

Mr. STEVENS. Now, Mr. President, it becomes apparent that the Navy really devoted a great deal of time and manpower to this epic research. Not just a rating on rollcall votes, it analyzes the so-called Military Reform Caucus from top to bottom. The caucus philosophy is examined, its numbers, its potential, its impact, its character, history, and future direction. I ask Members of the Senate to look, if you will at the "Order of Frequency of Member Committee Assignments," and read the individual profiles of each member.

That took work, Mr. President, and I resent this investment of public funds. To my mind, it smacks of the same unethical—perhaps illegal—conduct we recently read about the Air Force and its wide-open lobbying, its wide-open lobbying, on the C-5B aircraft procurement issue. This Navy effort may not be direct lobbying, but it is a worksheet for those who will be in a position to lobby Congress, directly or indirectly.

The distribution list mentioned in the Defense Week story is equally interesting. The memorandum went to the Navy's Chief of Information, who is not exactly in the business of suppressing the Navy's views. What was the Chief of Information supposed to do with the memorandum? Was it circulated beyond Navy circles? Who knows how far this went and to what extent it might have been used to influence Members of Congress?

Mr. President, the Senate Appropriations Committee plays at least a small part in deciding how much funding goes to the military and for what purpose. I can tell you, as chairman of the subcommittee most involved in Defense Department appropriations, that I personally never intended public funds to be used for that purpose—or for the purposes used in lobbying for the C-5B for that matter. I do not think any other member of the subcommittee or the full committee did, either.

My purpose in speaking on this subject, Mr. President, is not only to bring this kind of activity to the attention of the Senate but to serve notice on the Navy and everyone else in a position of responsibility in the Pentagon that the time for this kind of conduct is over. I think Congress is getting tired of the Defense Department winking at the law forbidding the use of public funds to lobby Congress. I think Congress is tired of the Department viewing congressional relations as a license to maneuver and manipulate those of us who are elected to oversee the use of taxpayer support of the Government.

There is a remedy through the appropriations process, Mr. President, and I intend to seek it and apply it.

One final thing, Mr. President, that really disturbs me. First, I am not a

member of the Military Reform Caucus—somehow my name was placed on the list at one time and I have not written to ask them to take it off; I did not put it on so I just ignored it. In my opinion however, the Navy's action shows the need for reform is certainly more evident lately.

Second, if we examine the seven votes the Navy used to rate me and other Senators, we discover that I voted against the Navy position four out of seven times. That figures out to a rating of 43 percent, not the generous 57 compiled by the astute Navy Department people in charge of congressional affairs.

And it does raise some questions about their ability to compute the vast numbers that they submit to us.

Third, anyone with even brief exposure to Capitol Hill knows that a rating based on such a narrow range of issues is misleading. It is almost worthless. In this case, it is worthless. I do not think I am exactly regarded as antidefense and certainly not anti-Navy. I did not agree with the admirals on two issues—battleship reactivation and supplemental funding for a bonus going to aviation officers. Those issues were voted on twice, and they are in the computation of the 11 as 4 separate votes. I had good reasons to oppose them on those issues, but that is beside the point. The subcommittee I chair, on my specific recommendation, delivered one of the biggest funding bills in the Navy's history. The subcommittee supported the Navy on several critical and controversial issues—issues vastly more far-reaching than reactivating the *New Jersey* and paying bonuses to airmen. We turned back attempts to reject another nuclear aircraft carrier, for instance, and we withstood a strong effort to terminate the Navy's fighter/attack plane for the future, the F/A-18. We did many other things for the Navy in reviewing its entire budget for the 1982 fiscal year.

But then, it seems, I committed the cardinal sin of voting against the Navy on two issues and I made the statement that it seemed to me that some admirals just wanted a battleship under their feet again.

Mr. President, I hope the Navy will try to avoid wasting its time and the taxpayers' money on this kind of inept and misguided activity, and I shall help them reach that conclusion. In the meantime, if they persist in this kind of political analysis, I have two messages: In the first place, I hope next time they do it right. In the second place, if this is an example of their objectivity and fairness, Mr. President, the Navy has gotten itself in harm's way.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?

Mr. STEVENS. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I commend the distinguished Senator from Alaska. He is 100 percent correct. It is a terrible precedent. Supposing it should be done by the Justice Department. Are they going to rate Members of Congress on how they rate on law and order? Supposing it happened in Human Services, are they going to say the Senator is not compassionate? It is a waste of taxpayers' money; it is wrong, and we ought to stop it and stop it forthwith.

I congratulate the Senator from Alaska for taking the position he has taken this morning.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am grateful to the Senator from Wisconsin, and I am delighted he made the comments.

I might add that I am going to have printed in the RECORD in full those Members who were rated. But, unfortunately, the Navy did not take time to rate everybody. They just rated those whose names were on the Military Reform Caucus mailing list. As I said, that was put together by someone over in the other body. I do not know anyone who voluntarily put his name on the list.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS LIMITATION

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the period for transaction of routine morning business Senators may be permitted to speak therein for not more than 3 minutes each.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### RECOGNITION OF THE MINORITY LEADER

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WALLOP). Under the previous order, the Democratic leader is recognized.

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I yield such time as he may require from the time allotted to me to the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader, and I shall be brief.

#### THE U.S. CHAIN OF COMMAND IN A NUCLEAR WAR

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this Senator cannot think of anything less funny than an all out nuclear war involving the United States of America. On the other hand, I do not think Art Buchwald, or the great master of satire, Voltaire could improve on the rich irony and utter ridiculousness of our preparation as a nation for this most terrible of events. In the Ed Zuckerman article from which I have been quoting in the past few days to describe this Nation's preparation, the

chain of command is described. Here is how it starts:

The chief someone in charge of directing things for the common good will be, of course, the President; so elaborate plans have been formulated to make sure there is a President after a nuclear attack—and only one President, if the original President isn't around anymore. "One of the things we discovered is that there was no authentication system" said General Louis Giuffrida, the Reagan appointee as director of FEMA, in a recent speech to a civil-defense organization, "So that if (someone) got on the horn and said, 'I'm the successor,' and somebody said, 'Prove it,' (no one could). So we're working on that. FEMA will be the authenticating mechanism to say, 'Yeah, this guy's for real. The President's gone and we don't know where the Vice President is . . . this is the man. . . .'"

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the remaining excerpt from the article by Ed Zuckerman in the March 1982 issue of *Esquire* magazine be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### CHAIN OF COMMAND

The chief someone in charge of directing things for the common good will be, of course, the President; so elaborate plans have been formulated to make sure there is a President after a nuclear attack—and only one President, if the original President isn't around anymore. "One of the things we discovered is that there was no authentication system," said General Louis Giuffrida, the Reagan appointee as director of FEMA, in a recent speech to a civil-defense organization. "So that if (someone) got on the horn and said, 'I'm the successor,' and somebody said, 'Prove it,' (no one could). So we're working on that. FEMA will be the authenticating mechanism to say, 'Yeah, this guy's for real. The President's gone, and we don't know where the Vice-President is . . . and this is the man.'" "To forestall any confusion, FEMA has already designed, and the White House administers, a Central Locator System for keeping tabs on the whereabouts of the President and all sixteen of his constitutionally designated successors. Upon warning of a nuclear attack on Washington, Air Force helicopters would swoop down and ferry the successors to safety. The President himself would board the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, a windowless, specially shielded, \$250 million version of the 747, which sits on permanent alert at Andrews Air Force Base.

Circling thousands of feet above the fallout, the President will have at his fingertips a copy of the classified Federal Emergency Plan D, which outlines federal recovery plans and contains a set of "Presidential Emergency Action Documents" authorizing the creation of emergency agencies and powers for mobilization and reconstruction in the event of nuclear war. A similar set of documents, designed for legislative action, are included in a compilation known as the "Other Than D Documents." These documents would be sent to Congress—if Congress still existed—for approval. If Congress had disappeared, the President could simply issue the Plan D documents as proclamations. "You won't have a big staff there to say, 'Go prepare me a legal document with all the necessary details,'" William Baird

explained, "so these have been done ahead of time."

Among the Plan D documents is a proclamation of war. "Only Congress can declare war," explained Baird. "The President can issue a proclamation that a state of war exists. Legally, a lot of things (including emergency powers) depend on that."

So the proclamation has already been drafted, with a few blanks to be filled in later. Like the date. And the name of the enemy.

While the President is in his airborne command post attending to legal details, many other situations will have to be monitored. To that end, provisions have been made for the survival of a cadre of bureaucrats from some three dozen "Category A" federal agencies, ranging from the CIA to the TVA, which are deemed to require the "capability for uninterrupted emergency operations" during "the immediate preattack, transattack and immediate postattack periods." This distinguishes them from Category B agencies, which have roles to play in "postattack reconstitution as soon as conditions permit," and the relatively expendable Category C agencies, which "are to defer reconstitution until directed by appropriate authority."

In preparation for postattack reconstitution, Category A agencies are required to safeguard essential records now. (Department of Labor guidelines suggest that such records "be wrapped in protective paper," as "experience has revealed that unprotected records not wrapped and sealed are often damaged by dust and moisture.") Category A agencies are also responsible for establishing emergency succession lists for the replacement of key officials who die in the attack. ("It is desirable to designate several executives who are frequent travelers and thus increase the likelihood that all successors will not be concentrated in the Washington capital area at any given time," advises Federal Preparedness Circular FPC-14.)

Most crucial, each Category A agency has established three emergency teams. Team A would administer from the agency's regular headquarters during the period of increased international tension that might precede a nuclear attack. Team B would report to Mount Weather, a massive underground complex that is the centerpiece of the entire "Continuity of Government" program, and would take over for Team A if Team A ceased to exist. Team C would report to its agency's secret relocation site somewhere in the Federal Relocation Arc, a network of emergency operating centers just a few hours' drive from Washington, and provide backup for teams A and B.

To aid in the case of traffic jams or other tie-ups immediately preceding or following a nuclear attack, every emergency-team member has already been issued a Federal Employee Emergency Identification Card, which carries both the bearer's photo and blood type and the message: "The person described on this card has essential emergency duties with the Federal Government. Request full assistance and unrestricted movement be afforded the person to whom this card is issued."

But certain factors may keep team members from reaching their assigned places. Most Category A agencies have made no plans for their team members' families, and a 1978 survey of 534 emergency-team members in six departments found that although more than 80 percent said they probably would report to their emergency duty sta-

tions, 76 percent said that improving provisions for their families would increase the likelihood of their showing up. "There's a fifty-fifty chance I'd go," one high-ranking official assigned to Mount Weather told me recently. "And if I do go, I'll probably take my family with me. What are the guards going to do? I don't think they'd capture me and take me inside without my family. They could turn us all away, but that misses the whole point of the thing."

Other questions have arisen about Mount Weather. Eighty miles west of Washington, near the town of Paris, Virginia, the complex contains offices, dormitories, computers, briefing papers, a reservoir, and Public Health Service Health Unit No. 1, a fully staffed hospital where any official assigned to Mount Weather can get a free checkup at any time. But Mount Weather was built during the 1950's, and the Russians know where it is. Enemy forces, equipped with modern nuclear weapons, "can dig out anything they want now," points out John J. Policastro, a retired Army officer who directs FEMA's Continuity of Government division.

"Do you scrap something like Mount Weather?" he pondered during a recent interview. "Its capital costs are amortized, and it might survive an attack. The operating costs of a place like that are pretty cheap. . . . Maybe at some point, when you have sufficient alternatives, you close it."

Alternatives to Mount Weather are being investigated right now. In 1980, a secret Continuity of Government study was undertaken at the request of the National Security Council; its results were incorporated in Presidential Directive 58, issued by President Carter in August 1980 in tandem with Presidential Directive 59, which made explicit a shift in American strategic doctrine toward the idea of "limited" nuclear warfare.

PD-58 is classified, but it apparently calls for a new, less centralized Continuity of Government program, relying instead on federal offices and employees already outside Washington. It is based on the "Federal Regional Reconstitution Area" planning concept, under which federal regional offices have designated certain small towns and cities with no obvious military or industrial targets as potential government centers in postattack America.

"If you can disperse your people so that if Russia wanted to target them it would soak up a large number of weapons," said one FEMA planner, "they'd have to judge. 'Is it worth expending so many weapons?' If you build that kind of system, what have you done? You've assured the survival of Washington."

#### OMISSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS SHOULD NOT DETER SENATORIAL ACTION

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the 34-year history of the Genocide Convention has included both wide-ranging support and persistent opposition. Most arguments against ratification have arisen because of what the treaty contains; however, one objection has surfaced because of what the treaty omits.

Some people who oppose this treaty believe it does not adequately deal with the problem of genocide because