Mr. STEVENS. Now, Mr. President, it becomes apparent that the Navy really devoted a great deal of time and manpower to this epic research. Not just a rating on rollcall votes, it analyzes the so-called Military Reform Caucus philosophy. 

The Caucus from top to bottom. The character, history, and future direction of Member Committee Assignments, and read the individual profiles of each member.

That took work, Mr. President, and I believe it is a valuable exercise. To my mind, it smacks of the same unethical—perhaps illegal—conduct we recently read about the Air Force and its wide-open lobbying, its wide-open lobbying, the C-5B procurement issue. This Navy effort may be not be direct lobbying, but it is a worksheet for those who will be in a position to lobby Congress, directly or indirectly.

The distribution list mentioned in the Defense Week story is equally interesting. The memorandum went to the Navy’s Chief of Information, who is not exactly in the business of supplying the Navy’s views. What was the Chief of Information supposed to do with the memorandum? Was it circulated by the Navy to every Member of Congress? How far is this went and to what extent it might have been used to influence Members of Congress?

Mr. President, the Senate Appropriations Committee plays a small part in deciding how much funding goes to the military and for what purpose. I can tell you, as chairman of the subcommittee most involved in Defense Appropriations, that I personally never intended public funds to be used for that purpose—or for the purposes used in lobbying for the C-5B for that matter. I do not think any other member of the subcommittee or the full committee did, either.

My purpose in speaking on this subject, Mr. President, is not only to bring this kind of activity to the attention of the Senate but to serve notice on the Navy and everyone else in a position of responsibility in the Pentagon that the time for this kind of conduct is over. I think Congress is getting tired of the Defense Department winking at the law forbidding the use of public funds to lobby Congress. I think Congress is getting tired of the need congressional relations as a license to maneuver and manipulate those of us who are elected to oversee the use of taxpayer support of the Government.

There is a remedy through the appropriations process, Mr. President, and I intend to seek it and apply it. One of the President’s great deal of time and money disturbs me. First, I am not a member of the Military Reform Caucus, somehow my name was placed on the list at one time and I have not written to them asking that it be removed. I did not put it on so I did not know it in my opinion, however, the Navy’s House committee rating of those who are going to say the Senator is not compassionate? It is a waste of taxpayers’ money; it is wrong, and we ought to stop it and stop it forthwith.

I congratulate the Senator from Alaska for taking the position he has taken this morning.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from Alaska. He is 100 percent correct. It is a terrible precedent. Supposing it should be done by the Justice Department. Are they going to rate Members of Congress on the Navy rating list and order? Supposing it happened in Human Services, are they going to say the Senator is not compassionate? It is a waste of taxpayers’ money; it is wrong, and we ought to stop it and stop it forthwith.

I congratulate the Senator from Alaska for taking the position he has taken this morning.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from Wisconsin, and I am delighted he made the comments.

I might add that I am going to have printed in the Register in full those Members who were rated. But, unfortunately, the Navy did not take time to rate everybody. They just rated those who are on the Military Reform Caucus mailing list.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
LIMITATION

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the period for transaction of routine morning business Senators may be recognized to speak therein for not more than 3 minutes each.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Under the previous order, the Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield such time as he may require from the time allotted to me to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader, and I shall be brief.

THE U.S. CHAIN OF COMMAND IN A NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this Senator cannot think of anything less than an all out nuclear war involving the United States of America. On the other hand, I do not think Art Buchwald, or the great master of satire, Voltaire could improve on the rich irony and utter ridiculousness of our preparation as a nation for this most terrible of events. In the Ed Zuckerman article from which I have been quoting in the past few days to describe this Nation’s preparation, the
chain of command is described. Here is how it starts:

The chief someone in charge of directing things on the ground will be, of course, the President; so elaborate plans have been formulated to make sure there is a President after a nuclear attack—and only one President, if the original President isn’t around anymore. “One of the things we discovered is that there was no authenticating mechanism,” said Harold G. Giffen, the Reagan appointee as director of FEMA, in a recent speech to a civil-defense organization. “So if (someone) got on the phone and said, ‘I’m the successor,’ and somebody else said, ‘Prove it,’ (no one could). So we’re working on that. FEMA will be the authenticating mechanism to say, ‘Yeah, this guy’s for real. The President’s gone and we don’t know where the Vice-President is ...’”

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining excerpt from the article by Ed Zuckerman in the March 1982 issue of Esquire magazine be printed in the Record.

The objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chief someone in charge of directing things on the ground will be, of course, the President; so elaborate plans have been formulated to make sure there is a President after a nuclear attack—and only one President, if the original President isn’t around anymore. “One of the things we discovered is that there was no authentication system,” said Harold G. Giffen, the Reagan appointee as director of FEMA, in a recent speech to a civil-defense organization. “So that (someone) got on the phone and said, ‘I’m the successor,’ and somebody else said, ‘Prove it,’ (no one could). So we’re working on that. FEMA will be the authenticating mechanism to say, ‘Yeah, this guy’s for real. The President’s gone and we don’t know where the Vice-President is ...’”

It is the plan to emplace a President in the event of nuclear war. Eighty miles west of Washington, near the town of Paris, Virginia, the complex contains offices, dormitories, computers, briefing papers, a reservoir, and Public Health Service Health Unit No. 1, a fully staffed hospital where any official assigned to Mount Weather can get a free checkup at any time. But Mount Weather was built during the 1950s, and the Russians know where it is. Enemy forces, equipped with modern nuclear weapons, “can dig out anything they want now,” points out John J. Policastro, a retired Army officer who directs FEMA’s Continuity of Government division.

“Do you scrap something like Mount Weather?” he pondered during a recent interview. “Its capital costs are amortized, and its life survives for a very long time. The building costs of a place like that are pretty cheap. ... Maybe at some point, when you have plenty of it, then that money is worth expending. But not now.”

Alternatives to Mount Weather are being investigated right now. In 1980, a secret Continuity of Government study was undertaken at the request of the National Security Council; its results were incorporated in Presidential Directive 58, issued by President Carter in August 1980 in tandem with Presidential Directive 59, which made explicit a shift in American strategic doctrine toward the idea of “limited” nuclear warfare.

PD-58 is classified, but it apparently calls for a new, less centralized Continuity of Government program, relying instead on federal offices and employees already outside Washington. It is based on the “Federal Regional Reconstitution Area” planning concept, under which federal regional offices have designated certain small towns and cities with no obvious military or industrial targets as potential government centers.

“If you can disperse your people so that if Russia wanted to target them it would soak up a large number of weapons,” said one FEMA planner, “they’d have to judge, ‘Is it worth expending so many weapons?’ If you build that kind of system, what have you done? You’ve assured the survival of Washington.”

OMISSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS SHOULD NOT DETER SENATORIAL ACTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the 34-year history of the Genocide Convention has included repeated failures to gain the necessary support and persistent opposition. Most arguments against ratification have arisen because of what the treaty contains; however, one objection has surfaced because of what the treaty omits.

Some people who oppose this treaty believe it does not adequately deal with the problem of genocide because...