Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism
By Hon. Mickey Edwards
Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism
by Julian Zelizer
Basic Books, 2009
There is no such thing as a “good” war. The closest approximation is a necessary war undertaken for meritorious purpose. If war is a sometimes unavoidable evil, we search for any good that might have come from the exercise, one being that wars, even the non-shooting kind (the “Cold War”) have a uniting dimension; as Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg said during Democrat Harry Truman’s presidency, when wars both cold and hot were in full bloom, “politics stops at the water’s edge.”
But such comforts have a mythical quality. As Julian Zelizer, a Princeton historian, notes in his new Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to The War on Terrorism, the relationship between Vandenberg and Truman did not accurately reflect “the overriding nature of national security politics in America since World War II. Their relationship was, in fact, an aberration even in the years when it took place.”
That is the central theme of Zelizer’s comprehensive and informative book about this country’s persistent ideological struggles to define its foreign policy and national security strategies. The Panama Canal Treaty and the Panama invasion, SALT II and Saddam, Cuba and Vietnam, the volunteer army and Star Wars, China and the Contras all get their day in this expansive narrative, and, consideration of each contributes to understanding the continuing conflicts over the question of how to advance American interests and contain threats. Perhaps the only “water’s edge” at which security battles were set aside is the edge of the swimming pool in the congressional gym.
The political context in which Zelizer writes his history is evident in his chapter headings: “How the Democrats Won World War II”, “No Room for a Republican Center”, “The Lost Democratic Opportunity”, “Fighting Conservatism on Capitol Hill.” Zelizer’s book may miss some of the nuance of the debates, but books are meant to be readable as well as informative, and the “political warfare” framework keeps the work engaging.
For all of its sweep, Arsenal of Democracy sometimes fails to capture fairly significant changes. Attention is paid, as it must be, to George Kennan’s famous and highly regarded “containment” strategy, aimed at reining in Soviet expansionism, but, as do most historians, Zelizer fails to fully appreciate Ronald Reagan’s de facto shelving of that strategy in favor of a more aggressive “rollback” policy designed to promote U.S. interests and put the Kremlin on the defensive. Conservatives argue that the shift was instrumental in draining the Soviet treasury and forcing a recalibration that played at least some part in bringing the Cold War to a close. And while Zelizer writes of the Boland amendment prohibiting aid to anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua (Contras), he fails to note that the Congress subsequently modified its position by approving my amendment which appropriated $100 million for the Contras and for which, significantly, the final three spokesmen in the House were prominent Democrats (Claude Pepper, Dante Fascell, and John Murtha).
In a sense, the book is a little too comprehensive, mixing its central purpose (a discussion of national security policy) with digressions into congressional battles over tax cuts, gun control, deregulation of the savings and loan industry, etc. Zelizer is a political junkie as well as a superb historian and as all of us who write are aware, it is harder to refrain from saying something than it is to include it.
There is not much in this book that has not been said, or reflected upon, before, but I cannot recall many instances of so much, and with such a specific focus, compressed into a single volume. The book even makes room for some interesting detail (when Mikhail Gorbachev came to the United States in 1987, the Marriott Hotel temporarily renamed its coffee shop Café Glasnost; campaign strategist Lee Atwater called the invasion of Panama and arrest of Manuel Noriega “a political jackpot” for the Republican Party).
Even before he began this book Julian Zelizer was already a prize-winning historian; this book will cement his reputation even more thoroughly. The best recommendation one can give a book (at least the one most satisfying to its author) is that this work belongs on every serious student’s bookshelf. Put this one there, too.
Mickey Edwards spent 16 years in Congress and 16 years teaching at Harvard and Princeton. He is a director of The Constitution Project and wrote Reclaiming Conservatism. He is also a vice president of the Aspen Institute and director of the Institute’s Aspen-Rodel Fellowships in Public Leadership program. He also blogs at The Atlantic, POLITICO, and the Washingtonpost.com's "On Leadership."
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