Factsheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism

The nature and range of terrorist and violent extremist threats has evolved quickly, in a media environment that often seize on the sensational, and we must come together to channel the energies of citizens, communities, and the private sector toward building a greater sense of preparedness and resilience.

Policy Context

In August 2011, the White House released *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, the first national strategy to prevent violent extremism domestically. In December 2011, a corresponding Strategic Implementation Plan outlined the specific steps departments and agencies will take to achieve the strategy’s central goal of preventing violent extremists and their supporters from radicalizing, recruiting, or inspiring individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.

While investigations and prosecutions are essential, successfully preventing violent extremism requires a range of government tools beyond traditional law enforcement activities. CVE often involves undercutting terrorist ideologies and local drivers of radicalization, and it is therefore equally if not more important that civil society and non-governmental actors participate, particularly given government’s legal and credibility limitations in this space. As such, the underlying premise of our approach to countering violent extremism in the United States is that (1) communities are the solution to violent extremism; and (2) CVE efforts are best pursued at the local level, with considerations for local dynamics.

At the federal level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) are implementing the strategy by executing their respective missions while collaborating with other agencies to ensure a coordinated, whole-of-government approach. In the field, local governments and law enforcement agencies continue to build relationships within their communities through established community policing and community outreach mechanisms. In this respect, decades of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing provides a basis for addressing violent extremism as part of a broader mandate of community safety, with an emphasis on crime prevention.

What is CVE?

The term “Countering Violent Extremism” refers to the “preventative” aspects of counterterrorism, which refers to efforts focused on preventing future recruitment into terrorist groups. It is distinct from disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of terrorism by those who have already subscribed to violence.
CVE ranges from general prevention measures—programs that are not necessarily done for CVE purposes, but which might have CVE effects because they happen to address some of the possible causes of violent extremism (such as community engagement around civil rights issues and ensuring protections of religious freedom and protections from bullying—both of which happen to address grievances) to programs that do have a direct CVE purpose, such as:

- Violent extremism awareness: programs that build awareness of the violent extremism (such as briefings on radicalization, recruitment, and indicators).
- Counternarrative measures: programs or messages that directly address and counter the violent extremist recruitment narrative (such as encouraging community-led counternarratives online).
- Intervention measures: programs that facilitate intervention in a person’s pathway to radicalization before the line of criminal activity is crossed (such as community-led intervention models).

**Role of Local Partners**

CVE efforts rely heavily on well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions. Communities play a strong role in CVE efforts—they are the first line of defense against violent extremists, and are best suited to lead in both counternarrative and intervention measures. Communities have more credibility than government to challenge the ideological underpinnings of violent extremist groups, and they are more suited to intervene when someone is vulnerable to radicalization.

**Community Engagement on CVE**

The U.S. Government has conducted outreach in various cities across the country with law enforcement, public safety officials, and directly to communities around the threat of violent extremism and terrorist recruitment. They have used certain “CVE Tools” that include the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), as well as the Community Resilience Exercise (CREX).

- The Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) is a half-day table-top exercise designed to improve communication between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas on how best to build community resilience. DHHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (ORCL) and NCTC have worked with local partners to implement this exercise—which involves an unfolding scenario of possible violent extremist activity—in cities across the United States.

- The Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) is a presentation designed to help communities and law enforcement develop understanding of al-Qa’ida-inspired recruitment tactics and explore ways to collectively prevent and address such public safety threats at the local level. It is updated continually with new information or from feedback. Due to the growing number of individuals traveling to foreign conflicts, such as Syria and Iraq, the Community Awareness Briefing now includes information relating to the foreign fighter recruitment. The Community Awareness Briefing has been conducted by multiple U.S. cities over the past few years.
"Three Cities" Pilot Program

Over the past few months, local government and community members in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis have taken the lead in developing prevention frameworks that best address the unique issues facing their local communities. In the same way local partners have developed frameworks to address drug and gang prevention, they are developing frameworks to address violent extremism prevention. This pilot encourages local partners to develop mechanisms for engaging the resources and expertise available from a range of new partners, including the private sector, including communications and tech experts that can build capacity, and social service providers, including education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders.

Local stakeholders—which include federal, state, local, and community partners—are in the best position to identify needs and gaps in services, assess existing local programs, leverage existing networks, form new relationships, and define and develop measurable goals that they have the capacity to implement.

The Federal Government’s role is to try and provide support to help address these gaps and meet their CVE goals.

Importance of Intervention Options

There are important non-law enforcement efforts that communities can take to stop a person from radicalizing. We can learn from intervention approaches in other situations, such as gang prevention. CVE intervention would use the same principles and we can make real progress by adapting the kinds of programs we are using in non-counterterrorism areas for our needs.

- Communities are taking a strong lead. We’ve seen this locally in Montgomery County, MD, where communities and law enforcement are collaborating to bring religious figures and education and mental health officials together to help at-risk youth.

- A non-profit, WORDE, partnered with the Montgomery County Chief of Police to set up an intervention board. The police Chief has been successful in bringing local government resources, such as mental health professionals and school officials, and WORDE has brought leaders who help with religious counseling. The intervention board gets referrals from the community, and the board identified government and community resources that could be brought to the table to help.

- Also, the Muslim Public Affairs Council released their Safe Spaces Initiative, which is essentially a guide for community centers on how to deal with violent extremism in their communities using a phased approach of prevention, intervention, and ejection.

Community-led Counternarratives

- Communities have also taken a lead in creating counternarratives to violent extremists. For instance, Somali communities in Minneapolis have created “The Truth About Al Shabaab”
and "Broken Dreams" to highlight the bankrupt ideology of this terrorist group. Also, communities are utilizing social media to challenge ISIL online.

**Future Direction**

- Government will continue to support local partners' CVE frameworks, and help to ensure long-term, sustainable direction for their CVE work.
1. Thank you all for agreeing to join us tonight as we discuss the faith communities’ role in public safety and preventing violent extremism.

2. I would also like to thank our special guests for coming all the way from DC from the Dept of Homeland Security, Mr. Irfan Saeed, from the NCTC, Mr. Seamus Hughes, and from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Chaplain Ibrahim Aziz.

3. We are proud to say that this partnership between the faith community and MCPD is the first effort across the country that is community led rather than being driven by a particular law enforcement agency. We believe that gives us the opportunity to have vital input into the direction and focus of the relationship and we believe it goes a really long way into building trust between us.
   a. The faith community role in Public Safety can include a wide array of issues—anything from working together on reducing crime both in our neighborhoods and online, protecting our children from gangs and other forms abuse, or preventing Violent Extremism— which we can define simply as any ideologically motivated violence that furthers political goals.
   b. Despite what some people may think, VE is not exclusive to any one religion. In fact, of the over 63 AQ inspired plots since 9-11, about 26 of those plots involved converts so that means 1/3 of those involved grew up in a religion other than Islam.
   c. In fact, 45% of those indicted on terrorism charges since 9-11 were not Al Qaeda inspired. This tells us that no family is immune from the dangers of radicalization.

4. So what we hope to accomplish in this partnership can be outlined in 3 categories:
   a. One: educating, and building awareness in the faith community about the various facets of public safety and VE. We will host a series of workshops that will cover everything from internet safety for young adults, to understanding the threat of radicalization or political violence within Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
   b. We also plan to cover the non-ideological precursors that cause VE such as acculturation problems that may stem from the trauma of war, domestic violence or social alienation, as well as the various psychiatric conditions, which may create vulnerability in certain persons.
c. Second: As we build this awareness and stay focused on these issues, we hope to attract and cultivate the expertise within our communities to deal with these conditions so that we can intervene before an at risk individual choses the path of violence. This will be us pooling community resources to develop innovative solutions to preventing violence.

d. Finally, we hope to create a reliable and effective relationship between government/law enforcement and the community experts [social workers, psychologists, mentors, and clergy] to intervene in cases where mentoring or counseling could deter an individual from the path of violence.

   i. And this is why the relationship with the MCPD and Chief Manger is so important as well as an ongoing relationship with the Board of Education and the MCPS.

5. As an analyst and community organizer in the field of countering violence extremism, I can say that the case of the Tsarnaev’s brothers indicates to us why developing this prevention model is so important:

   a. First off, when these young men, lost the presence of their parents, did their friends and parent’s of their friends realize they were left without adult supervision or guidance? Did their Sports coaches start to notice their erratic behavior or their anti-social perspectives on life in the US? Did the Muslim community members notice?

   b. But an even bigger issue is even IF any of these individuals saw the change and were alarmed, would they have any resources available to them to intervene?

6. The same thing can be said about Adam Lanza and the Newtown school shooting. He had displayed many warning signs of aberrant behavior but no one alerted to intervene.

7. The tragic reality of the Boston terror attack or the Newtown school shooting—both are events that remind us why we need to build awareness about the social, psychological, and ideological factors that can lead to VE and why we need identify the expertise in the community to deal with it. It is also tell us why the faith community needs to create the space within our institutions to address these issues.

8. Finally it’s important to mention that we will also need to re-evaluate how we chose to define at risk individuals for violence. Traditionally in the US, that refers to low income persons with a tendency towards gangs or drugs.

9. But the new reality in our country is that we have many young adults who may be suffering from the social and psychological trauma of war or conflict, especially from Muslim majority countries like immigrants from Iraq, Africa, Pakistan, or Afghanistan as well as the rising incidents of developmental conditions which can also make an individual vulnerable. The demographics of our County in particular is also changing and our programs and the allocation of resources must also change.

10. As we progress and plan for the coming events, we look forward to hearing from each of you if you have any expertise to offer and if you have any suggestions for programming.

11. We are honored and privileged that we have with us tonight and as our primary partner in this endeavor, Chief Tomas Manger of the MCPD. Chief Manger has been the Chief of Police in Montgomery County, Maryland, since February 2004. He began his law enforcement career in
1977 with the Fairfax County (Virginia) Police Department. He rose through the ranks to become Chief of Police in 1998. During his tenure in Fairfax County, Chief Manger received numerous awards including the Silver Medal of Valor. He is credited with reorganizing and expanding the Police Department's Community Policing efforts. His commitment to the highest ethical standards for policing and his enactment of new policies to increase departmental accountability earned him significant recognition from the community, including the Fairfax County Human Rights Commission Award for outstanding contributions, and the N.A.A.C.P.'s Community Service Leadership Award. In 2012, Chief Manger was inducted into the Montgomery County Human Rights Hall of Fame.

12. Please join me in welcoming Chief Manger to further discuss these issues with us and when he concludes, we will open the floor to questions and suggestions.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. I hope you will also join us for our upcoming events which include:
   a. The workshop at the HHS Emergency Operations Center on September 9th, which is to help the faith community become more involved in disaster preparedness.
   b. The MC friendship picnic on October 13th at Weaton Regional Park
   c. Our internet safety event on Oct 29th, location to be announced soon.

2. If you received an email from the FCWG then we should have your email for future notices but if you did not receive the email from us directly and want to be informed of future events, please give me or a member of my staff your contact information.
White House CVE Summit

- Countering violent extremism (CVE) has been a centerpiece of this Administration’s counterterrorism strategy. Our CVE approach is premised on the principle that local partners, including local law enforcement and communities, are at the forefront of preventing violent radicalization and recruitment both online and person-to-person. Indeed, protecting the American people from violent extremism is not the work of government alone; our communities are often best positioned to take the lead.

- The threat posed by violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology. Groups and individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other ideological beliefs have promoted and used violence against individuals worldwide.

- Local partners also need support from government—they need to know this is a priority for government action.

- Finally, communities and government are concerned about the efforts of groups like ISIS to recruit people from the United States. The time for partnership is now.

- In order to underscore these points, this fall the White House will host a CVE summit to showcase efforts by Federal and local officials, as well as civic and faith leaders, from several cities across the United States. These innovators have developed a comprehensive approach to the threat of violent extremism within our communities, and the summit will provide an opportunity to spur additional efforts both at home and abroad.

- This summit also will highlight non-traditional, holistic approaches to violence prevention, conflict resolution, and countering violent extremism, as well as community-led initiatives.

- This summit will come on the heels of the President’s stewardship of a UN Security Council session on foreign terrorist fighters. Given the ability of foreign terrorist groups to recruit Americans, the time for action to protect our communities from recruitment and prevent future flows is now.

- We will share additional details of the summit as it approaches.

What is this CVE pilot program that AG Holder announced on Monday 9/15?

- The CVE pilot program is a whole of government effort to partner and empower communities to lead on CVE initiatives.
• These programs will bring together community representatives, public safety officials, religious leaders, social service providers, and United States Attorneys, and FBI leadership to improve local engagement; to counter violent extremism; and ultimately to build a broad network of community partnerships to keep our nation safe.

• Current initiatives largely focus on engagement between public safety and community leaders. These new pilot strategies will complement and supplement existing efforts by engaging the resources and expertise available from a wide range of social service providers. These include education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders, who—in this context and more broadly—are on the front lines everyday providing robust support and help facilitating community-led interventions.

• These pilot programs will also bring in expertise from the private sector, including creative and communications industries who can help communities build capacity to challenge violent extremist propaganda.

• The hope is that lessons learned in those cities can be adopted, as appropriate, throughout the country. We work closely with state, local, and community leaders in the field and offer our expertise where appropriate.

How is the interagency working together to counter violent extremism?
Who has the lead?

• The U.S. Government uses a multi-pronged approach to countering violent extremism in the Homeland. The National Security Council provides policy guidance for these efforts. Departments and agencies have different yet complementary implementation roles and responsibilities, as outlined in the strategic implementation plan.

• For the past three years FBI, DHS, DOJ and NCTC have been working collaboratively to implement our domestic CVE strategy. Senior staff from these agencies meet weekly to discuss projects of common interest and ensure transparency among agencies regarding our CVE work. This group has implemented activities that incorporate all agencies’ distinct missions. More importantly, this group draws on the programs and initiatives developed by our state and local partners, in cities across the United States.

• To help people understand how to prevent violent extremism, they first need to understand the problem. Therefore, we in government need to continue building public awareness about what the indicators are for someone who might be on that path.

• FBI, DHS, DOJ and NCTC have conducted outreach in select cities where we speak with law enforcement, public safety officials, and communities about the threat of violent extremism and terrorist recruitment. When we do, we have historically used the Community Awareness Briefing, as well as the Community Resilience Exercise.
The Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) is a presentation designed to educate communities and law enforcement about violent extremist recruitment tactics – including recruitment of foreign fighters -- and to explore ways to prevent such public safety threats at the local level. This briefing has been given in cities across the country, and government is redesigning it so that it can reach more people.

The Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) is a half-day table-top exercise designed to improve trust between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas on how best to build community resilience. The CREX involves an unfolding scenario of possible violent extremist activity and asks participants to create a collaborative plan to respond. The exercise has been implemented in cities across the United States.

The US government has given this briefing and conducted these exercises throughout the country in places like Chicago, Boston, L.A, Minneapolis, Seattle, Austin, TX, Houston, and Baltimore, MD. But as you can see, with a limited number of staff, we are only able to travel to a small number of cities.

What are examples of CVE successes?

- Examples of CVE best practices in action are the United States Attorneys around the country who have hosted or attended more than 1,000 engagement-related events and meetings where they build relationships with communities, dispel myths and misperceptions, and develop locally-based partnerships. Similarly, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties hosts quarterly roundtables in 13 cities. When communities feel comfortable approaching federal officials for information and assistance, and conversely sharing information from federal officials with other community members, these are signs that community engagement is building trust. Evidence of this is anecdotal only and may be difficult to measure in a systematic way, but capturing some examples will help indicate progress.

- Similarly, law enforcement in cities like Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Dearborn have developed robust outreach programs for communities and training programs for law enforcement, leading to trusting relationships with communities on everything from civil rights to radicalization.

- Community groups have created very promising intervention programs, such as those lead by WORDE and MPAC. And community leaders are active online. Motivated by the atrocities of ISIL, community groups are working to counter that recruitment narrative on social media sites. Community leaders in Minneapolis have created documentaries like “Broken Dreams” to highlight the misleading narrative of groups like Al-Shabaab.
• In Minnesota, during trials that involved members of the Somali-American community, members of the Young Somali-American Advisory Council (established by the U.S. Attorney's office), often emailed press releases from the U.S. Attorney to educate community members. This helped diminish potential mistrust and misperception in the community.

• Another example is the exchanges with European government officials and community leaders from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Scandinavia, sponsored by DHS and the Department of State. These meetings provided an opportunity for communities who are targeted by violent extremists to (1) better understand the threat that similar communities face; and (2) develop a better understanding of the role that government officials, including law enforcement, can play in addressing it.
A Comprehensive Approach for Countering Violent Extremism at the Local Level

On 18 February 2014, the National Security Council Staff tasked the Preventing Violent Extremism Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) with developing a process to establish comprehensive frameworks for countering violent extremism (CVE). The process includes:

1. Mapping out department and agency programs and activities
2. Establishing measurable goals for each line of effort
3. Formulating assessments focused on outcomes and specifically designed to address programs, training, and our return on investment (e.g., impact).

As agreed in the IPC, this effort should be focused on the regions of Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Boston, with customizable aspects to accommodate for future implementation at a range of regions with varying demographics and stakeholder relationships.

Proposed Process for Developing Local Framework

In order to achieve success, local stakeholders should take the lead in building out and implementing a CVE framework that best addresses the unique issues facing their communities. In some locations, efforts to counter violent extremism may be incorporated into a larger anti-violence prevention, intervention and enforcement strategy. Local stakeholders—which include federal, state, and local government partners—are in the best position to identify needs and gaps in services, assess existing local programs, leverage existing networks, and define and develop measurable goals that they have the capacity to implement.

Meanwhile, federal partners need a shared collaborative plan to support local stakeholders’ efforts to address terrorist radicalization to violence and recruitment, one of the many forms of violence these stakeholders seek to prevent. Our collaborative efforts will result in a unified work-plan that promotes community solutions while leveraging federal support.

The work-plan will include but not be limited to the following phases:
nongovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations, mental health providers, social service providers, educational services, and youth-affiliated groups. (Estimated Completion Time: 30 days)

- **Share inventory and information amongst the network:** Federal partners will initiate a collaborative dialogue with local stakeholders to share inventories of local resources, activities, and networks; learn about the community’s strengths and weaknesses with respect to violent extremism specifically; identify gaps and opportunities to fill gaps; develop a comprehensive framework for countering violent extremism; and determine how success could be defined and measured. Local stakeholders will determine leadership roles to further develop the framework for ensuring safe and resilient communities. Such a dialog may be achieved through roundtable discussions or focused outreach. (Estimated Completion Time: 60 days)

- **Develop a framework:** Key local leaders (perhaps utilizing a steering committee) will meet with federal partners and generate a comprehensive framework, using the inventories collected and qualitative analysis, for countering violent extremism that includes elements of community engagement, community-oriented policing, information sharing, capacity building, and community interventions, and other tools for developing safe and resilient communities (e.g., youth organizations and human relations programs). The framework will include objectives/goals, current inventories, opportunity analysis, projected next steps, and suggested assessment processes. Federal partners may offer examples of best practices and connect local stakeholders with a national network of practitioners. (Estimated Completion Time: 90 days)

- **Incorporate community input:** The proposed framework will be presented for broader community input via local community engagement mechanisms (e.g., community roundtables or focused outreach). Based on that input, local leaders will determine areas of responsibility and the measurable steps necessary for implementation. (Estimated Completion Time: 90 days)

- **Share potential resources and guidance:** Federal partners will offer programmatic resources and guidance on potential funding and grant opportunities to support local stakeholders in implementing the framework and ensuring its continued sustainability. (Estimated Completion Time: 120 days)

- **Implement assessment processes:** Federal partners will collaborate with local partners to identify the goals of the implementation of the framework, including the end state of the community post-intervention (e.g., a community with higher levels of trust in authorities and enhanced legitimacy of criminal justice partners). At this stage the Federal partners will identify the appropriate short, medium, and long term outcomes from the outputs of the program and ensure assessment processes are being carried out to measure these outcomes as progress towards the overall goal of the framework (Estimated Completion Time: 365 days).

- **Update the inventory of resources, activities, and networks:** As resources, activities, and networks are all dynamic, stakeholders should plan to systematically update inventories on an ongoing basis (Estimated Completion Time: 365 days).
LOCALLY-DRIVEN CURRENT INVENTORY: EXAMPLE OF LOCAL INVENTORY

An inventory of an existing city-wide program might reveal a large and robust infrastructure of federal, state, and local officials who are engaged on a number of prevention issues, including CVE (i.e. outreach, threat awareness, trainings, etc.). This direct infrastructure at the federal level mostly consists of local FBI reps, local USAO reps, and DHS components such as CRCL and USCIS.

Local DOJ, FBI, and DHS have shown great collaboration and coordination among federal, state, and local partners on the issue of radicalization to violence, and have also had several high-profile terrorism related prosecutions.

Other federal agencies are involved on occasion and some on an as-needed basis for training, community forums, or subject-specific issues. Some examples of this are presentations by IRS officials on trends in tax preparations scams that target minority owned businesses, by TSA officials on TSA Pre, and other similar initiatives. There is no substantive participation in CVE-related outreach or training efforts from mental health, social service, youth-affiliated groups, or education administrators.

LOCAL INPUT NEEDED TO DIRECT SUPPORT

An inventory of activities and resources might reveal the following next steps:

Local DOJ, FBI, and DHS inventory federal engagement forums and networks include monthly or quarterly outreach meetings, regular briefings, and training focused on regional and national trends of HVE cases or CVE-related issues.

Local DOJ, FBI, and DHS compile a comprehensive list and assess the viability of improving prevention/intervention capability by incorporating mental health, social service, or education administrators whom the Federal Government may engage on other matters but could more regularly involved in CVE programing (e.g., Department of Mental Health, City Department of Social Services, and the City School District).

Local DOJ, FBI, and DHS should include CVE-specific programing into federal work plans. This should also include associated agency, office, or individual employee goals. Some examples of this are a field office goal of conducting two Community Awareness Briefings to all the major religious leaders in a 6-month period, or a manager-specific goal of one Community Resiliency Exercise in 2014. Other goals might include ensuring 50% of the front-line officers of the local police department and county sheriff have access to the DHS Web Portal or FBI's UEEP CVE Special Interest Group, scheduling subject-specific speakers from the TSA Redress Office, the TSC, USCIS FDNS, or threat-specific briefings from the local FBI field office on trends in international and domestic terrorism.
SUPPORT FOR FIELD OFFICE OR REGIONAL EFFORTS

The goal for any city should be to develop a CVE framework that parallels or leverages federal efforts. This action plan should provide an outline for applicable outreach, training, and CVE-specific programing for local DOJ, FBI, and DHS officials. This could be done through the following steps:

1. **Support and Facilitate the Strengthening of Local Partnerships**: Washington-based policy officials and intelligence analysts who have subject matter expertise on CVE should work collaboratively with local experts to understand the local landscape, identify potential catalysts to violent extremism, and determine if existing programs can meet the community’s needs. Washington-based experts and local experts in the field should work together to assess the depth and breadth of local partnerships supporting CVE-specific programing and recommend, where needed, formulating new partnerships and strengthening others. While the selected cities all have pre-existing partnerships, it may help enhance the efforts to include communities that have not previously been engaged.

2. **Continue to Improve and Expand Training**: CVE-specific training is regularly improving and evolving, but each metro area may have different training needs. Federal partners need to work with training experts to help establish a baseline for CVE training, or at a minimum what does CVE “101” look like for the field? Our city/regional training should focus on several basic points: (a) What is violent extremism and how is it related to counterterrorism? (b) What are some possible indicators of violent extremism? (c) What role does my department/agency have in this effort? (d) How do I work to prevent an act of violent extremism in my city/region? (e) How do I leverage existing engagements on more universal issues (e.g., child safety or school resource office programs) to address CVE and promote broad based intervention and prevention approaches?

3. **Share Best Practices and Known Violence Prevention Frameworks or Specific CVE Models**: Washington-based policy officials and intelligence analysts need to do a better job of packaging best practices in a manner that can be used by cities and municipalities across the country. We may want to consider using case studies to improve consistency and increase practitioner consumption.

4. **Raising Awareness of Existing Funding Opportunities and Leveraging Additional Resources to Support Local Efforts**: Federal agencies must continue efforts to coordinate, disseminate, and address gaps in federal resources, both in terms of grant funding and deliverables, such as training and knowledge products. Careful attention should be paid to funding opportunities and deliverables that simultaneously address CVE concerns alongside other concerns. Examples might include efforts to build partnerships with disenfranchised segments of the community, efforts to address group and organized violence, and efforts to implement analytic tools such as social network analysis applied to illicit networks writ large (including criminal and terrorist networks).

5. **Sharing Lessons Learned for Assessment and Monitoring**: Washington-based experts can provide peer-to-peer exchanges, training opportunities, or direct instruction on the proper ways to develop measurable goals and implement mechanisms for gathering program assessment data to ensure progress.
(U) This bulletin highlights the significant developments within the Countering Violent Extremism Office (CVEO) in recent weeks, encompassing CVE-related initiatives, activities, outreach, and open source forms of interest. It provides investigative and analytical insight, highlights FBI efforts to mitigate the impact of violent extremism, documents the community's efforts to aid our law enforcement partners in addressing this emerging issue, and provides tools to foster effective outreach within the community.

(U//FOUO) CVEO INITIATIVES

(U) FBI Navigates Complex Violent Extremism Landscape

(U) As the graphic (below) depicts, the FBI's success in countering violent extremism is dependent upon our understanding of the myriad forms of extremism, identifying the catalysts to these beliefs, and developing an effective strategy to counter these beliefs before a violent act. CVEO leverages FBI subject matter experts, other members of the intelligence community, academia, and various public sector groups to assist in implementing an effective strategy to counter violent extremism and reduce the threat to our communities. Although the FBI has been involved in countering violent extremism for many years through investigations, community outreach, engagement, and behavioral analysis, this new office will ensure those efforts are fully coordinated. The FBI's primary threat priority is to protect the United States from attack and to mitigate the threat using available intelligence-gathering and investigative means. Numerous international and domestic terrorist organizations, lone wolf offenders, and homegrown violent extremists targeted American communities in the past several years. There was also a significant increase in the number of active-shooter and mass-killing incidents.

(U) Group of Four Sponsors Columbus, OH, Outreach

(U) In August, the Group of Four (FBI, DHS, DOJ, and NCTC) sponsored a three-day outreach and engagement initiative in Columbus, Ohio, as part of the "two-city" initiative. This initiative identified best practices in community engagement, community oriented policing, and effective mechanisms to counter violent extremism. The group attended meetings with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials; intelligence analysts; county, city, and school officials; and community and civic partners. Columbus is considered a model city for community engagement, as law enforcement, civic leaders, and the community fostered a partnership to address issues and concerns as they have worked to make improvements within the city. While past Columbus-area CVE-
related outreach efforts focused on Somali-Americans, the U.S. Attorney's Office plans to include additional communities with a newly established Columbus Community Engagement Council. Some highlights from the Columbus outreach included the following:

- The Columbus Police Department hosted a meeting with community liaison officers, JTF members, and the Columbus Strategic Response Bureau, to identify both formal avenues of police-community outreach and the informal interactions that forge relationships and trust.

- The Columbus Global Academy hosted a meeting with about 30 community leaders from various organizations that interact with the local Somali and Ethiopian communities.

- DHS Fusion Center hosted an intelligence brief with state and local partners, DHS analysts, and local law enforcement, to characterize Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE), Moorish Nation, Sovereign Citizen, and international gang influences within the region.

(U//FOUO) CVE COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

(U) NGO Recommends Enhanced USG CVE Program

(U) The Washington Institute for Near East Policy released two-part article on the shortcomings of the U.S. Government's (USG's) efforts in combating violent extremism and provided recommendations to enhance community efforts to address this threat. The institute examined the August 2011 White House strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, and identified several key shortcomings in the USG's efforts to counter violent extremism, including the following:

- The policy identifies al-Qaeda and its affiliates as the principal enemy and excludes other forms of violent extremism or ideologies.
- No clear delineation of which government agency has overall responsibility for combating violent extremism.
- No clear understanding of which ideologies fuel violent extremism.
- No clear delineation of which agency has responsibility of recognizing radicalized behavior and attempts interdiction.
- Counterterrorism policy does not allow for intervention during the radicalization process, as this is not a role for law enforcement.
- Local communities are not empowered to defend against extremism.
- USG commitment to expand community engagement and development programs but no guidance on implementation.
- There are many paths to radicalization and a cookie-cutter approach to address the catalysts will not be effective.

(U) The Institute opines that the aforementioned shortcomings underscore the urgency to develop a preventive strategy to reduce the spread of violent extremism at the state and local levels and establish effective partnerships with at-risk communities. The institute provided the following recommendations to address the perceived shortcomings of this policy and ultimately enhance communities' resilience to violent extremism:

- Develop domestically, a counterterrorism strategy modeled after the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience, which was spearheaded by the United States and Turkey.
Implement a multilayered prevention strategy that addresses the factors leading to violent extremism, including social alienation, psychological disorders, political grievances, and violent ideologies.

- Develop guidelines for law enforcement referrals for community intervention of radicalized individuals.
- Utilize scholars with theological and intellectual expertise to develop counter narratives to extremist rhetoric.
- Provide adequate funding for community-based solutions.
- Develop an inclusive and holistic approach to addressing and countering the dangers of radicalization, due to the diversity of extremist recruits.

Source: Washington Institute Internet website; October 2013; An Innovative Approach to Countering Violent Extremism; accessed via the Internet on October 9, 2013.

(U) State Department Announces Global CVE Fund

(U) In September, the Department of State announced the United States and Turkey would create a $200 million fund to combat violent extremism by addressing recruitment and violent narratives appealing to those in extremist theaters such as Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan. The new fund, the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience, will be the first to draw its funding from various sources, such as government and non-government organizations. This fund will be used to identify local organizations, develop CVE programs, and allocate funds to local projects that assist in deflecting groups or individuals from violent extremist rhetoric. Grants from the fund will provide training for youth considered vulnerable to terrorist organizations, curriculum to teach problem solving, and informative websites to educate youth on the pitfalls of being involved with violent extremist ideologies and groups. Donors other than the United States and Turkey will include the European Union, Canada, Qatar, Denmark, Britain, and other private entities. The fund is expected to be operational by mid-2014.

Source: The New York Times Internet website; September 2013; U.S. and Turkey to Create Fund to Stem Extremism; accessed via the Internet on September 27, 2013.

(U) Community-led Violent Extremism Program

(U) In August, the International Cultural Center and other Maryland faith-based community leaders announced a partnership with the Montgomery County Police Department, Gaithersburg, Maryland, and the establishment of the Faith Community Working Group (FCWG). This partnership is the first program in the country that is community-led rather than being driven by a law enforcement agency. The FCG will increase public safety and counter violent extremism, by allowing the community to provide vital input, direction, and focus. This partnership is based on several key tenets:

- Educate and build awareness in the faith community about the various facets of public safety and violent extremism.
- Host a series of workshops that will cover Internet safety and explain the threat of radicalization or political violence within Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
- Cultivate expertise within the community to deal with conditions that precipitate an act of violence and intervene before an "at risk" individual chooses the path of violence.
- Develop reliable and effective relationships between government/law enforcement and community experts [social workers, psychologists, mentors, and clergy] to intervene in cases where mentoring or counseling could deter an individual from the path of violence.
This grassroots partnership builds on the framework outlined in the December 2011 White House mandate - Strategic Implementation Plan For Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States (SIP), which builds awareness about the social, psychological, and ideological factors that can lead to violent extremism and enlist community experts to deal with these factors. If successful, this program might serve as a best practice that communities could adopt in establishing effective community-led CVE programs.

Source: International Cultural Center Internet website; August 2013; Faith Community Role in Public Safety and Preventing Violent Extremism; accessed via the Internet on September 19, 2013.

(U) OPEN SOURCE ROUNDPUP

(U) Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us

(U) A recent book on radicalization, "Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us," catalogs 12 different mechanisms that drive normal individuals to radicalization. Two prominent psychologists conducted a study of known terrorists that reviewed case studies to identify the common mechanisms that transformed normal individuals into terrorists. The psychologists, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, evaluated each terrorist using set parameters, and documented similarities in nationality, social class, and chosen ideology. The researchers assessed that these individuals embraced terrorism through normal cognitive processes, which could be experienced by anyone. The case study identified the following 12 mechanisms leading to radicalization:

1. Personal grievance in which one seeks revenge
2. Group grievance in which a group seeks revenge
3. Slippery slope in which one seeks greater political involvement
4. Love in which one has attraction to a radicalized individual
5. Risk and status which moves one to violence regardless of ideology
6. Unfreezing in which one is open to new ideas and beliefs
7. Group polarization in which members shift to extremist views
8. Group competition when members become more cohesive following an external threat
9. Group isolation when the group becomes everything to its members
10. Jujitsu politics when terrorists provoke a government into a violent response
11. Hatred when the enemy is demonized, which elevates the group and rationalizes violence
12. Martyrdom which relies on selflessness for the cause

This book is a valuable resource in understanding the root causes of extremism and the radicalization mechanisms that drive common individuals or groups to commit a violent or terrorist act.

Source: Psychology Central Internet website; September 2013; Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us; accessed via the Internet on September 20, 2013.

(U) Countering the Narratives of Violent Extremism

(U) The Qatar International Academy for Security Studies recently disseminated a study, which focused on the narratives used by extremist groups to recruit new members. The study discovered that terrorist and extremist
groups prey on local grievances, by exploiting feelings of anger, humiliation, resentment, or lack of purpose and incorporate these feelings into violent pronouncements. These pronouncements contain conspiratorial messages that blame those they target. A catalyst in this process is the use of the Internet and social media to provide avenues for recruitment and disseminating extremist messages. The study provided some key takeaways that are crucial in countering violent extremism and developing an effective messaging campaign:

- There is no cookie-cutter approach to countering the narrative.
- The use of internet and social media accelerates the spread of negative messaging, resulting in increased self-radicalization or possible lone wolf scenarios.
- Extremists use local grievances as initial motivators to recruit.
- Traditional media and new media play an important role in recruitment.
- A lack of alternative narratives results in a spread of extremism.

(U) The study recommends the following guidelines in countering the narrative in an effective manner:

- Three components to an effective counter message are proper medium, message, and messenger.
- Tactics and methods must vary based on target group or community.
- Understanding local grievances is a starting point for counter narratives.
- Media is a key component in spreading counter messages.
- Education is the enemy of extremists, due to lack of critical thinking among members.
- Counter messaging requires proper language and terminology.
- Use of former extremists/terrorists is a powerful tactic.
- Religious leaders, faith-based groups, and community resiliency groups play a crucial role in countering narratives and rehabilitation.
- Effective CVE programs must be constantly assessed and recalibrated.

Source: Qatar International Academy for Security Studies Internet website; October 2013; Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter Narrative Study; accessed via the Internet on October 3, 2013.

(U//FOUO) RESOURCES

(U//FOUO) CVEO Established Special Interest Group

(U//FOUO) CVEO established a CVE Special Interest Group (SIG) on the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP). This SIG allows for greater dissemination of CVE-related activities, products, academic studies, community messaging, and identifies advances in this emerging issue. It enhances our engagement and outreach programs by acting as a conduit to our international, federal, state, local, and tribal partners in addressing the CVE issue within their respective communities. If you have interest in this LEEP SIG, please contact the SIG moderator via LEEP for access.
This bulletin highlights the significant developments within the Countering Violent Extremism Office (CVEO) in recent weeks, encompassing CVE-related initiatives, activities, outreach, and open source items of interest. It provides investigative and analytical insight, highlights FBI efforts to mitigate the impact of violent extremism, documents the community’s efforts to aid our law enforcement partners in addressing this emerging issue, and provides tools to foster effective outreach within the community.

**CVEO Initiatives**

**CVEO Releases 2014 Strategic Plan**

(U) In 2013, CVEO achieved significant success in building capacity, enhancing engagement, conducting outreach, and establishing research portals to aid the FBI’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. The 2014 strategic plan builds on last year’s success, promotes expansion, and advances our understanding of the catalysts to violent extremism. Key components of our 2014 strategy are as follows:

- (U) CVEO developed resource portals on FBINet, LEO/LEEP, and CVEO will continue to add content to these portals, which provide intelligence-driven research, demonstrate community efforts to counter violent extremism, and communicate grassroots initiatives that aid law enforcement efforts. CVEO is coordinating efforts with various FBI entities, including the Active Shooter programs in CIRG and SIOC.

- (U) The **CVEO Bulletin** highlights the significant developments within the program, and consists of CVE-related initiatives, activities, outreach, and open-source items of interest. It provides investigative and analytical insight, highlights FBI efforts to mitigate the impact of violent extremism, documents the community’s efforts to aid our law enforcement partners in addressing this emerging issue, and provides tools to foster effective outreach within the community. The CVEO will continue to produce the monthly bulletin and highlight items of significance to ensure the field divisions and other FBI entities are informed of the advances in the program.

- (U) CVEO will continue its liaison efforts that socialize CVEO’s mission, responsibilities, and efforts to ensure cross-programmatic efforts and equities are met across the FBI and the CVE network. Efforts will include participation in city visits; involvement in tabletop exercises; engaging community leaders, faith-based organizations, and academia; and identifying grassroots initiatives that aid in understanding the components to violent extremism and ways communities are empowered to combat them.
NCTC Hosts CVE Leadership Forum

(U) On January 14, NCTC hosted a CVE Leadership Forum attended by community leaders, academia, law enforcement, and representatives from the Group of Four. The forum consisted of a community workshop and an executive panel discussion. The workshop brought together community representatives, government staff, and communications experts, to discuss relevant communications strategies that leaders can apply to counter al-Qa'ida extremist narratives. The second segment consisted of an executive discussion on how government and communities can partner to counter the extremist narrative, while promoting community-driven solutions.

NSS Hosts CVE Workshop with UK

(U) On February 6, The White House's National Security Staff (NSS) hosted our United Kingdom (UK) counterparts to review CVE efforts in both countries. UK representatives discussed the nuances of their PREVENT initiative, which is a community policing and engagement program that aims to prevent individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorists and is considered a major component of their overall counter extremism strategy. U.S. representatives discussed CVE initiatives coordinated by the Group of Four and other efforts made to enhance community engagement and awareness. Common areas of concern include youth radicalization through the Internet and the flood of foreign fighters into Syria. Leaders discussed how local communities could play a significant role in identifying at-risk youth, who use the Internet to advance their beliefs or travel to Syria to fight against the current Syrian government. Both nations' leaders agreed that a joint counter narrative campaign and options to aid Syrian citizens should be areas to consider for development. The two countries plan to continue collaborative efforts to improve their respective CVE programs.

Group of Four Convenes Quarterly Breakfast

(U) On February 12, the Group of Four held its quarterly breakfast to discuss 2013 accomplishments and set a strategic focus for 2014. The discussions centered on G4 collective accomplishments, including DHS hosting more than 70 community engagement events, U.S. Attorney Office outreach to Arab- and Muslim-American communities, success of the National CVE Conference, and enhanced resource portals to share advances in CVE efforts across the network. The 2014 strategic focus will
(U//FOO) CVE COMMUNITY INITIATIVES

MPAC Releases Muslim-American Community CVE Toolkit
(U) The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) developed a toolkit for Muslim-American leaders to aid in the prevention of violent extremism within their communities. As Muslim and Sikh communities experienced hate crimes, communities sought tools, guidance, and viable alternatives. The need for the toolkit became much more evident in recent years. MPAC released the P.I.E. framework, consisting of Prevention, Intervention, and Ejection:

PREVENTION (Misguided ideas):
• Focus is community level
• Community-relevant programming
• Management of Community organizations
• Building networks
• Creating a climate of trust and communication

INTERVENTION (Individual at the Edge):
• Dealing with specific individual
• Creating safe environments
• Set up Crisis Inquiry Teams
  □ Focus on intervention assistance vs. notifying law enforcement

EJECTION (Embraces Violence):
• Identifying an individual committed to violence
• Only considered after prevention or intervention prove unsuccessful
• Individual removed from community and law enforcement notified of desire for violence

(U) Successful implementation of the P.I.E. model might aid in slowing, halting, or reversing the movement to extremism and violence to affect change. It also provides options for different types of involvement by individuals moving toward acceptance of extremism and violence. The fundamental approach is to have overlapping mechanisms that address the behavioral continuum that occurs during the progression from prevention through possible ejection.

(U) MPAC will be socializing this toolkit with Muslim leaders throughout the country, and CVEO will facilitate FBI field office visits as part of this process. MPAC identified Boston; Washington, DC; Miami; Houston; Los Angeles; Chicago; Seattle; and Minneapolis, as target locations for the 2014 rollout of its toolkit.

(U//FOO) OPEN SOURCE ROUNDPUP

LA Times Op-Ed: Building Bridges to Communities
(U) A recent Los Angeles Times OP/ED focused on the question, What turns people into terrorists? A former California State Representative, Jane Harman, cited the moving from radical beliefs to the willingness to engage in violence, involved common “triggers,” and the need to articulate a narrative, as a first task in addressing this issue. Harman lauded the U.S. State Departments’ use of real-time social media as a successful tool to counter the message of extremism and articulated the need for communities and local police to identify individuals when
they drift toward illegal forms of behavior. Harman views communities as a form of human intervention and endorses outreach with local police to build relationships and bridge cultural differences.

(U) In response, Salam Al-Marayati, President of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, argued that Muslim-American leaders cannot be an extension of law enforcement and that communities have proved effective in pushing back against al-Qa'ida rhetoric and shunting radicals out of mosques. To counter radicalization without creating lone wolves, Al-Marayati outlined five issues:

1. Who should preach nonviolence; the U.S. government should seek Muslim leaders who oppose U.S. policies and demand change through nonviolence.

2. The Muslim community, use of prevention and intervention through religious and peer counseling as an effective counter-radicalization strategy, with mosques and gatherings as safe harbors, free from government surveillance.

3. The lack of a presidential summit using interfaith relations to prevent extremism.

4. The division of roles; law enforcement and community roles need to be strictly divided with Muslims responsible for developing counter-narratives independently without interference from law enforcement.

5. Mental health, pointing out that those sold on extremism often display signs of psychosis and should be connected to proper mental healthcare.

(U) These are pertinent issues within the CVE environment, in defining roles for both communities and law enforcement and upholding the rule of law. These issues should be addressed when formulating effective community CVE programs and establishing proper engagement protocols with law enforcement.

**Source:** Los Angeles Times Internet website, January 2014, Op-Ed, “Future terrorists we need to build bridges to those most vulnerable to radicalization,” "Blowback 5 better ways to enlist U.S. Muslims in the fight against terrorism,” accessed via the Internet on January 6 and 7, 2014.

**Lack of Funding Hampers CVE Efforts?**

(U) In January, Hedieh Mirahmadi, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, highlighted the lack of financial support from the federal government on intervening with radicalized individuals. Citing the strong governmental efforts in combating terrorism abroad, Ms. Mirahmadi suggested the U.S. Government must establish an equally effective campaign to solve the phenomenon of radicalization domestically—calling for visible financial support that provides the ability to combat or defeat radical Islamist recruiters. The U.S. Government provided an exorbitant amount of money to counterterrorism efforts, but Mirahmadi opines that Washington lacks an effective strategy to prevent the radicalization of Americans. The White House’s Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the U.S. was filled with many ideas to counter violent extremism within communities, yet a lack of budgetary resources have detailed its progression. While the SIP outlines the role communities have in collaborating with law enforcement agencies, it does not include ways to establish those relationships or create benchmarks for those partnerships. In addition,
there is no mechanism in place for law enforcement agencies to refer radicalized individuals for intervention. There are several community models and programs that attempt to refer or "de-radicalize" individuals. For example, the former U.S. Attorney for the District of Minnesota, B. Todd Jones' outreach efforts, Los Angeles Police Department's community engagement program, and Maryland's Montgomery County Faith Community Working Group, have been successful models to build upon. Federal, state, and local governments must intensify and expand local partnerships across the United States to empower grass-roots organizations and bolster the relationships between law enforcement and the faith community. These enhanced partnerships will produce dividends in countering violent extremism.


European Union Formalizes Response to Extremism

(U) In January, the European Commission adopted a communication that outlined 10 areas of concern, which Member States and the European Union (EU) must adapt and incorporate into their respective actions to prevent extremism that leads to violence. The proposed measures include creation of a European knowledge hub, developing training for CVE practitioners, providing financial support for CVE projects, and establishing programs for members of extremist groups to abandon violence and the underlying ideology. The areas address radicalization and protect citizens with 10 goals:

1. Comprehensive strategies that develop effective frameworks to prevent violent extremism and terrorism.
2. Establish a knowledge hub that disseminates best practices and shapes pertinent research.
3. Build upon the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) to provide guidance to Member States.
4. Develop training for frontline practitioners working with at-risk individuals or groups to understand the process of radicalization.
5. Develop exit strategies for members of extremist groups to assist in disengagement and de-radicalization.
6. Develop cooperative solutions with civil society and the private sector to address online challenges.
7. Empower victims and victims support groups to ensure their voices are heard to aid prevention and de-radicalization.
8. Encourage critical thinking on extremist messages and allow discourse to expose the flaws of propaganda.
9. Increase research into trends on radicalization, including ideology, Internet-based recruitment, and identifying role models.
10. Work closely with partner countries, as radicalization does not stop at EU borders, and encourage development of cooperation tools and instruments.

TEVUS Portal Provides Insight into Terrorist Attacks

(U) DHS's Resilient Systems Division, Science and Technology Directorate collaborated with the University of Arkansas, University of Maryland's START program, Michigan State University, and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, to develop the Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the U.S. (TEVUS) Analysis Portal. The portal integrates four distinct open-source databases, consisting of 113,000 domestic and international terrorism, extremism, and criminal violence incidents from 1970 to 2012. This combined database infuses open source reporting, criminal complaints, and incident attributes to develop profiles of perpetrators and groups. This analytical tool aids in understanding the catalysts to extremism, radicalization mechanisms, attack methodology, and targets of preference. TEVUS resulted in START authoring a research highlight in January 2014 that captured terrorist trends and patterns since 1970. TEVUS is a valuable resource for analytical and operational insight and provides background information that can aid our understanding of the catalysts to extremism that result in terrorist attacks. Visit TEVUS at http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/terrorism-and-extremist-violence-us-tevus-database.