions in physically undamaged areas threaten to reach a standstill.

12. DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS. Minimum nationwide telephone and telegraph facilities remain available to provide for the exchange of urgent communications except with those areas actually attacked and destroyed, and with those areas in which communications facilities have been sabotaged. The loss of commercial power sources, together with a serious personnel problem created by loss of specialized manpower through casualties, sickness and confusion, the fear of radiation, and lack of food and water, seriously limits employing the remaining communication facilities to their full capacity. Consequently there are long delays in placing all but the most urgent telephone calls as well as in the delivery of telegraph messages.

13. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS. International radiotelegraph, radiotelephone and cable control terminals located in gateway cities on the east and west coasts have been destroyed. Damage from sabotage has occurred at cable landing locations on both the east and west coasts and the cutting of the ocean telephone cable has severely reduced the submarine cable capacity for handling telegraph and telephone traffic to Atlantic, Hawaiian, and Alaskan points. Limited radiotelegraph and radiotelephone capability remains, however, but is unreliable due to electronic jamming, damage to facilities at overseas locations, sabotage efforts and radiological contamination effects upon surviving technical and operating personnel. Air mail is being employed where available and practicable to supplement the reduced capabilities of the overseas communications network.

14. TRANSPORTATION. Severe disruption to transportation service exists in all attacked and contaminated areas. Within the attacked areas there has been heavy damage to terminal, warehousing, servicing and related facilities. Within contaminated areas, access to some of these facilities has been denied. Motor vehicles in non-attacked areas free of contamination, including those not previously engaged in common carrier service, are being mustered for use in support of disaster areas as fast as trained manpower can be made available. Rail transportation is affected more seriously by disruption of lines and yards
in attacked areas than by loss of rolling stock. Large quantities of rail and highway motive power and equipment were not damaged, making it possible to continue minimum essential traffic within those areas not unduly affected by contamination and to restore principal lines to service as rapidly as radioactive decay or decontamination measures permit opening lines which bypass the physically damaged areas insofar as the availability of trained manpower will permit. However, transportation vehicles using petroleum products for motive power are depleting the reserve stocks rapidly. Unless these stocks can be replenished, idleness will be forced upon more and more of the prime movers in all forms of transportation.

a. In major port areas there has been heavy damage to piers, warehousing, shipbuilding and repair yards, and related facilities. Damage to shore-side cargo handling facilities has necessitated the use of alternate outloading ports and sites along the coasts and limitation of shipment to the current capacity, maintenance facilities and fuel supplies of those locations. Damage to reserve fleets has been minor, but reactivation is impeded by losses of repair yards, tugs and manpower. The worldwide distribution of merchant shipping at sea and in foreign ports has left the major part of the active fleet intact, but ship losses are nevertheless serious in light of immediate and heavy requirements for shipping to support and reinforce overseas military operations. Neither ships nor convoy protection in the vulnerable coastwise sealanes can be provided for other than direct military support, except in cases of extreme necessity in priority higher than that of the military. Ocean merchant shipping cannot be counted on to supplement or replace inland domestic surface transportation to any substantial extent.

b. Domestic airlift capacity has been decreased substantially due to damage and destruction of air fields and aircraft, lack of communications, navigational aides, manpower, repair parts, fuel and maintenance facilities. The remaining aircraft are largely devoted to high priority routes and highest priority traffic under the air priority system and other controls. Transocean airlift capacity is decreased substantially due to destruction of aircraft, damage to bases, circuitous reroutings and inadequate ground facility capability.
15. ELECTRIC POWER. Due, for the most part, to heavy damage to transmission and distribution lines and substations in attacked areas, sufficient electric power is not immediately available in the majority of the fringe areas and reception centers. Most acute need for power in such areas is for refrigeration, hospital operation, community water systems, heating, and mass feeding. Small portable generators can meet only a fraction of these needs. Aggregate generating capacity of electric utilities operable following the attack is sufficient for minimal national needs; therefore, the power shortages will be alleviated in most areas as soon as transmission and distribution lines can be repaired, new lines strung, interconnections effected and communications restored. Restoration of electric service will be slower than in cases of natural disaster. Anticipated delays are due to several factors, including shortage of available trained manpower, difficulty in transporting utility repair crews and materials from undamaged areas to augment those in areas of need, and denial of access into radioactive areas to make repairs and to obtain stocks of materials and equipment, new or salvable. Where primary sources of electric power have been destroyed, the power consuming facilities (industrial plants, stores, homes, etc.) have in large measure, likewise been destroyed. In most cases, there is sufficient generating capacity intact in the system, and through interconnections with other systems, to meet essential needs of the areas served. In those areas, however, sharp curtailment of supply to undamaged industrial plants will be necessary for an extended period. Enough skilled manpower has survived to operate generating plants. Fuel stocks at thermal generating plants using coal are adequate to keep plants operating for a minimum of 30 to 60 days even after allowance for possible use of a part of their stockpiles for other emergency purposes. Generating plants dependent solely on oil as a fuel can continue operating for a shorter period from stocks on hand, the time varying with the stock position of individual plants.

16. FUELS. Of all fuel (including petroleum products, gas, and solid fuels), motor fuels, including aviation, are the most universally used throughout the nation regardless of season. Therefore, even though movement of the mass of passenger automobiles is strictly limited, the availability of motor fuels for uses essential to human survival and military operations is of widespread and urgent concern. Among such uses are the operations of trucks, diesel locomotives, water transport, aircraft, tractors and other farm equipment needed for food production and a host of engines required for water supply, sanitary disposal systems and hospitals.
a. Initial military operations are being fueled almost entirely from stocks in military storage. Stocks of motor fuels in undamaged areas to and through which evacuees moved are nearly exhausted, despite rationing efforts by some local authorities. In many of these areas and in contiguous support areas, radioactivity temporarily immobilizes all transport and farming operations, thus halting consumption in wheeled equipment and simultaneously preventing replenishment of stocks. When radioactive decay permits resumption of activity, some consumers such as railroads, airlines, and to a lesser extent, certain farmers, can operate for a brief period using stocks on hand. Generally, however, there will be immediate heavy drain on bulk plant stocks.

b. In cold areas to and through which evacuees have moved, the situation with respect to cooking and heating fuels (kerosene, fuel oil, liquified petroleum gas, coal, and gas) is somewhat similar to that of motor fuels. Sheltering and feeding swollen populations in such areas are rapidly depleting cooking and heating fuels in homes and other buildings and, in communities served by natural gas, lowering pressure in distribution lines. Radiation prevents immediate replenishment of home stocks. When deliveries can be resumed local distributors' stocks of fuel oil, bottled gas, and coal will soon be gone. Local industrial and some utility stockpiles of coal can be tapped if needed for heating of hospitals, homes and shelters. At the outset, wood where available is providing essential warmth, but this cannot long meet needs of masses of people. Provision of minimum essential supplies of cooking and heating fuels will depend largely upon restoration of transportation and communications.

c. The physical productive capacity of oil and gas wells and coal mines has been little affected by the attack, but their operation in some areas is precluded temporarily by radioactivity making surface work hazardous. Even after decay permits work at these facilities, breaks in power service will temporarily prevent operation
of certain of them as well as some pipeline pumping stations. A substantial percentage of above-ground fuel facilities in attacked areas -- including petroleum refineries, pipeline terminals, tank farms, gas compressor stations, and coal handling equipment at rail and port terminals -- has been destroyed or extensively damaged. Destruction of docks, tanks and refineries in coastal areas has drastically curtailed intercoastal movement and importation of petroleum and petroleum products by tankers. Inland, the disruption of and damage to railroas water-way, and highway transport at or near urban centers will continue to hamper distribution of both coal and petroleum products.

d. The non-military requirements for fuels will be much smaller than pre-attack requirements, since millions of fuel consuming units -- particularly residences, commercial buildings, electric power generating plants, and factories -- have disappeared in the bombing. With strict rationing of petroleum products and allocation of coal, the surviving fuel production capacity is sufficient to meet properly timephased military requirements and minimum essential civilian needs for both motor fuel and heating fuel and, also, progressively to supply reviving industries. Refinery yields will be adjusted to fit the pattern of needs for particular petroleum products depending on the season of the attack and military requirements. Nevertheless, due mainly to transportation difficulties, severe, localized shortages of one fuel or another from time to time during the next several months should be anticipated.

17. MANPOWER. In assessing the survival and emergency work to be done, total manpower requirements substantially exceed the available supply. Although manpower priorities have been established in individual local areas, the difficulties of communicating with higher levels of government have resulted in conflicting demands on certain support areas. Some survival activities are experiencing support surpluses while others cannot function because needed support is lacking.

a. The provision of effective manpower support is jeopardized by the dislocation and disorganization of the general population. In many communities evacuation took place in anticipation of further attack. People are
is slow, and previously identified skills cannot be located until the evacuated population is re-established in the home community. It will be some time before manpower in such areas can be organized to provide needed support to devastated areas and to restore essential services and production.

b. In many localities radioactivity and particularly the fear of this unseen hazard have temporarily immobilized a tremendous proportion of the manpower which would otherwise be immediately available. Denial of access to large areas because of the hazard has compounded the already major problems in transportation of labor to the point of need.

c. In many localities there is a surplus of manpower in certain skilled occupations which could be used if necessary equipment and supplies were available. Difficulty has been encountered in trying to contain evacuated populations in relocation centers around cities which have been attacked so that they do not further endanger their lives by moving into hazardous areas. Many thousands of people are trying to reach the homes of friends and relatives. As a consequence, the size of the labor force and the skill distribution within the relocated area change continuously. The instability of this situation adversely affects the recruitment of specific skills within the area, and throws askew the labor assessments necessary to balance manpower demand with available supply with a minimum of population shift. Effective use of manpower is further reduced by the unavoidable effects of lowered resistance, psychological shock, and varying degrees of exposure to radiation.

d. In relocation areas, utilization of available unskilled manpower for necessary emergency work is most inefficient because of lack of managerial personnel and trained technicians and of other leaders and sub-leaders previously trained and organized. Training programs offer a solution but only for short-term skill development.
18. ESSENTIAL PRODUCTION. As in all other areas of economic activity the effect of the attack on levels of production can best be described in time phases. There is an immediate and virtually complete paralysis of the production effort, even in non-damaged and slightly damaged areas. Following this phase, the gradual return of workers to their places of employment sets in motion a slow recovery cycle, manifesting itself first in scattered, undamaged and non-hazardous areas. As the radioactivity decays in decontamination is started the areas of recovery expand, limited by manpower shortages as well as transportation bottlenecks and breakdowns in supplies of processed materials and parts. Two major factors determine achievable levels of production.

a. A first major limitation will arise from the damage to the chain of production. The pre-attack production levels achieved in this country resulted from the functioning of a highly complex operation, in which many thousands of contributors to over-all production were bound together through the inter-relationships of the production processes. Suppliers of raw materials, fabricators of metal shapes and forms, manufacturers of components and subassemblies, and final product producers all contributed to the flow of production in such a manner that, by and large, items necessary for successive steps in the productive process were available when and where needed. It is impossible to measure the damage to this chain of production in all of its ramifications. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that the process has suffered severe damage, not immediately repairable. It will take months to determine the bottlenecks and dislocations, and many more months to overcome shortages and imbalances. The resumption of any sizeable production effort will, of course, be dependent on the extent to which necessary services -- power, transportation, communications, etc. -- can be provided.

b. A second major limitation is the number and types of workers available for production purposes, particularly in the first several months. As the need
for workers for emergency civil defense efforts lessens, more persons will become available for the production of goods and services. However, even after the first several months, manpower will impose a restriction on the size of the production program, because of manpower losses, the assignment of manpower to other activities and the lower productivity of the available utilized labor force. The breakdown in the production process will also result in lowered industrial productivity, for which more manpower will be required to complete the same quota of production.

19. STOCKPILES OF CRITICAL AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS. Due to the pre-attack dispersal of the Federal government's stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, the major portion of stockpiles of most of the 75 different materials involved have survived the blast and thermal effects of the attack. About one-third of the stocks of destructible materials (mainly agricultural products for industrial use, including oils, fibers and rubber) were still in target areas at time of attack, and losses of these must be calculated on the basis of the actual damage pattern. The amount of most of the destructible materials, surviving, however, is equal to 100 per cent of the procurement priority level previously established for these materials. No substantial losses of bulky metal and mineral stockpiles have resulted from blast or thermal effects.

   a. In general, the destruction of plants which, prior to the attack, consumed the various types of materials in the stockpiles has been proportionately greater than that suffered by the stockpiles themselves. Therefore, the quantities of stockpiled materials which physically survived the attack are adequate to meet the requirements of the remaining consumer plants.

   b. The extent to which remaining stockpiles materials are affected by radioactive fallout as a result of the attack cannot be ascertained immediately. Radiological monitoring of stockpiles in fallout areas will have to be done when access to the areas becomes possible. Where the material is thus found to be radioactive, the rate of normal decay of radioactivity in the material, and also the efficacy and practicability of decontamination will have to be determined. Only after these findings are
made will it be possible to ascertain the time-phasing of availability of usable material from radioactive stockpiles.

c. Little demand for stockpiled materials, except for narcotics, is expected during the first 60 to 90 days after attack. The processors of metals and minerals (the largest category of stockpiled materials) usually have sufficient inventories available to operate for a period of at least 60 to 90 days. The same is generally true of users of most other categories of stockpiled materials. If consuming plants are operable soon after attack, it is probable that their inventories of raw materials also survived and are usable, even though requiring decontamination in some cases.

d. Denial of access to points, or areas through which personnel and service transportation equipment must pass, to examine and obtain some of the stockpiles for use in plants in unaffected areas may be a delaying factor. There will be a problem of marshaling transportation for movement of bulky materials from surviving, usable stockpiles to distant surviving plants needing them. Air transport of certain materials will be feasible and justified in some instances. The transportation conditions which will delay movement of stockpiles materials will, in many cases, slow down the flow of other raw materials with which they are used at consuming plants. Therefore, transportation of stockpiled materials should not generally be a limiting factor in production by plants utilizing such materials.
PART II - MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES

MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES consist of statements adopted to give direction to the planning process. They are designed to meet the objectives described in the PURPOSE OF THE PLAN.

Although it may be possible to take certain Federal actions during and soon after attack, the implementation of others could vary considerably in time from rapid action in some UNDAMAGED AREAS to a lag in implementation in DAMAGED AREAS. Nevertheless, all executive elements of the Federal government, including field establishments, will assume, for planning purposes, that the Federal government will implement these MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES.

A. MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT AND ORDER

1. The President, under his constitutional and statutory authorities, directly or by delegation, will take or direct whatever actions are essential for national security and survival.

2. The Director, OCDM, acting for the President, will coordinate and direct the civil defense and defense mobilization activities of the Federal Government.

3. Initial reliance for Federal executive actions will be placed on the existing departments and agencies (Annex C) with emergency agencies to be established later as conditions may warrant or require (Annex D).

4. Federal executive agencies will operate from relo-cated headquarters and field establishments. Pending the resumption of effective centralized control, Federal regional and other field officials will act in accordance with prepositioned directives, pre-arranged plans, including alternate headquarters and lines of succession and decentralized authority provided by the agencies concerned. All units will carry out operational assignments of an emergency character including pre-emergency plans for continuity of their essential functions and aid to the states for civil defense operations.

5. The Regional Directors, OCDM, will coordinate and direct the civil defense and defense mobilization activities of Federal agency field establishments within their regions, when higher author-ity cannot do so, or under either of these circumstances:
a. Upon request of the Federal agency, State or locality involved.

b. At the specific direction of the Director, OCDM.

6. Primary reliance will continue to be placed on the state and local governments for the performance of normal civil functions and such other functions as may be specified in prearranged plans, and initial Federal efforts will be to increase their effectiveness. However, when requested by a state government or when a state government is unable or unwilling to perform essential civil functions, Federal authority will be relied upon to ensure performance of such functions.

7. Military assistance will be made temporarily available by Federal military commanders for civil defense operations upon request, such assistance being rendered as necessary and to the extent that it can be made available without prejudicing essential military operations or their direct support.

8. A national emergency and a civil defense emergency will be proclaimed.

9. If not in session, the Congress will be convened as soon as possible. Standby legislation will become effective and requests for additional emergency legislation will be transmitted.

10. Funds will be made available to Federal agencies for emergency operations.

11. Actions will be taken to support the restoration and functioning of the economic system including banking and credit.

12. A Federal order will be issued imposing immediate ceilings on prices, wages, salaries and rents, and steps will be taken to ensure equitable distribution of essential consumer goods.

13. Internal security measures will be implemented.
14. Domestic public information programs will be implemented.

15. Censorship will be imposed including implementation of the voluntary Censorship Code for public media.

B. SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS & MILITARY ALLIANCES

1. Members and units of the reserve components of the Armed Forces will be ordered to active Federal duty as required.

2. Military aid to allies will be reviewed.

3. The Department of Defense will, as necessary, place calls for inductees on the Selective Service System within strength ceilings established by the President.

4. Economic warfare activities will be carried out.

C. SURVIVAL OF THE POPULATION

1. Radiological defense monitoring and the application of protective measures will be taken to reduce further casualties from the effects of residual radiation.

2. Priority will be prescribed for post-attack medical care directed toward maintaining the health of the surviving well population and the return to productive activity of the greatest possible number of casualties and non-casualty sick and injured. The level of care will be as high as possible, but priorities will be governed by the national rather than the individual needs.

3. Enforced billeting will be authorized.

4. Rationing will be imposed on consumer goods.

5. Restrictions will be imposed on population movement.

6. Welfare services and assistance, financial or in kind, will be furnished to all persons in need.
D. USE OF RESOURCES FOR ESSENTIAL PURPOSES

1. Federal controls will be imposed on production, construction, distribution, manpower, health services, food, housing, transportation, communications, fuel, power and water resources.

2. For industrial and agricultural production, priority will be given to the resumption and continuation of operations that can produce material urgently required for military operations and new supplies of survival items and services.

3. Federal requisitioning will be authorized to acquire goods, property and services for immediately essential programs when other means of procurement do not meet requirements.

4. International trade will become subject to further regulation.

5. Non-military and economic aid to allies and neutrals will be reviewed and adjusted.

6. An embargo with respect to selected destinations will be placed on non-military exports regardless of ownership. Release will be dependent upon inventory and allocation arrangements.

7. Import restrictions such as tariffs, customs regulations, etc., will be suspended to the extent necessary to facilitate the receipt of necessary supplies and discharge of ship cargo.

8. American-owned foreign assets and gold which can be used to purchase supplies from abroad will be controlled and financial transactions regulated as necessary.

E. MAINTENANCE OF FREE WORLD UNITY

1. U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic relations with each country will be re-examined, with a view to strengthening our alliances and obtaining support from friendly and neutral countries.

2. International arrangements will be established for the supply and allocation of necessary goods and services and for the coordination of information.
3. Foreign information activities directed to friendly, enemy and neutral countries will deal with statements of intentions and purposes of U.S. policy; statements of war objectives; programs of the U.S. in withstanding and recovering from attacks; free world retaliation against the enemy; and statements covering U.S. foreign economic policies and assistance to free-world countries.
PART III - PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

(REFERENCE: ANNEX E TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS "PROCEDURES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS")

The Summary Statements listed in this Part III describes actions the President may wish to take in the circumstances described in the General Situation Assumption, page 5. Documents for such actions shall be prepared as prescribed in Annex "E". They shall be premised on the General Situation Assumption. When completed, the documents shall be held in readiness for use by the President as he in his discretion shall determine in such an emergency.

Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements assume a civil-defense emergency with reliance upon statutory authorities where available. Where such authorities are not available, and the probable delay which would be occasioned by obtaining such authorities would jeopardize the national security, the extraordinary powers of the President under the Constitution shall be used as legal authority for the required actions. Appropriate legislation, as listed in this Part III, will be requested as soon as possible.

Presidential Actions prescribe and implement national policy, assign responsibilities, and delegate authority. Planning is based on the assumption that the President will take these actions when the described situation occurs or at an appropriate time thereafter. All other planning and readiness measures to meet the situation will be consistent therewith.

It should be clearly understood that the assumption that the President will take these actions is made for planning purposes. In an actual situation, the President retains the authority and responsibility for decisions according to his evaluation of conditions. Decisions would include whether or not to take the various actions, the scope of actions if taken, when and in what sequence, and other considerations.
IDENTIFICATION NUMBER - The identification number of the Summary Statement and the implementing document is enclosed in parentheses at the end of the statement.

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - Designated in parentheses at the end of the Summary Statement is the agency having primary responsibility for necessary pre-emergency planning in connection with the Statement, including necessary preparation and coordination within the Executive Branch, the preparation of the implementing document, and performance of annual review.

H-HOUR ACTIONS - Actions to be considered immediately by the President wherever he may be, upon enemy attack, or intelligence to the effect that attack has been launched even though physical damage to the U.S. has not yet occurred.

D-DAY ACTIONS - Actions to be considered as soon as possible on D-Day.

RESERVE ACTIONS - Actions to be considered as soon as the prevailing conditions demonstrate the need therefore.

PRE-EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES - Delegations of authority which have already been promulgated and emergency statutes already enacted (or which are proposed for promulgation or enactment in the near future and prior to the emergency), and which will become operative automatically upon enemy attack.
H-HOUR ACTIONS

1. PROCLAMATION of the existence of an unlimited national emergency and a state of civil defense emergency. (A1-53)(OCDM)

2. PROCLAMATION that an act of war has been perpetrated against the United States. (A1-64)(OCDM)

3. PROCLAMATION providing that whenever the Director of OCDM determines that a state government or political subdivision thereof is unable or unwilling to perform essential civil functions, (1) the Director shall discharge all necessary functions of such local civil government, (2) military commanders shall make available to the Director and Regional Directors of OCDM those resources not needed for the conduct of military operations and (3) officials of local civil governments and of Federal departments and agencies shall make any necessary requests for military assistance to the Regional Directors. (A1-69)(OCDM)

4. PROCLAMATION authorizing the Secretary of Defense, where necessary to maintain public order and enforce Federal, State and local laws. (A1-42 REV 11/58)(OCDM)

(NOTE: Proclamation A1-42 (REV 11/58) would be issued only if the provisions of A1-69 were not adequate to meet the situation.)

5. PROCLAMATION authorizing Secretary of Defense to establish and govern military areas. (A1-70)(OCDM)

6. PROCLAMATION convening Congress if not in session. (A1-48) (Justice)

7. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for civil defense measures and the mobilization of the nation's resources. The Order provides for the utilization of the personnel, materials, facilities, and services of Federal Agencies during the civil defense emergency, and prescribes (1) extraordinary functions of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and (2) responsibilities for the performance of functions by existing departments and agencies with respect to health services, welfare services, communications, food, energy and minerals, housing, manpower, production, stabilization and transport, pending the possible establishment of emergency agencies and the transfer of such functions thereto. (A1-16 REV)(OCDM)
8. PROCLAMATION concerning the documentary requirements applicable to persons seeking to enter or leave the United States. (A1-98)(State)

(NOTE: Proclamation A1-98 requires issuance in a Plan C situation; it also governs the documentary requirements in a Plan D-Minus situation along with Proclamation A1-99 which applies to actual physical control of persons seeking to cross our borders.)

9. PROCLAMATION authorizing the control of persons entering or leaving the United States. (A1-99)(Justice)

10. PROCLAMATION for the control of alien enemies. (A1-7)(Justice)

11. PROCLAMATION authorizing apprehension of persons considered dangerous to the national security. (A1-8)(Justice)


13. EXECUTIVE ORDER for the control of weather reports and coordination of civil meteorological facilities. (A1-9)(Defense)

14. EXECUTIVE ORDER authorizing Secretary of State to institute measures of protection, surveillance and control of certain foreign diplomatic, consular and other official personnel. (A1-28 REV 5/58)(State)

15. PROCLAMATION authorizing Secretary of Defense to exclude from defense facilities persons whom it is reasonable to believe might engage in sabotage, espionage, or any other subversive act. (A1-24)(Defense)

16. EXECUTIVE ORDER (1) establishing Office of Censorship and requiring Director thereof to censor communications crossing the borders of the United States, its territories or possessions; and (2) directing Secretary of Defense to perform such censorship functions until Office of Censorship develops operational readiness. (A4-2 REV 5/58)(OCDM)

17. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing control over communications with respect to position and movement of ships. (A1-73)(Defense)
EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the establishment of an alternate system for filing and publishing executive agency documents. (A1-59)(GSA)

EXECUTIVE ORDER concerning augmentation of the Armed Forces, (1) suspending all limitations on their personnel strength; (2) requiring military personnel to serve until six months after the war or emergency whichever is later; (3) extending liability for registration and performance of military service to all men 18 to 46 years of age, inclusive; (4) suspending any restrictions on territorial use of any unit or individual; (5) providing that members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces may be called to active duty by Secretary of Defense; and (6) prohibiting enlistment of males except under Universal Military Training and Service Act. (A1-54 REV 5/58)(Defense)

PROCLAMATION regarding national policies relating to resources and the financial and economic system. (A1-51 REV 7/58)(OCDM)

EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Stabilization Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-96)(OCDM)

EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Transport Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-97)(OCDM)

EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Communications Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-90)(OCDM)

EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing military jurisdiction over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone. (A1-11)(Defense)

EXECUTIVE ORDER directing the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy. (A1-62 REV 8/58)(Defense)

EXECUTIVE ORDER regarding control of vessels in territorial waters of the United States and the Canal Zone. (A1-12 REV 7/58)(Defense)

EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the establishment and operation of an Emergency Financial System for operation of the Federal Government. (A1-56)(BoB)
111. **EXECUTIVE ORDER** amending Executive Order 10501, as amended, by authorizing additional Federal agencies to classify defense information. (A1-57)(Justice)

112. **EXECUTIVE ORDER** declaring the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service to be a military service and prescribing regulations therefor. (A1-1)(HEW)

113. **EXECUTIVE ORDER** suspending requirements as to display of lights and sounding of signals on board U. S. vessels. (A1-76) (Defense)

114. **EXECUTIVE ORDER** eliminating the requirement that the seal of the United States be affixed to Proclamations issued by the President. (A1-119)(Justice)

115. List of Topics to be considered for possible inclusion in a Presidential Statement to the people as to the state of the nation after attack. (A1-66)(OCDM)
RESERVE ACTIONS

201. MESSAGE to Congress requesting the declaration of a state of war with related Joint Resolution of Congress declaring the existence of a state of war and confirming and ratifying Presidential actions taken after attack on the United States. (A1-67 Reserve)(Justice)

202. REPORT to Congress on interim actions that have been taken for the handling of executive affairs. (A1-61 Reserve)(Justice)

203. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Food Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-91 Reserve)(OCDM)

204. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Energy and Minerals agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-92 Reserve)(OCDM)

205. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Housing Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-93 Reserve)(OCDM)

206. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Manpower Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-94 Reserve)(OCDM)

207. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Health and Welfare Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-102 Reserve)(OCDM)

208. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Production Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-95 Reserve)(OCDM)

209. EXECUTIVE ORDER directing the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to order on behalf of the President, the curtailment or discontinuance of non-essential functions in the Executive Branch and for agencies to make available for performance of essential functions funds, personnel, material, and facilities made available by such curtailment or discontinuance. (A1-68 Reserve)(BoB)

210. PROCLAMATION establishing the Cristobal and the Gulf of Panama Maritime Control areas and prescribing regulations for the control thereof. (A1-10 Reserve)(Defense)

(NOTE: This requires negotiation by Department of State with Government of the Republic of Panama before issuance.)
211. EXECUTIVE ORDER authorizing Secretary of State to control all property within the United States owned or controlled by the diplomatic or consular establishments or personnel of certain governments. (A1-29 Reserve)(State)

212. EXECUTIVE ORDER designating authorities to certify the essentiality of access roads to permit construction of such roads to serve new sources of raw materials under provisions of the Defense Highways Act of 1941 and 1950, as amended and reenacted (23 USC 210). (A1-115 Reserve)(Commerce)

213. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for military aid to allies. (A1-79 Reserve)(Defense)

214. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for non-military aid to allies. (A1-114 Reserve)(State)

215. EXECUTIVE ORDER supplementing authority already delegated to the Secretary of Treasury for the facilitation of lending operations. (A1-113 Reserve)(Treasury)

216. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the protection of banking institutions and the restoration of normal banking and loan operations. (A1-101 Reserve)(FRB)

217. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the protection of savings and loan institutions and the restoration of normal savings and loan operations. (A1-102 Reserve)(FHLBB)


220. THE WAR RESOURCES ACT, a Bill providing for (1) priorities and allocations, (2) authority to requisition, (3) expansion of productive capacity and supply (4) acquisition and disposition of real property, (5) emergency contracting authority, (6) plant seizures, (7) emergency foreign assistance, (8) price and wage stabilization, (9) control of consumer and real estate credit, (10) employment control, (11) settlement of labor disputes, (12) censorship of communications, (13) general provisions. (A1-26 Reserve)(OCDM)
with civilian personnel problems in the Executive Branch. (Al-83 Reserve)(CSC)

222. A BILL to establish the Federal Emergency Financial System. (Al-84 Reserve)(BoB)

223. A BILL to provide for additional tax revenues. (Al-80 Reserve) (Treasury)

224. A BILL to authorize an increase in the statutory public debt limit. (Al-81 Reserve)(Treasury)

225. A BILL authorizing the President to provide for the summary exclusion from national defense facilities of certain individuals who may engage in sabotage, espionage, or other willful activity intended to disrupt the national defense program. (Al-103 Reserve)(Defense)

226. A BILL establishing control over communications with respect to the position and movement of ships. (Al-104 Reserve)(Defense)

227. A BILL authorizing the actions under items (1) through (5) of Item 102. Legislation is not required for item (6). (Al-105 Reserve)(Defense)

228. A BILL authorizing the suspension of requirements of statutes with respect to display of light and sounding of signals on board certain vessels. (Al-106 Reserve)(Defense)

229. A BILL which would bar suit against the United States arising out of certain combatant or warlike activities of military vessels of the United States. (Al-107 Reserve)(Defense)


231. A BILL providing for non-military aid to allies. (Al-110 Reserve)(State)

232. A BILL to amend section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, removing the existing limitation of $5,000,000,000 on the direct purchase by Federal Reserve Banks of Government obligations. (Al-111 Reserve)(Treasury)
233. A BILL to exempt from reserve requirements deposits payable to the United States by Federal Reserve member banks arising solely as the result of subscriptions made by such member banks for United States Government securities, and to exclude such deposits from the definition of "deposits" for the purpose of determining the assessment base for any insured bank. (Al-112 Reserve) (Treasury)

234. A BILL to provide for the continued operation of the banking system of the United States during the present war emergency, and for other purposes. (Al-117 Reserve)(FRB)

235. A BILL to provide for the continued operation of the savings and loan institutions of the United States during the present war emergency, and for other purposes. (Al-118 Reserve)(FHLBB)
PRE-EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES

301. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10705, dated April 17, 1957, delegates authority to the Director, OCDM, pursuant to Sections 305 and 606 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The authority contained in subsections 305(a) and 606(a) may be performed "only during the continuance of a war in which the United States is engaged," and the authority contained in subsections 606(c) and (d) may be performed "only upon proclamation by the President that there exists a state of war involving the United States." (OCDM)

302. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10638, dated October 10, 1955, authorizes the Director, OCDM, to order the release of strategic and critical materials from stockpiles in the event of an enemy attack upon the Continental United States. (OCDM)
PART IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM

Actions by the Director, OCDM, listed in this Part IV, are those required to be taken to meet the described situation. The authority for taking these actions is found in two places: (1) current statutes and Presidential delegations, and (2) Presidential Actions in Part III.

Planning is based on the assumption that the Director will take these actions shortly after the described situation occurs. All other planning and readiness measures will be consistent there-with.

It should be clearly understood that the assumption that the Director will take these actions is made for planning purposes. In an actual situation, actions by the Director would depend on his evaluation of the situation and actions by the President.

The OCDM is responsible for ensuring all necessary pre-emergency planning in connection with an action, including necessary preparation and coordination.

The identification number of the action statement is indicated in parentheses at the end of the statement. For instance, DO-1 indicates Plan D-Minus, OCDM, Number 1.


3. Resource Directive No. 1, Delegation of priorities and allocation authority and policy for its use. (D)-20


14. Resource Directive No. 12, Federal agency personnel, material, facilities, and services for civil defense purposes. (DO-31)

15. Resource Directive No. 13, Coordination of activities to suppress fires in rural areas. (DO-32)

17. Resource Directive No. 15, Damage assessment surveys and reports. (DO-34)


20. Resource Directive No. 18, Mobilization and use of Nation's health resources. (DO-37)


25. Damage Assessment Memorandum No. 1, Aerial reconnaissance in support of national damage assessment program. (DO-42)

26. Health Directive No. 1, Minimum health standards to apply in areas of relocated people and facilities. (DO-43)

27. Health Directive No. 2, Standards for use and/or emergency construction of water, sewerage, and other sanitation facilities. (DO-44)


29. Letter request to the Secretary of State pertaining to the availability of foreign resources. (DO-46)