EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN
D-MINUS

APRIL 1959
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Washington 25, D. C.

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PROMULGATION

FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D-MINUS has been prepared in accordance with provisions of Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 USC 404); Section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 USC App. 2062); the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 USC App. 2251-2297); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, as amended (5 USC 1332-15 Note) Executive Order 10346 (17 F.R. 3477), as amended; and Executive Order 10480 (18 F.R. 4939), as amended.

The information contained herein provides direction and guidance for readiness planning and emergency operations to meet the described situation.

It is the responsibility of each department and agency to prepare operational plans through all organizational levels appropriate to its emergency functions. This includes taking necessary staffing, programming and budgetary actions, in accordance with the President's budget policy, sufficiently in advance so that a satisfactory condition of readiness, verified by periodic exercises, will exist at all times. Periodic reports of readiness conditions will be submitted as requested.

This plan will remain under constant review and be subject to continual revision with consideration being given to such national and international factors as variations in the threats to national security, status of alliances, readiness of civil defense and United States and Allied military capabilities.

The classified parts of this document contain information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. For training and planning purposes, however, including the development of implementing plans by agencies, a department or agency head having responsibility pursuant to this plan is authorized to meet that responsibility by issuance of a department or agency directive or other appropriate instrument which may contain all or some of the language assigning the responsibility providing that no reference is made to the plan and that the language in the agency instrument so issued be presented as the language of the agency itself. Agency instruments will be classified pursuant to Executive Order 10501.

[Signature]
Leo A. Hazen
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1. FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLAN D-MINUS prescribes policies and actions and provides for implementing documents that will be required by the Federal Government during and after crippling attack on the United States, its overseas bases and on its allies. This plan gives uniform guidance to the departments and agencies concerned not only in planning for post-attack activities, but also in current programming actions designed to improve readiness to meet the situation.

2. Part I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS. Statements to give uniform direction to the Planning process by describing the assumed situation.

3. Part II - MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES. Statements of Federal policies required to meet the described situation.

4. Part III - ACTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT. Summary Statements of Presidential Actions implementing MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES.

5. Part IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM. Summary Statements of Actions required for the control of resources and for Federal direction of civil defense operations.

6. ANNEXES. Additions which are essential to completeness and understanding.

7. APPENDICES. Implementing plans.

8. IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTS. Actual documents or drafts of documents required to implement actions in Parts III and IV are distributed separately from the plan.
GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION

The Plan is based on an assumed international situation involving actual or imminent surprise attack on the United States and its allies so crippling in effect as to impair governmental control, seriously reduce military strength, produce millions of casualties, disrupt industrial and agricultural production and endanger the existence of the nation and the free world.
PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

1. To prescribe policies and actions and to provide for implementing documents that will be required by the Federal Government during and after crippling attack on the United States, its overseas bases and on its allies. Objectives of planned policies and actions are:
   a. To maintain form and authority of government.
   b. To support military operations and military alliances.
   c. To ensure survival of the remaining population and recovery of the nation.
   d. To ensure most effective use of resources.
   e. To maintain free-world unity.

2. To describe planning and operational functions.

3. To provide planning policies with which all directives, delegations and assignments of responsibility to departments and agencies will be consistent.

4. To serve as a guide for coordinating individual agency current programming actions and other readiness measures in order that the total national effort will be unified and properly interrelated.

5. To describe emergency organizations which may be established as conditions warrant or require.
PART I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

A. CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS

CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS are statements of capabilities at this time of the USSR and assumed advance warning capabilities of our own forces. CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS are not statements of intent. USSR CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS, as well as all other assumptions in Part I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS, are consistent with current intelligence. It is within the range and scope of the CAPABILITY ASSUMPTIONS that ATTACK and DAMAGE ASSUMPTIONS have been developed.

THE USSR IS CAPABLE OF:

1. Supporting a large scale war effort.

2. Providing military aid to its allies such as production equipment and facilities; military equipment and supplies; research, development, engineering and training information and missions; and military intelligence.

3. Providing political aid to its allies such as financial and other assistance to the governing communist organizations; military assistance in suppression of internal disturbances; world-wide espionage, propaganda, psychological warfare and subversion; and support of their activities in the United Nations.

4. Providing economic aid to neutrals and to allies of the United States such as financial grants and loans; barter arrangements for international trade; production equipment and facilities; research,
development, engineering and training information and missions; and commercial intelligence.

5. Producing nuclear weapons of varying yields ranging from a few kilotons to several megatons of TNT equivalent, biological and chemical agents, and incendiary and high explosive weapons.

6. Delivering these weapons anywhere within the United States and upon U.S. deployed forces and allies by various means including aircraft, submarines, missiles or by clandestine means.

7. Fusing these weapons for air or surface burst or for delayed action, and for detonation at appropriate altitude even though the vehicle is successfully attacked.

WARNING CAPABILITIES:

1. Missiles may arrive without warning. Likewise, weapons emplaced by clandestine means may be set off without warning.

2. An air raid warning of an initial mass attack by aircraft can be received on the Canadian border and the Atlantic, Pacific and Gulf coasts from a few minutes to three hours before the aircraft reach those boundaries. Intelligence as to the probable time attacking aircraft will take to reach specific areas can be available through the Attack Warning System.

3. Interior areas can have one to three hours additional warning between the time an air defense warning is received and the time when they are under attack from aircraft.

4. Strategic warning is a possibility.
PART I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

B. ATTACK ASSUMPTIONS

The GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION (p. 5) assumes an international situation involving actual or imminent surprise attack on the United States and its allies so crippling in effect as to impair governmental control, seriously reduce military strength, produce millions of casualties, disrupt industrial and agricultural production, and endanger the existence of the nation and the free world. The circumstances described in the GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION could result from various forms of enemy attack, involving the exercise by the enemy of some or all of its capabilities. For assistance in planning, however, the Attack Assumptions which follow describe a particular form of attack -- employing nuclear weapons possibly in conjunction with biological and chemical agents -- which is representative in that its consequences could be of the magnitude described in the GENERAL SITUATION ASSUMPTION.

1. The USSR has made attacks with large numbers of nuclear weapons on the United States and on its territories, possessions, bases overseas and on its allies. Coincident with the sounding of the domestic air raid warning a devastating missile attack was made on prime military targets and weapons emplaced by clandestine means were detonated. Some two hours after the air raid warning was disseminated USSR aircraft appeared over U.S. frontiers. The major weight of the Attack has been delivered by aircraft.

2. A very high percentage of the missiles penetrated our missile defenses, however air defense operations in North America and overseas have destroyed a substantial portion of the attacking aircraft but half of those destroyed had reached the bomb release lines and had released their weapons. U.S. and allied military operations have resulted in casualties and damage to the enemy at least as great as those received. Notwithstanding severe losses of military and civilian personnel and materiel, air operations against the enemy are continuing and our land and naval forces are heavily engaged. Both sides are making use of nuclear weapons for tactical air support in land and sea operations.
B. ATTACK ASSUMPTIONS

3. The USSR is expected to use its remaining capability to launch additional strategic air attacks and has considerable air power for tactical and air defense operations. The USSR submarine fleet is active in both the Atlantic and Pacific and serious losses to U.S. and allied controlled ocean shipping are being incurred. Intensive propaganda is being directed against the U.S. and its allies. Clandestine activities and sabotage are being conducted. It is expected that bacteriological and chemical warfare agents may be employed.

4. Both on the North American Continent and overseas, the major weight of the attacks appears to have been directed on U.S. and allied military installations including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities and facilities producing nuclear weapons, coastal naval bases, concentrations of ground and air defense forces, and ports and airfields servicing international transportation. In addition, the District of Columbia and many population and industrial centers remote from military facilities have been attacked. Due to actions of Air Defense Forces and to aiming and other errors of the attacking forces, many weapons resulted in random surface bursts.

5. The weapons employed range from a few kilotons TNT equivalent to several megatons. All of the weapons in the megaton range burst on the surface. The great majority of the weapons in the kiloton range were air bursts. Blast and thermal radiation damage extends from 5 miles to as much as 15 miles from ground zeros. Severe fire storms and mass fires have occurred in heavily built-up cities and many rural fires were started involving growing crops and forests. Fires in rural areas have blocked or hindered rail, highway and air transportation routes, damaged communication and power transmission systems and cut off many evacuation routes. The surface bursts have resulted in widespread radioactive fallout of such intensity that over substantial parts of the U.S., the taking of shelter for considerable periods of time, not likely to exceed one month, is the only means of survival. Prior to assurance of safety anywhere on the surface, radiological intelligence is essential.

PART I - PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

C. DAMAGE ASSUMPTIONS

1. GENERAL. The attacks have almost completely paralyzed the functioning of the economic system, causing disruption of organized governmental activities, fragmentation of society into local groups, deterioration of our social standards, breakdown in our financial system,
and complete disruption of normal production processes. The proportion of human casualties exceeds the proportion of material losses. In spite of the magnitude of the catastrophe and the possibility of additional but lighter attacks, about 120,000,000 uninjured people and substantial material resources remain. Consequently, there is ultimate recuperative potential to meet the requirements of the surviving population. Restoration of our society and its economy is possible in spite of the existence of confusion, despair, bereavement and psychological deterioration.

2. TYPES OF AREAS. Some areas of the United States have completely destroyed; others are undamaged; and casualties in the remaining areas vary in intensity from place to place. The ability of a locality to recuperate from the attacks and support national objectives depends on whether it is in a:

a. Damaged Area: An area suffering from blast and thermal damage including secondary fires. This area, or part of it will usually be heavily contaminated by residual radiation.

b. Fallout Area: An area subject to residual nuclear radiation causing death and sickness, and thus preventing free movement of personnel. However, the pressure of elemental needs will drive many of the sheltered survivors out to face remaining radiation hazards.

c. Undamaged Area: An area free of blast and thermal damage and relatively free of residual nuclear radiation. Personnel may move freely without acquiring disabling radiation sickness, although in some instances personnel would be required to spend non-working time in shelters.

3. DAMAGED AREAS: In these areas the loss and damage to property is severe, and the death toll is high. Most of the remaining population is either sick or injured. The surviving injured outnumber the surviving uninjured. In the early post-attack period, contamination and debris prevent operations in and through the area and make surviving resources inaccessible. Communications have been destroyed or are inoperative, organized commercial, financial and industrial activities have ceased, the existing local government has been destroyed or greatly weakened and the morale of the surviving people is very low. These areas urgently need and are completely dependent upon outside aid and assistance. Whatever capability for control of resources might exist, would be limited to the simplest forms of allocation and rationing of basic goods and services essential to survival. Weeks, months and in some cases years, will elapse before remaining facilities can be safely used.
4. FALLOUT AREAS. These areas are largely free from property
damage but suffer many radiation casualties. The sickness ratio is
high and morale very low. Although commercial, financial and industri-
rial facilities may be intact, activities are seriously affected by radio-
active contamination and manpower losses, and by disrupted relations
with other business interests in the damaged areas. Communication
and transportation services are unreliable. Local governments in many
places are ineffective. In many cases resources, although intact, will
require decontamination before they can be used. Crops such as fresh
fruits and vegetables cannot be used without washing or peeling, and fur-
ther use of some land may be restricted to grazing of beef-type cattle,
hogs and sheep, or to the growing of non-food crops or crops with low
calcium content. Radiation casualties and fear of the population to subject
itself to further radiation hazards, limit or prevent movement of personnel
and support of military forces or damaged areas. In many areas relatives,
friends and neighbors furnish the only medical care available to the sick
and injured. Controls which may be imposed on resources will have
little effect until confidence is restored and the fear of radiation sickness
overcome.

5. UNDAMAGED AREAS. In these areas there is no property
damage or loss of life, and no sickness directly due to the attack. Those
State and local governments which are still functioning in these areas
are taking measures within Federal policies to assure the maintenance of
law and order and continued survival of the uninjured population, and to
provide aid to those on the fringes of the damaged and fallout areas.
Industrial, financial and commercial activities are seriously affected by
the destruction of resources located in damaged areas, and by the disrup-
tion of business relations with customers, suppliers, contractors and sub-
contractors, etc., located in damaged or fallout areas. Transportation and
communication services within the area are in operation but connections to
other areas are interrupted or destroyed. Although morale has been
shaken by reports from outside the area, it is much better than exists in
damaged and fallout areas. It is in these areas, that programs can be
undertaken to aid and assist the damaged and fallout areas, to support
military operations, and to reorganize and expand national resources. Con-
servation and allocation of resources in these areas are necessary to in-
sure maximum availability of essential items to care for evacuees and to
meet the needs of the severely-stricken areas and the armed forces.

6. FEDERAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. Central direction is
seriously impaired and many of the highest government officials are cas-
ualties. The relocated Presidential office is functioning, is providing
national leadership, and is working to reconstitute effective nationwide
direction and control. Washington has been so severely damaged that
no operations there are possible. Some pre-attack complements of per-
sonnel were at the relocation sites of those governmental agencies that
inadequate to carry out all required essential functions. As it is, the
great majority of the sites have escaped direct effects of the attacks, but
because of residual radiation, many personnel are sick and some are
sure to die. Nevertheless, it is expected that some personnel (including
executive reservists) who evacuated during the warning period or waited
out the radiation hazard in adequate shelter may be available to augment
the relocated complements. The problems of re-establishing national
direction and control of field installations by Federal executive depart-
ments and agencies were complicated by inadequate communications and
transportation between the Federal relocation centers and the field.

7. HEALTH. Health resources are in a critical state, both from
high concentration of these resources in the attacked areas, and from the
unprecedented requirements for the surviving resources. Even with
the most stringent selection of patients to be treated, rationing of sup-
plies from the outset, and maximum support of industrial restoration,
remaining supplies will be inadequate by D/7 to D/10 days.

a. The general level of casualties throughout the U.S. is extremely
serious. In many localities it is catastrophic. The following is an estim-
ate of the millions of casualties which have occurred or will occur as a
direct result of the attacks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed and Fatally</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Injured Recovery Possible</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blast &amp; Thermal</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Radiation</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The 12,000,000 surviving casualties require emergency medical
care. Of this number 3,000,000 are suffering from blast and thermal
injuries and have an immediate and evident need for treatment. Of the
9,000,000 surviving radiation casualties, one-half will require hospital-
ization at some time during the period from D/1 week to D/12 weeks, with
the peak, 5,000,000 being reached between D/2 weeks and D/6 weeks.
Many surviving casualties have been injured by two or more of the weapons
effects, rendering treatment more difficult and recovery more doubtful.
Because health personnel and medical supplies and facilities are lacking or
are in very short supply, several million people will die who otherwise might
have recovered.
c. Many more radiation casualties will occur from the cumulative effects of exposure to residual radiation and the consumption of contaminated foodstuffs and water due to the lack of thorough radiological defense monitoring and the application of adequate protective measures.

d. Many of the supplies remaining are either inaccessible or unusable because of contamination or because of lack of transportation. The production potential for health supplies and equipment is almost completely inoperable for an extended period. Most of the plants which remain are seriously damaged or unusable due to contamination and lack of materials and skilled personnel.

e. From a pre-attack total of 1.6 million hospital beds, approximately 100,000 are available for use at D/7 days. Where medical care is possible, most patients are being treated under improvised arrangements utilizing civil defense emergency hospitals as available.

f. Besides the casualties resulting from the direct effects of attack, blast, thermal and initial nuclear radiation, there are 120 million surviving of which there is a daily census of 9 million requiring some type of medical care. The medical care requirements are greater than in the pre-attack period, because of displacement of people, disruption of normal medical and sanitation services, pollution of food and water supplies, environmental exposure, physical and emotional stress, malnutrition and overcrowding. Included in the 9 million above, the numbers afflicted with communicable diseases are increasing rapidly and half a million require hospital beds. These diseased include typhoid fever, influenza, smallpox, diphtheria, tetanus, infectious hepatitis, and diarrheal and streptococcal diseases. There are some reports of outbreaks of yellow fever and other tropical diseases in the South and of plague, cholera and typhus in coastal cities. Diseases transmitted by insect, rodent and other animal vectors are on the increase. Reserve stocks of vaccines are practically non-existent or are inaccessible. Epidemics of certain of these and of other communicable diseases are anticipated.

8. FOOD. The total food supply is generally adequate to meet the nutritional needs of the remaining population. There are large remaining stocks of usable food, especially grain and livestock. In some areas serious local food shortages have resulted due to loss of wholesale distribution facilities and to lack of transportation. In these areas and in areas affected by heavy fallout, survival depends to a large extent on the adequacy of home food stocks. Local shortages due to transportation or distribution problems are usually of one or several individual items, but not of all types of food. Day-to-day food production of such items as meat, eggs, dairy products and flour continues at a reduced level but adequate for the reduced population. Dairy production is moderately to severely curtailed
in heavily contaminated areas. As transportation capability improves, the greatest remaining problem is in the distribution of food as a result of the extensive damage and destruction of wholesale warehouses, which were concentrated in attack areas.

a. When decay of radioactivity permits survivors located in heavily contaminated areas to leave the place where they have taken shelter, there will generally be usable stocks of food in local stores and warehouses adequate to meet needs until inshipments can be resumed. In some instances, local food shortages will occur. Salvable food stocks in evacuated areas will gradually become accessible and will usually be available to areas housing evacuees from such areas.

b. Food supplies in areas receiving little contamination are generally adequate. Rationing has been instituted by local authorities in many areas and will be instituted nationally as quickly as conditions permit. To conserve transportation for essential shipments, all localities have been directed to maximize the use of locally produced foods. Food surplus areas are receiving very limited inshipments of some types of food not produced or available locally.

c. Since existing food stocks cannot long take the place of continued new production, manpower and other resources must be made available in order to continue and, where necessary, restore essential production, processing and distribution.

d. No attempt is being made to give people their choice of the normal variety of food. Food items available in one area are not always available in another area. The real effort is to provide a diet adequate in quantity and quality to maintain the health and vitality of an active population. Food deficit areas receive inshipments of concentrated foods, with bulky items usually being used near where they are produced. National control is being established over all production, processing and shipments of food products to be used outside the immediate area in which they are produced.

9. WATER. The absolute necessity of potable water for survival is one of the most serious problems. Complete failure of the supply of potable water has resulted in attacked areas both because of the physical damage to systems and of power failures. Interruption of electric power has also disrupted water supply in other areas. It has been necessary to employ makeshift and primitive methods of supply and treatment. Supply of water in some evacuation areas is inadequate and use of contaminated water is expected to result in additional casualties. Stop-gap arrangements for providing potable water from local sources are in effect, but waste disposal is a serious health menace.
10. HOUSING AND COMMUNITY FACILITIES. Fire and blast have either completely destroyed or rendered unrepairable significant portions of the housing supply in and around attacked areas. The situation is further complicated by radiation which has made much of the remaining housing unusable for varying lengths of time and which precludes immediate repairs to damaged housing in contaminated areas. Only in isolated situations are the housing inventories adequate to re-house survivors from adjoining attacked areas, and re-entry into many target areas will not be possible for an indefinite period of time. Voluntary and enforced billeting measures and utilization of non-residential structures are being effected. Community facilities of all types have been extremely hard hit. Blast damage has not only disrupted major water and sewer networks, but has at the same time dangerously impaired the functioning of water and sewer facilities in peripheral areas otherwise unaffected by blast and fire damage.

11. MONETARY AND CREDIT SYSTEMS. The monetary and credit systems have collapsed in damaged areas and are under severe pressure in those areas overrun with refugees and in the areas where evacuees are concentrated. In transactions occurring in these areas the price structure is rising sharply as to some essentials while collapsing as to other goods and services. Bartering, unorganized confiscation and looting are in evidence and threaten further any restoration of an orderly degree of economic activity. Because of the breakdown of interrelationships between the financial and banking system and the production and distribution functions, personal and business financial transactions in physical undamaged areas threaten to reach a standstill.

12. DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS. Minimum nationwide telephone and telegraph facilities remain available to provide for the exchange of urgent communications except with those areas actually attacked and destroyed, and with those areas in which communications facilities have been sabotaged. The loss of commercial power sources, together with a serious personnel problem created by loss of specialized manpower through casualties, sickness and confusion, the fear of radiation, and lack of food and water, seriously limits employing the remaining communication facilities to their full capacity. Consequently there are long delays in placing all but the most urgent telephone calls as well as in the delivery of telegraph messages.

13. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS. International radiotelegraph, radiotelephone and cable control terminals located in gateway cities on the east and west coasts have been destroyed. Damage from sabotage has occurred at cable landing locations on both the east and west coasts and the cutting of the ocean telephone cable has severely reduced the submarine cable capacity for handling telegraph and telephone traffic to Atlantic, Hawaiian, and Alaskan points. Limited radiotelegraph and radiotelephone
capability remains, however, but is unreliable due to electronic jamming, damage to facilities at overseas locations, sabotage efforts and radiological contamination effects upon surviving technical and operating personnel. Air mail is being employed where available and practicable to supplement the reduced capabilities of the overseas communications network.

14. TRANSPORTATION. Severe disruption to transportation service exists in all attacked and contaminated areas. Within the attacked areas there has been heavy damage to terminal, warehousing, servicing and related facilities. Within contaminated areas, access to some of these facilities has been denied. Motor vehicles in non-attacked areas free of contamination, including those not previously engaged in common carrier service, are being mustered for use in support of disaster areas, as fast as trained manpower can be made available. Rail transportation is affected more seriously by disruption of lines and yards in attacked areas than by loss of rolling stock. Large quantities of rail and highway motive power and equipment were not damaged, making it possible to continue minimum essential traffic within those areas not unduly affected by contamination and to restore principal lines to service as rapidly as radioactive decay or decontamination measures permit opening lines which by-pass the physically damaged areas, insofar as the availability of trained manpower will permit. However, transportation vehicles using petroleum products for motive power are depleting the reserve stocks rapidly. Unless these stocks can be replenished, idleness will be forced upon more and more of the prime movers in all forms of transportation.

a. In major port areas there has been heavy damage to piers, warehousing, shipbuilding and repair yards, and related facilities. Damage to shore-side cargo handling facilities has necessitated the use of alternate outloading ports and sites along the coasts and limitation of shipment to the current capacity, maintenance facilities and fuel supplies of those locations. Damage to reserve fleets has been minor, but reactivation is impeded by losses of repair yards, tugs and manpower. The world-wide distribution of merchant shipping at sea and in foreign ports has left the major part of the active fleet intact, but ship losses are nevertheless serious in light of immediate and heavy requirements for shipping to support and reinforce overseas military operations. Neither ships nor convoy protection in the vulnerable coastwise sea-lanes can be provided for other than direct military support, except in cases of extreme necessity in priority higher than that of the military. Ocean merchant shipping cannot be counted on to supplement or replace inland domestic surface transportation to any substantial extent.

b. Domestic airlift capacity has been decreased substantially due to damage and destruction of air fields and aircraft, lack of communications, navigational aids, manpower, repair parts, fuel and maintenance facilities. The remaining aircraft are largely devoted to high priority routes and highest
priority traffic under the air priority system and other controls. Trans-
ocean airlift capacity is decreased substantially due to destruction of aircraft,
damage to bases, circuitous reroutings and inadequate ground facility capability.

15. ELECTRIC POWER. Due, for the most part, to heavy damage
to transmission and distribution lines and substations in attacked areas,
sufficient electric power is not immediately available in the majority of the
fringe areas and reception centers. Most acute need for power in such
areas is for refrigeration, hospital operation, community water systems,
heating, and mass feeding. Small portable generators can meet only a
fraction of these needs. Aggregate generating capacity of electric utilities
operable following the attack is sufficient for minimal national needs; there-
fore, the power shortages will be alleviated in most areas as soon as trans-
mision and distribution lines can be repaired, new lines strung, intercon-
nections effected and communications restored. Restoration of electric
service will be slower than in cases of natural disaster. Anticipated de-
lays are due to several factors, including shortage of available trained man-
power, difficulty in transporting utility repair crews and materials from un-
damaged areas to augment those in areas of need, and denial of access into
radioactive areas to make repairs and to obtain stocks of materials and
equipment, new or salvable. Where primary sources of electric power have
been destroyed, the power consuming facilities (industrial plants, stores,
homes, etc.) have, in large measure, likewise been destroyed. In most
cases, there is sufficient generating capacity intact in the system and through
interconnections with other systems, to meet essential needs of the areas
served. In those areas, however, sharp curtailment of supply to undamaged
industrial plants will be necessary for an extended period. Enough skilled
manpower has survived to operate generating plants. Fuel stocks at thermal
generating plants using coal are adequate to keep plants operating for a minimum
of 30 to 60 days even after allowance for possible use of a part of their stock-
piles for other emergency purposes. Generating plants dependent solely on oil
as a fuel can continue operating for a shorter period from stocks on hand, the
time varying with the stock position of individual plants.

16. FUELS. Of all fuel (including petroleum products, gas, and solid
fuels), motor fuels including aviation are the most universally used through-
out the nation, regardless of season. Therefore, even though movement of the
mass of passenger automobiles is strictly limited, the availability of motor
fuels for uses essential to human survival and military operations is of wide-
spread and urgent concern. Among such uses are the operations of trucks,
diesel locomotives, water transport, aircraft, tractors and other farm
equipment needed for food production and a host of engines required for water
supply, sanitary disposal systems and hospitals.
a. Initial military operations are being fueled almost entirely from stocks in military storage. Stocks of motor fuels in undamaged areas to and through which evacuees moved are nearly exhausted, despite rationing efforts by some local authorities. In many of these areas and in contiguous support areas, radioactivity temporarily immobilizes all transport and farming operations, thus halting consumption in wheeled equipment and simultaneously preventing replenishment of stocks. When radioactive decay permits resumption of activity, some consumers such as railroads, airlines, and to a lesser extent, certain farmers, can operate for a brief period using stocks on hand. Generally, however, there will be an immediate, heavy drain on bulk plant stocks.

b. In cold areas to and through which evacuees have moved, the situation with respect to cooking and heating fuels (kerosene, fuel oil, liquefied petroleum gas, coal, and gas) is somewhat similar to that of motor fuels. Sheltering and feeding of swollen populations in such areas are rapidly depleting cooking and heating fuels in homes and other buildings and, in communities served by natural gas, lowering pressure in distribution lines. Radiation prevents immediate replenishment of home stocks. When deliveries can be resumed, local distributors' stocks of fuel oil, "bottled" gas, and coal will soon be gone. Local . industrial . and some utility stockpiles of coal can be tapped if needed for heating of hospitals, homes and shelters. At the outset, wood where available is providing essential warmth, but this cannot long meet needs of masses of people. Provision of minimum essential supplies of cooking and heating fuels will depend largely upon restoration of transportation and communications.

c. The physical productive capacity of oil and gas wells and coal mines has been little affected by the attack, but their operation in some areas is precluded temporarily by radioactivity making surface work hazardous. Even after decay permits work at these facilities, breaks in power service will temporarily prevent operation of certain of them as well as some pipeline pumping stations. A substantial percentage of above-ground fuel facilities in attacked areas -- including petroleum refineries, pipelines terminals, tank farms, gas compressor stations, and coal handling equipment at rail and port terminals -- has been destroyed or extensively damaged. Destruction of docks, tanks and refineries in coastal areas has drastically curtailed intercoastal movement and importation of petroleum and petroleum products by tankers. Inland, the disruption of and damage to railroad, water-way, and highway transport at or near urban centers will continue to hamper distribution of both coal and petroleum products.

d. The non-military requirements for fuels will be much smaller than pre-attack requirements, since millions of fuel consuming units -- particularly residences, commercial buildings, electric power generating plants, and factories -- have disappeared in the bombing. With strict rationing of
acity, including petroleum products and allocation of coal, the surviving fuel production capacity, including petroleum refinery capacity, is sufficient to meet properly timephased military requirements and minimum essential civilian needs for both motor fuel and heating fuel and, also, progressively to supply reviving industries. Refinery yields will be adjusted to fit the pattern of needs for particular petroleum products depending on the season of the attack and military requirements. Nevertheless, due mainly to transportation difficulties, severe, localized shortages of one fuel or another from time to time during the next several months should be anticipated.

17. MANPOWER. In assessing the survival and emergency work to be done, total manpower requirements substantially exceed the available supply. Although manpower priorities have been established in individual local areas, the difficulties of communicating with higher levels of government have resulted in conflicting demands on certain support areas. Some survival activities are experiencing support surpluses while others cannot function because needed support is lacking.

a. The provision of effective manpower support is jeopardized by the dislocation and disorganization of the general population. In many communities evacuation took place in anticipation of further attack. People are now attempting to return to their homes but the process is slow, and previously identified skills cannot be located until the evacuated population is re-established in the home community. It will be some time before manpower in such areas can be organized to provide needed support to devastated areas and to restore essential services and production.

b. In many localities radioactivity and particularly the fear of this unseen hazard have temporarily immobilized a tremendous proportion of the manpower which would otherwise be immediately available. Denial of access to large areas because of the hazard has compounded the already major problems in transportation of labor to the point of need.

c. In many localities there is a surplus of manpower in certain skilled occupations which could be used if necessary equipment and supplies were available. Difficulty has been encountered in trying to contain evacuated populations in relocation centers around cities which have been attacked so that they do not further endanger their lives by moving into hazardous areas. Many thousands of people are trying to reach the homes of friends and relatives. As a consequence, the size of the labor force and the skill distribution within the relocated area changes continuously. The instability of this situation adversely affects the recruitment of specific skills within the area, and throws askew the labor assessments necessary to balance manpower demand with available supply with a minimum of population shift. Effective use of manpower is further reduced by the unavoidable effects of lowered resistance, psychological shock, and varying degrees of exposure to radiation.
d. In relocation areas, utilization of available unskilled manpower for necessary emergency work is most inefficient because of lack of managerial personnel and trained technicians and of other leaders and sub-leaders previously trained and organized. Training programs offer a solution but only for short-term skill development.

18. ESSENTIAL PRODUCTION. As in all other areas of economic activity the effect of the attack on levels of production can best be described in time phases. There is an immediate and virtually complete paralysis of the production effort, even in non-damaged and slightly damaged areas. Following this phase, the gradual return of workers to their places of employment sets in motion a slow recovery cycle, manifesting itself first in scattered, undamaged and non-hazardous areas. As the radioactivity decays and decontamination is started the areas of recovery expand, limited by manpower shortages as well as transportation bottlenecks and breakdowns in supplies of processed materials and parts. Two major factors determine achievable levels of production.

a. A first major limitation will arise from the damage to the chain of production. The pre-attack production levels achieved in this country resulted from the functioning of a highly complex operation, in which many thousands of contributors to over-all production were bound together through the inter-relationships of the production processes. Suppliers of raw materials, fabricators of metal shapes and forms, manufacturers of components and subassemblies, and final product producers, all contributed to the flow of production in such a manner that, by and large, items necessary for successive steps in the productive process were available when and where needed. It is impossible to measure the damage to this chain of production in all of its ramifications. It seems reasonable to assume, however that the process has suffered severe damage, not immediately repairable. It will take months to determine the bottlenecks and dislocations, and many more months to overcome shortages and imbalances. The resumption of any sizeable production effort will, of course, be dependent on the extent to which necessary services -- power, transportation, communications, etc., can be provided.

b. A second major limitation is the number and types of workers available for production purposes, particularly in the first several months. As the need for workers for emergency civil defense efforts lessens, more persons will become available for the production of goods and services. However, even after the first several months, manpower will impose a restriction on the size of the production program, because of manpower losses, the assignment of manpower to other activities and the lower productivity of the available utilized labor force. The breakdown in the production process will also result in lowered industrial productivity, for which more manpower will be required to complete the same quota of production.
19. STOCKPILES OF CRITICAL AND STRATEGIC MATERIALS.

Due to the pre-attack dispersal of the Federal Government's stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, the major portion of stockpiles of most of the 75 different materials involved have survived the blast and thermal effects of the attack. About one-third of the stocks of destructible materials (mainly agricultural products for industrial use, including oils, fibers and rubber) were still in target areas at time of attack, and losses of these must be calculated on the basis of the actual damage pattern. The amount of most of the destructible materials surviving, however, is equal to 100 per cent of the procurement priority level previously established for these materials. No substantial losses of bulky metal and mineral stockpiles have resulted from blast or thermal effects.

a. In general, the destruction of plants which, prior to the attack consumed the various types of materials in the stockpiles, has been proportionately greater than that suffered by the stockpiles themselves. Therefore, the quantities of stockpiled materials which physically survived the attack are adequate to meet the requirements of the remaining consumer plants.

b. The extent to which remaining stockpiled materials are affected by radioactive fallout as a result of the attack cannot be ascertained immediately. Radiological monitoring of stockpiles in fallout areas will have to be done when access to the areas becomes possible. Where the material is thus found to be radioactive, the rate of normal decay of radioactivity in the material, and also the efficacy and practicability of decontamination will have to be determined. Only after these findings are made will it be possible to ascertain the time-phasing of availability of usable material from radioactive stockpiles.

c. Little demand for stockpiled materials, except for narcotics, is expected during the first 60 to 90 days after attack. The processors of metals and minerals (the largest category of stockpiled materials) usually have sufficient inventories available to operate for a period of at least 60 to 90 days. The same is generally true of users of most other categories of stockpiled materials. If consuming plants are operable soon after the attack, it is probable that their inventories of raw materials also survived and are usable, even though requiring decontamination in some cases.

d. Denial of access to points, or areas through which personnel and service transportation equipment must pass, to examine and obtain some of the stockpiles for use in plants in unaffected areas may be a delaying factor. There will be a problem of marshalling transportation for movement of bulky materials from surviving, usable stockpiles to distant surviving plants needing them. Air transport of certain materials will be feasible and justified in some instances. The transportation conditions which will
flow of other raw materials with which they are used at consuming plants. Therefore, transportation of stockpiled materials should not generally be a limiting factor in production by plants utilizing such materials.
PART II - MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES

MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES consist of statements adopted to give direction to the planning process. They are designed to meet the objectives described in the PURPOSE OF THE PLAN.

Although it may be possible to take certain Federal actions during and soon after attack, the implementation of others could vary considerably in time from rapid action in some UNDAMAGED AREAS to a lag in implementation in DAMAGED AREAS. Nevertheless, all executive elements of the Federal government, including field installations, will assume, for planning purposes, that the Federal government will implement these MAJOR FEDERAL POLICIES.

A. MAINTENANCE OF GOVERNMENT AND ORDER

1. The President, under his constitutional and statutory authorities, directly or by delegation, will take or direct whatever actions are essential for national security and survival.

2. The Director, OCDM, acting for the President, will coordinate and direct the civil defense and defense mobilization activities of the Federal Government.

3. Initial reliance for Federal executive actions will be placed on the existing departments and agencies (Annex C) with emergency agencies to be established later as conditions may warrant or require (Annex D).

4. Federal executive agencies will operate from relocated headquarters and field establishments. Pending the resumption of effective centralized control, Federal regional and other field officials will act in accordance with perpositioned directives, prearranged plans, including alternate headquarters and lines of succession, and decentralized authority provided by the agencies concerned. All units will carry out operational assignments of an emergency character including pre-emergency plans for continuity of their essential functions and aid to the states for civil defense operations.

5. The Regional Directors, OCDM, will coordinate and, in appropriate circumstances, direct the civil defense and defense mobilization activities of Federal agency field establishments within their regions.
6. Primary reliance will continue to be placed on the states and local governments for the performance of normal civil functions and such other functions as may be specified in prearranged plans, and initial Federal efforts will be to increase their effectiveness. However, when requested by a state government or when a state government is unable or unwilling to perform essential civil functions, Federal authority will be relied upon to ensure performance of such functions.

7. Military assistance will be made temporarily available by Federal military commanders for civil defense operations upon request, such assistance being rendered as necessary and to the extent that it can be made available without prejudicing essential military operations or their direct support.

8. A national emergency and a civil defense emergency will be proclaimed.

9. If not in session, the Congress will be convened as soon as possible. Standby legislation will become effective and requests for additional emergency legislation will be transmitted.

10. Funds will be made available to Federal agencies for emergency operations.

11. Actions will be taken to support the restoration and functioning of the economic system including banking and credit.

12. A Federal order will be issued imposing immediate ceilings on prices, wages, salaries and rents, and steps will be taken to ensure equitable distribution of essential consumer goods.

13. Internal security measures will be implemented.

14. Domestic public information programs will be implemented.

15. Censorship will be imposed including implementation of the voluntary Censorship Code for public media.

B. SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS & MILITARY ALLIANCES

1. Members and units of the reserve components of the Armed Forces will be ordered to active Federal duty as required.

2. Military aid to allies will be reviewed.
3. The Department of Defense will as necessary, place calls for inductees on the Selective Service System within strength ceilings established by the President.

4. Economic warfare activities will be carried out.

5. The Secretary of Defense may establish military areas where needed for military purposes.

C. SURVIVAL OF THE POPULATION

1. Radiological defense monitoring and the application of protective measures will be taken to reduce further casualties from the effects of residual radiation.

2. Health services will be provided to ensure maintenance of the health of the surviving population and the return to productive activity of the greatest possible number of casualty and non-casualty injured.

3. Priorities of care will be established for the treatment of the sick and injured. The level of care will be as high as possible, but priorities will be governed by the national rather than the individual needs.

4. Enforced billeting will be authorized.

5. Rationing will be imposed on consumer goods.

6. Restrictions will be imposed on population movement.

7. Welfare services and assistance, financial or in kind, will be furnished to all persons in need.

D. USE OF RESOURCES FOR ESSENTIAL PURPOSES

1. Federal controls will be imposed on production, construction, distribution, manpower, medical service, food, housing, transportation, communications, fuel, power and water resources.

2. For industrial and agricultural production, priority will be given to the resumption and continuation of operations that can produce material urgently required for military operations and new supplies of survival items and services.

3. Federal requisitioning will be authorized to acquire goods, property and services for immediately essential programs when other means of pro-
4. International trade will become subject to further regulation.

5. Non-military and economic aid to allies and neutrals will be reviewed and adjusted.

6. An embargo with respect to selected destinations will be placed on non-military exports regardless of ownership. Release will be dependent upon inventory and allocation arrangements.

7. Import restrictions such as tariffs, customs regulations, etc., will be suspended to the extent necessary to facilitate the receipt of necessary supplies and discharge of ship cargo.

8. American-owned foreign assets and gold which can be used to purchase supplies from abroad will be controlled and financial transactions regulated as necessary.

E. MAINTENANCE OF FREE WORLD UNITY

1. U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic relations with each country will be re-examined, with a view to strengthening our alliances and obtaining support from friendly and neutral countries.

2. International arrangements will be established for the supply and allocation of necessary goods and services for the coordination of information.

3. Foreign information activities directed to friendly, enemy and neutral countries will deal with statements of intentions and purposes of U.S. policy; statements of war objectives; programs of the U.S. in withstanding and recovering from attacks and free world retaliation; statements covering U.S. foreign economic policies and assistance to free-world countries.
PART III - PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

(REFERENCE: ANNEX E TO FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS)
"PROCEDURES FOR PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS"

The Summary Statements listed in this Part III describes actions the President may wish to take in the circumstances described in the General Situation Assumption, page 5. Documents for such actions shall be prepared as prescribed in Annex "E". They shall be premised on the General Situation Assumption. When completed, the documents shall be held in readiness for use by the President as he in his discretion shall determine in such an emergency.

Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements assume a civil-defense emergency with reliance upon statutory authorities where available. Where such authorities are not available, and the probable delay which would be occasioned by obtaining such authorities would jeopardize the national security, the extraordinary powers of the President under the Constitution shall be used as legal authority for the required actions. Appropriate legislation, as listed in this Part III, will be requested as soon as possible.

Presidential Actions prescribe and implement national policy, assign responsibilities, and delegate authority. Planning is based on the assumption that the President will take these actions when the described situation occurs or at an appropriate time thereafter. All other planning and readiness measures to meet the situation will be consistent therewith.

It should be clearly understood that the assumption that the President will take these actions is made for planning purposes. In an actual situation, the President retains the authority and responsibility for decisions according to his evaluation of conditions. Decisions would include whether or not to take the various actions, the scope of actions if taken, when and in what sequence, and other considerations.

DEFINITIONS

IDENTIFICATION NUMBER - The identification number of the Summary Statement and the implementing document is enclosed in parenthesis at the end of the statement.
RESPONSIBLE AGENCY - Designated in parenthesis at the end of the Summary Statement is the agency having primary responsibility for all necessary pre-emergency planning in connection with the Statement, including necessary preparation and coordination within the Executive Branch, the preparation of the implementing document, and performance of annual review.

GOVNET - Agencies included on the Government Communications Network as listed in Annex "E".

H-HOUR ACTIONS - Actions to be considered immediately by the President wherever he may be, upon enemy attack, or intelligence to the effect that attack has been launched even though physical damage to the U.S. has not yet occurred.

D-DAY ACTIONS - Actions to be considered as soon as possible on D-Day.

RESERVE ACTIONS - Actions to be considered as soon as the prevailing conditions demonstrate the need therefor:

PRE-EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS - Delegations of authority which have already been promulgated and emergency statutes already enacted (or which are proposed for promulgation or enactment in the near future and prior to the emergency), and which will become operative automatically upon enemy attack.
H-HOUR ACTIONS

1. PROCLAMATION of the existence of an unlimited national emergency and a state of civil defense emergency. (A1-53)(OCMD)

2. PROCLAMATION that an act of war has been perpetrated against the United States. (A1-64)(OCMD)

3. PROCLAMATION providing that whenever the Director of OCDM determines that a state government or political subdivision thereof is unable or unwilling to perform essential civil functions, (1) the Director shall discharge all necessary functions of such local civil government, (2) military commanders shall make available to the Director and Regional Directors of OCDM those resources not needed for the conduct of military operations and (3) officials of local civil governments and of Federal departments and agencies shall make any necessary requests for military assistance to the Regional Directors. (A1-69)(OCMD)

4. PROCLAMATION authorizing the Secretary of Defense, where necessary to maintain public order and enforce Federal, State and local laws. (A1-42 REV 11/58)(OCMD)

(NOTE: Proclamation A1-42 (REV 11/58) would be issued only if the provisions of A1-69 were not adequate to meet the situation.)

5. PROCLAMATION authorizing Secretary of Defense to establish and govern military areas. (A1-70)(OCMD)

6. PROCLAMATION convening Congress if not in session. (A1-48)(Justice)

7. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for civil defense measures and the mobilization of the nation's resources. The Order provides for the utilization of the personnel, materials, facilities, and services of Federal Agencies during the civil-defense emergency, and prescribes (1) extraordinary functions of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and (2) responsibilities for the performance of functions by existing departments and agencies with respect to health welfare services, communications, food, energy and minerals, housing, manpower, production, stabilization and transport, pending the possible establishment of emergency agencies and the transfer of such functions thereto. (A1-16 REV) (OCMD)
8. PROCLAMATION concerning the documentary requirements applicable to persons seeking to enter or leave the United States. (A1-98) (State)

(NOTE: Proclamation A1-98 requires issuance in a Plan C situation; it also governs the documentary requirements in a Plan D-Minus situation along with Proclamation A1-99 which applies to actual physical control of persons seeking to cross our borders.)

9. PROCLAMATION authorizing the control of persons entering or leaving the United States. (A1-99)(Justice)

10. PROCLAMATION for the control of alien enemies. (A1-7)(Justice)

11. PROCLAMATION authorizing apprehension of persons considered dangerous to national security. (A1-8)(Justice)

12. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the transfer of the personnel, funds, material and facilities of the Federal Aviation Agency to the Department of Defense. (A1-100)(FAA)

13. EXECUTIVE ORDER for the control of weather reports and coordination of civil meteorological facilities. (A1-9)(Defense)

14. EXECUTIVE ORDER authorizing Secretary of State to institute measures of protection surveillance and control of certain foreign diplomatic, consular, and other official personnel. (A1-28 REV 5/58) (State)

15. PROCLAMATION authorizing Secretary of Defense to exclude from Defense facilities persons whom it is reasonable to believe might engage in sabotage, espionage or any other subversive act. (A1-24)(Defense)

16. EXECUTIVE ORDER (1) establishing Office of Censorship and requiring Director thereof to censor communications crossing the borders of the United States, its territories or possessions; and (2) directing Secretary of Defense to perform such censorship functions until Office of Censorship develops operational readiness. (A4-2 REV 5/58)(OCDM)

17. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing control over communications with respect to position and movement of ships. (A1-73)(Defense)
D-DAY ACTIONS

101. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the establishment of an alternate system for filing and publishing executive agency documents. (A1-59)(GSA)

102. EXECUTIVE ORDER concerning augmentation of the Armed Forces, (1) suspending all limitations on their personnel strength; (2) requiring military personnel to serve until six months after the war or emergency whichever is later; (3) extending liability for registration and performance of military service to all men, 18 to 46 years of age, inclusive; (4) suspending any restrictions on territorial use of any unit or individual; (5) providing that members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces may be called to active duty by Secretary of Defense; and (6) prohibiting enlistment of males except under Universal Military Training and Service Act. (A1-54 REV 5/58)(Defense)

103. PROCLAMATION regarding national policies relating to resources and the financial and economic system. (A1-51 REV 7/58)(OCDM)

104. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Stabilization Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-96)(OCDM)

105. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Transport Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-97)(OCDM)

106. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Communications Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-90)(OCDM)

107. EXECUTIVE ORDER delegating all powers vested in the President with respect to financial and banking transactions and banking institutions. (A1-101)(Treasury)

108. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing military jurisdiction over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone. (A1-11)(Defense)

109. EXECUTIVE ORDER directing the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy. (A1-62 REV 8/58)(Defense)

110. EXECUTIVE ORDER regarding control of vessels in territorial waters of the United States and the Canal Zone. (A1-12 REV 7/58)(Defense)

111. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for the establishment and operation of an Emergency Financial System. (A1-56) (BoB)
112. EXECUTIVE ORDER amending Executive Order 10501 by authorizing additional Federal Agencies to classify defense information. (A1-57)(Justice)

113. EXECUTIVE ORDER adjusting the Federal Civilian personnel system for operations in a national emergency and other related matters. (A1-65)(CSC)

114. EXECUTIVE ORDER declaring the Commissioned Corps of the Public Health Service to be a military service and prescribing regulations therefor. (A1-1)(HEW)

115. EXECUTIVE ORDER setting forth benefits available to certain government civilian personnel for injury, death or detention resulting from war risk hazards. (A1-75)(CSC)

116. EXECUTIVE ORDER suspending requirements as to display of lights and sounding of signals on board U.S. vessels. (A1-76)(Defense)

117. EXECUTIVE ORDER barring action against the United States arising out of certain combatant or warlike activities of U.S. Naval vessels. (A1-77)(Defense)

118. List of Topics to be considered for possible inclusion in a Presidential Statement to the people as to the state of the nation after attack. (A1-66)(OCDM)
RESERVE ACTIONS

201. MESSAGE to Congress requesting the declaration of a state of war with related Joint Resolution of Congress declaring the existence of a state of war and confirming and ratifying Presidential actions taken after attack on the United States. (A1-67 Reserve) (Justice)

202. REPORT to Congress on interim actions that have been taken for the handling of executive affairs. (A1-61 Reserve) (Justice)

203. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Food Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-91 Reserve) (OCMD)

204. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Energy and Minerals agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-92 Reserve) (OCMD)

205. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Housing Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-93 Reserve) (OCMD)

206. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Manpower Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-94 Reserve) (OCMD)

207. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Health Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-102 Reserve) (OCMD)

208. EXECUTIVE ORDER establishing the Emergency Production Agency and prescribing its functions. (A1-95 Reserve) (OCMD)

209. EXECUTIVE ORDER directing the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to order on behalf of the President, the curtailment or discontinuance of non-essential functions in the Executive Branch and for agencies to make available for performance of essential functions funds, personnel, material, and facilities made available by such curtailment or discontinuance. (A1-68 Reserve) (BoB)

210. PROCLAMATION establishing the Cristobal and the Gulf of Panama Maritime control Areas and prescribing regulations for the control thereof. (A1-10 Reserve) (Defense)

(NOTE: This requires negotiation by Department of State with Government of the Republic of Panama before issuance.)
211. EXECUTIVE ORDER authorizing Secretary of State to control all property within the United States owned or controlled by the diplomatic or consular establishments or personnel of certain governments. (A1-29 Reserve)(State)

212. EXECUTIVE ORDER designating authorities to certify the essentiality of access roads to permit construction of such roads to serve new sources of raw materials under provisions of the Defense Highways Acts of 1941 and 1950, as amended and re-enacted (23 USC 210). (A1-115 Reserve)(Commerce)

213. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for military aid to allies. (A1-79 Reserve)(Defense)

214. EXECUTIVE ORDER providing for non-military aid to allies. (A1-114 Reserve)(State)


216. THE WAR RESOURCES ACT, a Bill providing for (1) priorities and allocations, (2) authority to requisition, (3) expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply (4) acquisition and disposition of real property, (5) emergency contracting authority, (6) plant seizures, (7) emergency foreign assistance, (8) price and wage stabilization, (9) control of consumer and real estate credit, (10) employment control, (11) settlement of labor disputes, (12) censorship of communications, (13) general provisions. (A1-26 Reserve)(OCDM)

217. A BILL to extend the benefits of the Missing Persons Act, to civilian officers and employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches in the continental United States. (A1-82 Reserve)(CSC)

218. A BILL to give the President broad emergency powers to cope with civilian personnel problems in the Executive Branch. (A1-83 Reserve)(CSC)

220. A BILL to provide for additional tax revenues. (A1-80 Reserve) (Treasury)

221. A BILL to authorize an increase in the statutory public debt limit. (A1-81 Reserve)(Treasury)

222. A BILL authorizing the President to provide for the summary exclusion from national defense facilities of certain individuals who may engage in sabotage, espionage, or other willful activity intended to disrupt the nation defense program. (A1-103 Reserve)(DoD)

223. A BILL establishing control over communications with respect to the position and movement of ships. (A1-104 Reserve)(DoD)

224. A BILL authorizing the actions under items (1) through (5) of Item 102. Legislation is not required for item (6). (A1-105 Reserve)(DoD)

225. A BILL authorizing the suspension of requirements of statutes with respect to display of light and sounding of signals on board certain vessels. (A1-106 Reserve)(DoD)

226. A BILL which would bar suit against the United States arising out of certain combatant or warlike activities of military vessels of the United States. (A1-107 Reserve)(DoD)


228. A BILL to amend section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, removing the existing limitation of $5,000,000,000 on the direct purchase by Federal Reserve Banks of Government obligations. (A1-111 Reserve)(Treasury)

229. A BILL to exempt from reserve requirements deposits payable to the United States by Federal Reserve member banks arising solely as the result of subscriptions made by such member banks for United States Government securities, and to exclude such deposits from the definition of "deposits" for the purpose of determining the assessment base for any insured bank. (A1-112 Reserve)(Treasury)

230. EXECUTIVE ORDER supplementing authority already delegated to the Secretary of Treasury for the facilitation of lending operations. (A1-113 Reserve)(Treasury)
PRE EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES

301. Proposed EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. _____, DATED_____.
1959, directs that (1) emergency relocation plans, both
at the Seat of Government and elsewhere, will be activated
immediately on receipt of the ALERT SIGNAL, which is a
steady blast of three to five minutes duration, (2) all
civilian employees of the Executive Branch in the greater
Washington, D.C. area will immediately evacuate that area
upon receipt of the ALERT SIGNAL, (3) all civilian em-
ployees of the Executive Branch having emergency reloca-
tion site assignments will, on receipt of the ALERT SIGNAL,
proceed to their emergency relocation sites in accordance
with department or agency instruction, (4) all civilian em-
ployees of the Executive Branch who do not have emergency
relocation site assignments, will, on receipt of the ALERT
SIGNAL, follow the instructions given to the public by local
Civil Defense Authorities, (5) instructions authorized herein
are subject to necessary exceptions for personnel having
other authorized emergency assignments, (6) heads of de-
partments and agencies are responsible for issuing pre-
emergency instructions to all their employees, with respect
to actions to be taken by them on receipt of the ALERT SIGNAL.
Such instructions will provide for the performance at reloca-
tion sites, subject to appropriate authorization, of such functions
as may have been assigned for planning purposes by the Director,
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, including those
eMERGENCY functions requiring specific authorization by the
President. (AI-30)(OCDM)

302. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10705, dated April 17, 1957, dele-
gates authority to the Director, OCDM, pursuant to Sections
305 and 606 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.
The authority contained in subsections 305(a) and 606(a) may
be performed "only during the continuance of a war in which
the United States is engaged," and the authority contained in
subsections 606(c) and (d) may be performed "only upon pro-
clamation by the President that there exists a state of war
involving the United States." (OCDM)
303. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10638, dated October 10, 1955, authorizes the Director, OCDM, to order the release of strategic and critical materials from Director, OCDM, to order the release of strategic and critical materials from stockpiles in the event of an enemy attack upon the Continental United States (OCDM)
PART IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM

Actions by the Director, OCDM, listed in this Part IV are those required to be taken to meet the described situation. The authority for taking these actions is found in two places: (1) current statutes and Presidential delegations, and (2) Presidential Actions in Part III.

Planning is based on the assumption that the Director will take these actions shortly after the described situation occurs. All other planning and readiness measures will be consistent therewith.

It should be clearly understood that the assumption that the Director will take these actions is made for planning purposes. In an actual situation actions by the Director would depend on his evaluation of the situation and actions by the President.

The OCDM is responsible for ensuring all necessary pre-emergency planning in connection with an action, including necessary preparation and coordination.

The identification number of the action statement is indicated in parentheses at the end of the statement. For instance, DO-1 indicates Plan D-Minus, OCDM, Number 1.
PART IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM


2. Resource Directive No. 1, Delegation of priorities and allocation authority and policy for its use. (DO-2)


5. Resource Directive No. 4, Delegation of emergency contracting authority. (DO-5)


7. Resource Directive No. 6, Establishing a central inventory and providing for effective utilization of idle government-owned production equipment and machine tools. (DO-7)


13. Resource Directive No. 12, Federal agency personnel, material, facilities, and services for civil defense purposes. (DO-12)

14. Resource Directive No. 13, Coordination of activities to suppress fires in rural areas. (DO-13)

PART IV - ACTIONS BY THE DIRECTOR, OCDM


17. Resource Directive No. 16, Responsibility for administration of projects being continued under contracts of the former Defense Minerals Exploration Administration. (DO-16)


19. Damage Assessment Memorandum No. 1, Aerial reconnaissance in support of national damage assessment program. (DO-18)

20. Health Directive No. 1, Mobilization and use of health resources of the Nation. (DO-19)

21. Health Directive No. 4, Minimum health standards to apply in areas of relocated people and facilities. (DO-20)

22. Health Directive No. 5, Standards for use and/or emergency construction of water, sewerage, and other sanitation facilities. (DO-21)

23. Housing Directive No. 1, Ordering activation of plan for billeting refugees. (DO-22)

24. Housing Directive No. 4, Use of federal housing for refugee lodging. (DO-23)


27. Availability of foreign resources. (DO-26)
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Washington 25, D. C.

April, 1959

DEFINITIONS

ANNEX A

TO

FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS

Definitions contained herein define words and terms as used in planning to meet various emergency situations and are not intended to define the words and terms for all usages. Terms relating to nuclear activities are defined in Annex B, Effects of Nuclear Weapons
DEFINITIONS

ANNEX A

TO

FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS

AIR DEFENSE: All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne.

AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY: A condition declared by Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defense Command (CINCNORAD) when hostile action is imminent or sufficiently probable to require emergency air defense measures.

AIR RAID WARNING: A condition of warning indicating that an attack by hostile aircraft or missiles is probable or imminent. This condition remains in effect until terminated by orders from competent authority.

ALLOCATION: The apportionment, by government, of available materials or services among users, or assignment of a facility to a particular use, in the national interest.

ALTERNATE HEADQUARTERS: An existing facility currently manned and capable of assuming essential emergency functions of the primary headquarters in the event such headquarters cannot operate or relocate.

ANNEX: An addition to a plan essential to its completeness or understanding.

APPENDIX: An implementing plan.

ARMED FORCES: An inclusive term which embraces all of the military forces of a nation or a group of nations.

ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM: The total communications system used for the dissemination of civil defense warnings from the various originating points throughout the country to the local levels and then to the general public through the sounding of warning devices and all other available media. The Attack Warning System comprises the National Warning System (NAWAS) and the State and local
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: The intentional employment of living organisms, toxic biological products and chemical plant growth regulators to produce death or casualties in man, animals, or plants; and defense against such action.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS: The materials used in offensive biological warfare.

CAPABILITY: A power or capacity to do a particular thing arising from the forces and resources now available or due to become available within a given time period.

CASUALTY: A person injured and needing treatment or one killed.

CENSORSHIP: Inspection and regulation of material to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information of value to an enemy and to secure intelligence of value to the United States in the prosecution of war.

CHAIN OF COMMAND: The succession of officials or officers from a superior to a subordinate through which direction or command is exercised. Also called command channel.

CHEMICAL WARFARE: The intentional employment of toxic and non-toxic chemical agents, flame, incendiaries and smoke to accomplish an assigned mission, and defense against such action.

CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS: The materials used in offensive chemical warfare.

CIVIL DEFENSE: Activities and measures designed or undertaken

1. to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States,
2. to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack and
3. to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack.

CIVIL DEFENSE EMERGENCY: A condition which exists when the President, by proclamation, or the Congress, by appropriate action, finds that an attack upon the United States has occurred or is anticipated and that the national safety therefore requires an invocation of the provisions of Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. (PL920)
CIVILIAN REQUIREMENTS: The requirements (see definition) for resources necessary to maintain the civilian economy in a state of productive efficiency and in a post-nuclear attack period to assure survival of the Nation's remaining population and to restore its productivity, with due attention to both physical well-being and morale.

CLAIMANCY: The process of calculating the requirements for resources to carry out a function or mission or to achieve a goal and of presenting each such requirement to the Federal Agency responsible for determining the allocation of the supply of the particular resource involved.

CLAIMANT: A Federal department or agency, or part thereof, which performs the claimancy function with respect to an activity for which it is responsible.

CLANDESTINE ORDNANCE: Destructive devices covertly assembled in or introduced into this country.

COMMUNICATIONS: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another, except by direct unassisted conversation.

CONELRAD: (A short title for "Control of Electromagnetic Radiations.") A plan to deprive an enemy of the use of electromagnetic radiations as an aid to the navigation of hostile aircraft, guided missiles and other devices capable of attack upon the United States without depriving the public of standard broadcast radio as a source of news and instructions. News and official instructions can be obtained by the public at either 640 or 1240 kilocycles on the AM dial in areas served by standard broadcasting stations licensed to operate during CONELRAD(Radio Alert) period.

CONSTRUCTION: The act of producing fixed works and structures, and making major additions and alternations thereto. Construction includes design and engineering, clearing and developing land, and installation of equipment generally considered an integral part of the structure (such as plumbing, heating, air conditioning, elevators). Construction does not include drilling for oil, gas, or water, digging and shoring mines, and farming operations such as plowing, ditching, and terracing.
CONTAMINATION: The condition resulting from the deposit of radioactive material, biological warfare agents, other disease-producing agents, or chemical warfare agents in or upon structures, areas, bodies of water, personnel and objects, or caused by deterioration due to failure of normal sanitary safeguards. Includes food, water and medical supplies which may be contaminated with disease-producing agents as an indirect result of an attack.

CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT: All measures designed or taken to assure the continuity of essential functions of government in event of an enemy attack.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: That phase of intelligence covering all activities devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to protecting information from espionage, personnel from subversion, and installations and material from sabotage.

Crippling: The degree of destruction, disruption, and loss of life that, while not decisive, would raise serious question as to the ability to recover and regain former status.

DAMAGED AREA: An area suffering from blast and thermal damage from a nuclear attack, including secondary fires. This area, or part thereof, may also suffer effects from radioactive fallout.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: The appraisal of the effects of enemy attacks on resources and exploration of alternative programs for the use of surviving resources.

D-DAY: The term used to designate the day on which an attack is made on the United States.

DECONTAMINATION: The process of reducing the personnel hazard associated with an object or area by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical, biological, radiological or toxicological agents clinging to or around it.

DEFENSE MOBILIZATION: The employment of government and the national economy for meeting essential civilian and military requirements.
DEFENSE SUPPORTING REQUIREMENTS: That portion of the Nation's resources which must be allocated to the civilian economy in order to assure adequate production and logistical support of the mobilization and combat operations of the Armed Forces of the United States.

DIRECTIVE: A communication in which a policy is established or a specific action is ordered. A document issued with a view of placing its provisions in effect when so ordered, or in the event that a stated contingency arises. Broadly speaking, any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct or procedure.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL: The total capacity of a nation to produce goods and services.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL FOR WAR: That share of the economic potential of a nation which can be used for the purposes of war.

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION: All those emergency or wartime economic measures designed to stabilize the economy or, in the event of attack upon the United States, to restore our economy and, thereafter, to stabilize it. These economic measures would include indirect instruments concerned with fiscal and monetary policies, as well as direct instruments such as rationing, allocation of consumer goods and price, wage, and rent controls.

ECONOMIC WARFARE: The application, in peace or war, of measures for the purpose of influencing the economic potential, primarily the economic potential for war, of one or more nations vis-a-vis others, in furtherance of national security objectives.


EMERGENCY RELOCATION SITE: The location to which a headquarters or field office may be evacuated. This site should be capable of operating for the duration of the emergency and include capabilities of expansion to meet full mobilization requirements.
EMERGENCY WELFARE SERVICES: Feeding; clothing, housing or lodging in private and congregate facilities; registration; locating and reuniting families; care of unaccompanied children; the aged; the handicapped, and other groups needing specialized care or service; necessary financial assistance or assistance in kind, counseling and referral services to families and individuals; aid to welfare institutions under national emergency or post-attack conditions; and all other feasible welfare aid and services to people in need during a civil defense emergency. Such measures include organization, direction, and provision of services to be instituted before attack in the event of strategic or tactical evacuation and after attack.

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS: Those functions of the Federal government as determined by departments and agencies thereof and approved for the President by the Director, OCDM, which are necessary to the accomplishment of the indispensable operations of government in war time.


EXERCISE: A maneuver, drill, or operation carried out for training or discipline.

FACILITY: A physical plant which provides the means of assisting or making easier the performance of a function. The term facility includes real estate and all improvements thereto such as buildings and equipment. For example, factory, arsenal, hospital.

FALLOUT: The process of precipitation to earth of particulate matter from an atomic cloud, also applied in a collective sense to the particulate matter itself. Although not necessarily so, such particulate matter is generally radioactive.

FALLOUT AREA: An area subject to residual nuclear radiation sufficient to cause death and sickness, and thus preventing free movement of personnel.

FEDERAL AGENCY: Any executive department, independent establishment, commission, board, bureau, division or office in the Executive Branch of the United States Government as listed in
FEDERAL AGENCY FIELD ESTABLISHMENTS: Offices, installations or representatives of the Federal Executive Branch of Government (including those normally under the direction of but not necessarily a formal part of the Executive Branch) not located at the seat of government or constituting or designated as a National Headquarters.

FOREIGN REQUIREMENTS: The requirements (see definition) for resources necessary to assist friendly foreign countries in maintaining their civilian economies in a state of productive efficiency and, in a post nuclear attack, assuring survival of their remaining populations and restoring their productivity, with due attention to both physical well-being and morale. Not included are those quantities of items necessary to provide military support of friendly or enemy civilian populations in combat areas. (See definition for Military Requirements.)

FUNCTIONS: The appropriate or assigned duties of an individual, office or organization. (As defined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term "function" includes functions, powers and duties. As defined in Functions of the Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff, approved by the Secretary of Defense 1 October 1953, the term "function" includes responsibility, missions and tasks.)

HARDENING: Reducing the vulnerability of a structure, device or system by strengthening its material components or otherwise increasing its physical protection against deliberate, accidental or natural damage or wear.

HEALTH MANPOWER: Physicians including osteopaths, dentists, sanitary engineers, registered nurses, and those occupations included in the List of Health Manpower Occupations issued by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization after consultation with the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, and such other personnel as may be allotted by a General Manpower Agency in an emergency.

HEALTH RESOURCES: The manpower, materiel and facilities required to prevent the impairment of, improve, and restore the physical and mental health conditions of the civilian population.
HEALTH SERVICES: Medical and dental care in all of their specialties and adjunct therapeutic fields; and the planning, provision, and operation of first aid stations, hospitals, and clinics, preventive health services, including detection, identification and control hazards; inspection and control of purity of food, drugs and biologicals; food and milk sanitation; public water supplies; sewage and other waste disposal; registration and disposal of the dead; prevention and alleviation of water pollution; vital statistics services; preventive and curative care related to human exposure to radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents; and rehabilitation and related services for disabled survivors.

H-HOUR: The term used to designate the hour on which attack is made.

INTELLIGENCE: The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to planning.

INTERSTATE COMPACT: Agreement between two or more States to commit supplies, materials, equipment, or forces to each other to alleviate the effects of attack.

INTERSTATE TARGET AREA: Any metropolitan complex or other attack objective situated in two or more States.

INTERSTATE MUTUAL-AID PERIMETER: Boundaries of a geographical area agreed upon by the State and between two or more political subdivisions within the State for purposes of planning for the exchange of supplies, materials, equipment or forces to each other to alleviate the effects of attack.

INVASION: A warlike or hostile incursion into the possessions or domains of another. Included in the possessions and domains are land areas, territorial waters surrounding land areas and the air space overlying both.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Any county, city, village, town, metropolitan area, district, or other political subdivision of any state or territory.
MATERIALS: Raw matter, articles, commodities, products, supplies, equipment, components, technical information, and processes but excluded are those source materials, by-product materials, and special nuclear materials as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

M-DAY: The day designated as the beginning of a mobilization period.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITY: The provision of resources of the Military Departments to aid civil authorities in maintenance of law and order, and to assist in the recovery from the effects of disaster. The term is synonymous with "Military Support".

MILITARY AREAS: Those geographical areas designated by the Secretary of Defense for military purposes from which any and all persons may be excluded and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary may impose at his discretion.

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS: The requirements for resources necessary for the Armed Forces of the United States to perform their assigned missions. Military requirements include those resources necessary to provide military support of our allies and minimum support of friendly or enemy civilian population in the combat areas. Not included are those quantities of items which may be required for transfer from the Armed Forces for civil defense purposes in the event of attack on the United States or as a result of other disasters. (See definitions of Requirements and Resources).

MISSION: A duty, goal or objective assigned to an individual or unit.

MOBILIZATION: The calling-up of reserves and the assembly of military forces in order to meet a national emergency; the process of augmentation associated with these actions. The act of organizing and marshalling national resources to achieve national objectives and placing the Nation, including civil defense, in a state of readiness to meet a military threat.

MOBILIZATION BASE: The total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. They include resources required for the support of essential military, civilian, and survival activities as well as the elements affecting their state of readiness, such as, but not limited to manning levels: state of training, modernization of equipment, material
of the people; international agreements, planning with industry; dispersion; and legislation.

MONITORING: The procedure or operation of locating and measuring radioactive contamination by means of survey instruments which indicate the residual radioactivity in terms of radiation intensity. The individual performing the operation is called a monitor.

NATIONAL EMERGENCY: A condition proclaimed by the President or by action of the Congress that requires extraordinary measures to insure national safety and welfare.

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS: All inter-connected services for transporting persons and goods by public or private means, whether of a local, intercity or interstate character, which are determined to be essential to the national effort in time of war or national emergency.

NON-INTERRUPTIVE FUNCTIONS: Those essential functions which if interrupted or discontinued would affect vitally the survival of the nation post-attack.

OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS: The functions (see definition) assigned to agencies in the Executive Branch of the Federal government in Federal Emergency Plans.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY: The post-attack ability of qualified personnel using facilities available to carry out effectively assigned wartime responsibilities.

OPERATIONAL READINESS: The establishment pre-attack of an operational capability to carry out all assigned wartime functions.

PHYSICAL SECURITY: Security against sabotage, espionage, and other hostile activities, destructive acts and omissions, but excluding security attributable to operations of military defense and excluding also activities with respect to dispersal and post-attack restoration of facilities.

POLITICAL SUBDIVISION: Any county, city, town, or other local government of any State, Territory or Possession of the United States.
PRIORITY: The preference which contracts or orders, designated by
the government as important to national defense or survival of
the Nation, shall be given by a supplier or facility to assure
completion or delivery of goods, or performance of services,
ahread of other contracts or orders not so designated, Order
of preference based on urgency, importance or merit.

PROPAGANDA: Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals
disseminated to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or
behavior of any specified group in order to serve the purposes
of the sponsor either directly or indirectly.

PROGRAM: The scheduling of future activities so as to meet projected
requirements.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION: The deposit of radioactive material
on the surfaces of structures, areas, objects, animals or persons
following a nuclear explosion. This material generally consists
of radioactive fallout in which fission products and other bomb
debris have become incorporated with particles of dirt, etc.

REGIONAL DIRECTOR: Director of one of the regional offices of the
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

REQUIREMENTS: The need or demand for resources, by specified
quantities for specific periods of time or at specified times.

REQUISITION: Government action to demand or acquire property or
services needed immediately for purposes of common defense
and general welfare without regard to the willingness of the
owners or suppliers to provide them, as distinguished from
normal procurement. Requisitioning implies payment of fair
value for the goods or services furnished as guaranteed by the
5th Amendment to the Constitution.

RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES:
  a. The Army National Guard of the United States
  b. The Army Reserve
  c. The Naval Reserve
  d. The Marine Corps Reserve
  e. The Air National Guard of the United States
  f. The Air Force Reserve
  g. The Coast Guard Reserve
RESOURCES: The means available to a person, an organization, a nation, etc., for the achievement of an end or for carrying out a function or mission; Resources may be tangible, i.e., materials, persons, facilities, property, services and money, or intangible, i.e., economic capabilities, psychological qualities, educational potential, organizational ability and the like.

SABOTAGE: Any positive action taken deliberately by an agent or sympathizer of one country, coalition, or faction to impede, obstruct, or interrupt normal processes of production, or the regular work of employees, or the scheduled build-up of a war effort within an area controlled by another country, coalition, or faction. The damage resulting from such action.


SERVICES: Organizations which perform labor for others without producing tangible commodities, for example: transportation service or telecommunication service.

STRATEGIC ALERT CADRE: Individuals or staff units of executive branch agencies which, with very short warning, can move to relocation sites and conduct minimum essential functions of the agency until additional personnel arrive or can be recruited.

STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE: Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war.

STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIAL: A material required for essential uses in a war emergency, the procurement of which in adequate quantity, quality or time, is sufficiently uncertain, for any reason, to require prior provision of the supply thereof.

STRATEGIC WARNING: Knowledge of probable attack in advance of the launching of such an attack.
SURVIVAL ITEMS: Those items which would be required, following nuclear attack, to sustain life at a productive level and without which over a period of time great numbers of people might die or have their health so seriously impaired as to imperil the national survival effort.

TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT: The phase, or phases, of air operations which assist in the furtherance of a land campaign. It includes support of ground forces by air action against enemy air and land objectives as well as against enemy ground forces in the battle area.

TACTICAL WARNING: Knowledge of probable attack after such attack has been launched.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS: Any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writings, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, visual or other electromagnetic systems.

UNDAMAGED AREA: An area free of blast and thermal damage and relatively free of residual nuclear radiation. Personnel may move freely without acquiring disabling radiation sickness, although in some instances personnel would be required to spend non-working time in shelters.

UNITED STATES: The several states, the District of Columbia, and the several territories and possessions of the United States, including the territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof.

WELFARE RESOURCES: The manpower, materials, and facilities required to provide assistance and services to people in need during a civil defense emergency.

WELFARE SERVICES: It is suggested that the definition used in the proposed "Executive Order Assigning Certain Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization Functions Concerning Education and Welfare to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare" be used in this Annex.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE
MOBILIZATION

April, 1959

PROCEDURES
FOR
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

ANNEX E
TO
FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS
ANNEX E - FEDERAL EMERGENCY PLANS

CONTENTS

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B. TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS AND AUTHORITY

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1. Presidential Emergency Action is the term applied to the possible action that may be taken by the President to meet the situation described in the particular Federal Emergency Plan, including submission to the Congress of required legislation. Presidential Emergency Actions prescribe and implement national policies, assign responsibilities and delegate authorities. All other planning and readiness measures to meet the described situation will be consistent therewith. In an actual situation, the President retains the power of decision as to whether or not to take the actions, the scope of actions if taken, their timing and sequence, alternative course of action and other considerations.


3. Presidential Emergency Action Documents consisting of executive orders, proclamations, other directives, and drafts of required legislation, will be provided to implement all Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements listed in the Federal Emergency Plans.

4. Departments and agencies having direct or indirect responsibility for carrying out Presidential Emergency Actions, or portions thereof, in an emergency shall establish and maintain operational capability therefor, as a current planning responsibility. Operational Capability includes:

   a. Preparation of emergency operational plans through all organizational levels appropriate to emergency functions;

   b. Maintenance of adequate communications facilities at necessary national and regional relocation sites to receive and issue information;

   c. Maintenance at appropriate relocation and other sites of responsible personnel with delegated authority adequate to carry out the emergency functions of the department or agency;

   d. Pre-positioning at all appropriate organizational levels and locations of Presidential Emergency Action Documents, and of specific agency plans and documents as will fully implement Presidential Emergency Actions;
5. Nothing herein shall be construed as in any manner altering department and agency responsibility to insure the presentation of Presidential Emergency Actions and supporting Presidential Emergency Action Documents to the President in time of emergency.

B. TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ACTIONS AND AUTHORITY

1. PRESIDENTIAL PLAN C ACTIONS - matters of national importance which are expected to require execution by the President to meet the situation. Presidential Plan C Actions consist of (1) those actions for which legal authority presently exists; (2) those actions which are dependent upon the enactment of new enabling legislation.

2. PRESIDENTIAL PLAN D-MINUS ACTIONS - matters of supreme national importance in a civil-defense emergency, which are expected to require execution by the President on D-Day or at an appropriate time thereafter. Presidential Plan D-Minus Actions consist of, in order of urgency, (1) H. Hour actions i.e. those actions to be taken immediately by the President, wherever he may be, upon enemy attack, or intelligence to the effect that attack has been launched even though physical damage to the U.S. has not yet occurred, (2) D-Day actions, i.e. those actions to be taken as soon as possible on D-Day; (3) Reserve actions, i.e., those actions to be taken as soon as prevailing conditions demonstrate the need therefor.

3. REQUIRED LEGISLATION - matters of national importance requiring the enactment of enabling legislation before the President or other officials are empowered to take action. These actions as listed in Federal Emergency Plans describe (1) the required legislation, and (2) the Presidential Emergency Action in implementation thereof.

4. PRE-EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATIONS - Presidential or other delegations of authority which have already been promulgated and emergency statutes already enacted or which are proposed for promulgation or enactment in the near future and prior to the emergency and which will become operative automatically under the situations as described in Federal Emergency Plans.

5. AUTHORITY - in the preparation of Presidential Emergency Actions and supporting Documents to meet a situation:

a. which assumes a civil-defense emergency, statutory authorities relied upon where available. Where such authorities are not
obtaining such authorities would jeopardize the national security, the extraordinary powers of the President under the Constitution shall be used as legal authority for the required actions. Appropriate legislation will be requested as soon as possible.

b. which does not assume a civil-defense emergency, existing statutory authorities shall be relied upon, or the actions shall be dependent upon the enactment of new enabling legislation.

C. PROCEDURES


   a. Normally, Summary Statements of proposed Presidential Emergency actions including required legislation are submitted by departments and agencies to the Director. Plans Development and Review, OCDM, for review by the Mobilization Plans Group. This Group, chaired by the Director, is advisory to the Deputy Assistant Director for Federal, State and Local Plans. The statements are reviewed in context of the planning assumptions and other plans, and are recommended for approval, modification or rejection as may be warranted in the circumstances.

   b. It is only on the basis of approved Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements and their inclusion in the Plan, that the Presidential Emergency Action Documents are developed and submitted to the White House Office for approval. However, departments and agencies are responsible for recommending promptly to OCDM, deletions, changes in, or new Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements at any time the need therefor develops.

2. Submission of Presidential Emergency Action Documents

An original and two copies of each document required to implement a Presidential Emergency Action shall be prepared by the responsible department or agency, double spaced, on size 8x10 1/2" paper and forwarded to the Director, Office of Federal Plans, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
3. **Cover Sheet**

A uniform cover sheet shall be completed similar to the sample, Attachment "A", and appended to each copy of the document.

4. **Descriptive Statement**

A descriptive statement shall be prepared and attached to each copy of the document. The statement should contain such explanatory background material as will fully reveal the need for the document, its nature, significance and merits. Each statutory provision (with U.S. Code Citation) involved in the document, including those relied upon and those affected, should be cited in the descriptive statement, as well as the wartime or other emergency precedent, if any, and any departure therefrom with explanation. Any problems, ramifications, or delicate aspects of the documents, should be reported. In general, the information on the descriptive statement should permit the making of decisions as to recommending the document to the President and as to the adoption thereof by the President.

5. **Security Classification**

a. If the document contains information requiring protection in the interest of national defense, it shall be given an appropriate security classification according to the provisions of Executive Order 10501. No reference shall be made in the document to the Federal Emergency Plan which the document implements or its status, purpose or use, except as may be required in the context of the document to accomplish the purpose for which it is intended. Therefore, if a classification is required, it will be on the basis of the document's own contents and no consideration need to be given to the Plan which it implements or, normally, to its relationship to other documents, except that documents implementing Presidential Plan D-Minus Actions will have a minimum classification of CONFIDENTIAL during the document development and clearance process until their submission to the White House Office. If, of course, the contents of a document warrants a higher classification, it shall be accorded such classification.

b. Similarly, the descriptive statement will be classified according to its own contents. However, it may require classification when the basic document is unclassified, or a higher classification than the basic document since it may contain information as to the time of use of the document, its intended purpose, its relationship to the Federal Emergency Plan or to other documents, etc.
c. The cover sheet shall be protected by an appropriate security classification of "CONFIDENTIAL" or higher since it contains reference to the Federal Emergency Plan and other pertinent information for the attention of the President. It will be classified at least as high as the most highly classified attachment thereto.

6. Review and clearance of documents

a. OCDM will provide staff review to assure that documents adequately reflect the intent of the Presidential Emergency Action Summary Statements which they implement in the Plan and are otherwise consistent with OCDM policy, with the Plan and with other documents. Where changes are necessary, the document may be returned to the originating agency for revision and re-submission.

b. After OCDM review, documents will be forwarded to the Bureau of the Budget for interagency comment and clearance, review by the Department of Justice as to form and legality, and submission to the White House Office. When the Bureau of the Budget or the Department of Justice clearance processes result in substantive revision of a document, it shall be returned to OCDM for review and clearance with the initiating agency before submission to the White House Office.

c. Agencies are not authorized to reproduce documents, their cover sheets or supporting papers except during the clearance process and upon the express approval of OCDM in each instance.

7. Approval, distribution and execution of Plan C Documents

a. Presidential Plan C Documents are approved for planning purposes and for consideration by the President in a Plan C emergency. After such approval the documents will be reproduced by OCDM and copies thereof will be distributed to Action and Information agencies as noted on the cover sheets. Additional copies as required by departments and agencies for planning purposes and for emergency readiness will be provided upon receipt of written request therefor to the Director, Office of Federal Plans, OCDM. Such written request should contain a brief explanation of the purpose for which the additional copies are needed.
b. In the event of an actual situation, similar to that described in Plan C, the documents will be evaluated in the light of the actual circumstances existing and would be implemented, adapted or modified as might be required. In such an event, to the extent the President deems it necessary, he may consult the department and agency heads responsible for preparation of the documents prior to execution thereof.

c. Notification of the execution of such documents in an emergency and dissemination of copies thereof will be by regularly established means.

8. Approval, reproduction and distribution of Plan D-Minus Documents

a. Presidential Plan D-Minus documents are approved by the President for planning purposes and for inclusion in his Emergency File. After such approval, they are positioned so as to be at all times immediately available, to the President for possible execution by him in a D-Minus type of emergency.

b. For planning purposes and to insure prompt implementation in an emergency, photo-offset copies of these documents in limited numbers, as set forth below, will be provided to those departments and agencies requiring advance knowledge of the contents of these documents. These copies must be pre-positioned at relocation sites and other necessary locations so that they will immediately be available to agency heads and authorized personnel in an emergency.

b. After a document is approved by the President for inclusion in his Emergency File, it will be reproduced by Photo-offset process and copies so made will be serially numbered by OCDM. One photo-offset copy will be supplied to each Action and Information address for inclusion in the Emergency File of the agency head, and one additional copy is authorized for prepositioning in each agency relocation site (except field relocation sites), providing that secure storage facilities and cleared personnel are available at such site to receive and control classified information.

c. Dissemination of additional photo-offset copies of Presidential Emergency Documents by OCDM will be rigidly controlled and reproduction by departments and agencies is forbidden (See sub-paragraph "f"). Departments and agencies believing they need additional photo-offset copies should submit requests therefor with accompanying justification to the Director, Office of Federal Plans, OCDM. Such justification should describe the need for and the pro-
d. Two photo-offset copies of all documents will be forwarded to the Emergency Federal Register Division of General Services Administration for pre-positioning at the Division's relocation site.

e. Where all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch are Action or Information Addressees on a document, photo-offset copies of that document will be provided only to departments and agencies equipped to receive and control classified information. There will be no pre-emergency distribution to agencies not so equipped. Distribution to these latter agencies will be made by the Emergency Federal Register Division as soon as practicable following execution by the President in an emergency. Agencies having no relocation site, or no secure storage facilities at a relocation site, will not receive photo-offset copies for such locations.

f. Agencies are not authorized to reproduce, in full or in part, any Presidential Emergency Document or supporting paper until execution thereof by the President in an emergency. Security of these documents prior to execution is a paramount consideration. Upon such execution, the documents become unclassified. For training and planning purposes, however, including the development of implementing plans by agencies, a department or agency head having responsibility pursuant to a Presidential Emergency Document is authorized to implement such document by issuance of a department or agency directive or other appropriate instrument which may contain all or some of the language as contained in the Presidential Emergency Document, providing that no reference is made in the agency instrument to the Presidential document and that the language in the agency instrument so issued be presented as the language of the agency itself.

g. Photo-offset copies of Presidential Emergency Documents must be held under strict accountability. Periodic reports will be required by the OCDM.


a. Each document will be assigned a code word. For each agency, an Emergency Code Word List will be prepared relating the assigned code words to the identification numbers of the documents or documents the agency holds. One such Code Word List will be provided by OCDM for each set of documents held. No reproduction of Code Word Lists in whole or in part is authorized.
b. Where field elements of agencies have emergency operational responsibilities, or otherwise need to know of an emergency action taken by the President, agencies in framing their supporting emergency plans should establish their own means of conveying immediate notification to these field elements, (Field elements should be instructed upon receipt of such notification, to undertake necessary implementing action immediately and without further direction);

c. For purposes of pre-emergency security, code words will not appear and must not be placed on the photo-offset copies of the document or on the Distribution Cover Sheet therefor.

d. Identification of the Emergency Document signed by the President must be made by relating the code word to the opposite document number on the Code Word List, and then by relating such document number to the document itself (the document number appears on the Distribution Cover Sheet attached to the photo-offset copy of the document.). Code Word Lists will be distributed in sealed envelopes to Agency heads with instructions (as indicated on Attachment "B") that they should not be opened except upon receipt of a message to the effect that the President has signed certain Emergency Documents signified by code words. The sealed envelopes containing the Code Word Lists will not be delivered to the Agency head simultaneously with the photo-offset copies of the documents to which the lists apply. In accordance with standard procedures, separate storage facilities must be provided for the photo-offset copies of the documents and the Code Word Lists.

e. Periodically, code words assigned to documents will be changed. New Code Word Lists will be provided to agencies and the old lists must be returned to OCDM.

10. Notification of Execution of Plan D-Minus Documents

a. In the event an emergency arises and the President executes an Emergency Document, notification of such execution to Action and Information Addressees will be by the most expeditious means available. Code Words transmitted via the Government Communications Network (Govnet), (Attachment "C"), will be used for notification if possible. Code Words may also be transmitted by other means. Emergency conditions, however, may dictate notification by transmission of the full text. Code Words or full
text also may be transmitted by other means. Action and Information Addressees should be prepared to take implementing action upon receipt of notification by any means of communications (commercial, broadcast, telegraph, etc.)

b. If use is made of the code word as a means of notification, a message pertaining thereto will be sent by the most expeditious means available to Action and Information Addressees, similar, for example, to the following:

"The President has this date signed the following Emergency Action Documents: COMEX, BANANA, FINANCIAL, GOLDEN. FINANCIAL is changed as follows: Quote first line second paragraph...etc."

Upon receipt of such a message, a Department or Agency should refer to its Code Word List. If the Code Word and a photo-offset copy of the document to which it relates are held by the department or agency, that department or agency should without further direction immediately take all necessary implementing action with respect to the document concerned, including appropriate notification to field elements having implementing responsibilities.

c. Any agency receiving a message containing a code word or words not on its Code Word List should disregard such word or words.

d. Where the Action and/or Information Addressee on a document are all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch and the Govnet is employed as the primary means of notification, the code word will be transmitted only to those agencies on the Govnet. Notification to agencies not on the Govnet will be accomplished by the Emergency Federal Register Division, or by other means as facilities permit.

11. Annual Review of Approved Documents

a. Departments and agencies are responsible for recommending promptly to OCDM any necessary changes in Presidential Emergency Action Documents at any time after they are approved as specified in paragraphs C.7 and C.8 herein.

b. An agency responsible for the initial preparation and submission of a Presidential Emergency Action Document is also responsible
it is (1) compatible with the national Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, (2) currently conforms to the particular Federal Emergency Plan the document implements, and (3) realistically reflects the possible action that should be taken by the President to meet the situation described in the Plan in terms of (a) weapons developments and other technical data, (b) the availability of resources, and (c) current assignments of emergency responsibility and delegations of authority.

c. On or about the anniversary date of the approval of a Presidential Emergency Action Document, the OCDM will address a letter to the responsible agency, requesting review of the document. The agency will accomplish the review, including appropriate clearances with any other interested departments or agencies, and will, within 20 days of the receipt of the request from OCDM, reply by letter that (1) no changes are recommended, or (2) changes are recommended as contained in a proposed draft which is to be forwarded with the agency reply.

d. Upon receipt of agency recommendations, OCDM will perform any appropriate staff review and arrange for a review of the document and any pertinent recommendations by the Mobilization Plans Group. Following such review, if there is no significant substantive change, OCDM will by letter so inform the White House Office. If any substantive change in the document is recommended, OCDM will prepare a revised document, bearing the original identification number but showing the month of the proposed revision, and transmit it to the Bureau of the Budget for appropriate clearance and recommendation to the White House Office.
Description of Document

(Title, and sufficient additional descriptive matter to reveal the contents, scope and effect of the document.)

Conditions Precedent to Execution

(e.g. attack on the Continental United States; engagement of U.S. military forces by an aggressor; declaration of national emergency; prior execution of other document(s) or legislative action on which this document depends, etc.)

Action Addressees

(Departments and/or agencies responsible for action when document is executed.)

Information Addressees

(Departments and/or agencies which need to know of execution of document in order to carry on related activities.)

Actions Required of White House Subsequent to Execution

(e.g. submission of legislative proposals; announcement to the people; conferences with representatives of other countries, etc.)

Attachments

(Descriptive statement and any other data necessary to facilitate understanding and use of the document.)

Classification of Document Prior to Execution

Classification of Document after Execution
OUTSIDE ENVELOPE

THIS ENVELOPE CONTAINS AN EMERGENCY CODE WORD LIST FOR USE ONLY IN A CIVIL DEFENSE EMERGENCY IN REFERRING TO PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY ACTION DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED IN OCDM EMERGENCY PLANS.

List No. __  Issue Date ___________________________ Receiving Agency ___________________

Name of Permanent Custodian ____________________________

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Each Presidential Emergency Action Document for which your agency has responsibility is assigned a code word on the list contained herein. In the event an emergency arises and the President executes an Emergency Action Document, a message pertaining to the code word may be sent to Action and Information Addressees, similar, for example, to the following:

"The President has this date signed the following Emergency Action Documents: COMEX, BANANA, FINANCIAL, GOLDEN. FINANCIAL is changed as follows: Quote first line second paragraph . . . . etc."

Upon receipt of such a message, open this envelope and the inner envelope and refer to the Code Word List. Opposite the code word is the document number. The document number also appears on the Distribution Cover Sheet of the photo-offset copy of the document. (note 6, below).

3. IF THE CODE WORD APPEARS ON YOUR LIST AND YOU HOLD THE PHOTO-OFFSET COPY OF THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH IT RELATES, YOU SHOULD WITHOUT FURTHER DIRECTION IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THE DOCUMENT. THIS INCLUDES NOTIFICATION TO ALL INDIVIDUALS ORGANIZATION UNITS AND FIELD ELEMENTS HAVING EMERGENCY OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE DOCUMENT.

4. Any agency receiving a message containing a code word or code words not on the Code Word List should disregard such word or words.

5. No part of these instructions may be reproduced.

6. This envelope must not be stored in the same safe (or other secure container) as your photo-offset copies of Presidential Emergency Action Documents.

7. Any questions regarding the storage or use of this envelope or its contents should be referred to the Director, Office of Federal Plans, Office of Civil and Defense Mobil-
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
(Govnet)

Agriculture, Department of
Atomic Energy Commission
Bureau of the Budget
Central Intelligence Agency
Civil Aeronautics Board
Civil Service Commission
Commerce, Department of
Council of Economic Advisors
Defense, Department of (Incl. Coast Guard)
Emergency Censorship Agency
Emergency Communications Agency
Emergency Stabilization Agency
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors)
General Services Administration
Health, Education and Welfare, Department of
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Housing and Home Finance Agency
Interior, Department of
International Cooperation Administration
Interstate Commerce Commission
Justice, Department of
Labor, Department of
National Security Council
National Science Foundation
Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Post Office Department
Selective Service System
Small Business Administration
State, Department of
Treasury, Department of
U. S. Information Agency
Veterans Administration
White House