On June 12, 2011, the New York Timesreported that the FBI plans to amend its Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), the set of rules that governs the Bureaus’ investigative activities, to extend “significant new powers” to investigators. A subsequent editorial registered concerns about these changes and their civil liberties implications. These reported changes are the latest in a series of alterations to FBI policies implemented in the last decade (discussed in detail in the Brennan Center report Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks) that have radically expanded the FBI’s power to investigate and collect intelligence information — often without any indication of wrongdoing — about Americans.
According to reports, the impending changes to the DIOG would allow agents to
conduct searches of commercial or law enforcement databases to gather information about individuals who are not the subject of any official investigation;
search an individual’s trash for the purpose of finding material that might pressure him or her into becoming a government informant at the “assessment” stage, when the investigation need not be based on any factual predicate; and
participate covertly in several meetings of groups, such as religious congregations or gatherings of political activists, without any applicable rules at all.
Just as troubling as the reported changes is the fact that the proposed rules themselves remain secret — as do some portions of the existing rules (most notably, those governing covert participation in group meetings). It is therefore impossible to fully evaluate the implications of the reported changes. Nor do we know what other changes have been proposed but not reported in the media.
In the wake of the reports of these changes, FBI officials challenged the Times’ characterization of the amendments, arguing that they are merely some minor “fine-tuning” of the existing rules. These official statements continue another trend: government efforts to downplay the significance of changes to the FBI’s investigative rules. Over the past several years, FBI and Justice Department officials have consistently rejected assertions that changes to the rules have extended new powers to the FBI. An examination of several of these statements shows, however, that they have been misleading, incomplete, or simply incorrect.
Unfortunately, in editorializing on the most recent changes, the Washington Post seems to rely on the FBI’s assurances, calling the changes “relatively modest and reasonable.” While this description of the changes is charitable at best, even the Post recognizes that such powers demand stringent oversight. The Post provides a list of steps that should be taken to prevent FBI excesses: First, the FBI should make the new rules public to the extent possible; second, Congress should “keep close tabs on how the new rules are applied”; and third, the President should nominate a new Justice Department Inspector General, the department’s internal watchdog, to replace the highly effective Glenn Fine who retired from the position several months ago.
This call for oversight is right on the mark, but the list is incomplete. In addition to these measures, the Brennan Center, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and Defending Dissent have called on the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold hearings on the new DIOG rules before they go into effect in order to determine how they will work, to insist that the FBI explain why they are necessary, to explore whether they are consistent with existing FBI policy and regulations, and to consider the many constitutional and privacy concerns they implicate.
The FBI should of course have the power to follow every lead. But agents can do that without using the highly intrusive tools permitted by the current rules, much less the even-more-liberal impending rules. Congress should not allow these changes to be mischaracterized as “fine tuning” and slipped through without scrutiny. This time around, a real inquiry is in order.
Radicalization is complex. Yet a thinly-sourced, reductionist view of how people become terrorists has gained unwarranted legitimacy in some counterterrorism circles. This view corresponds with—and seems to legitimize—“counter-radicalization” measures that rely heavily on non-threat-based intelligence collection, a tactic that may be ineffective or even counterproductive. Only by analyzing what we know about radicalization and the government’s response to it can we be sure that these reactions are grounded in fact rather than stereotypes and truly advance our efforts to combat terrorism.
In a New York Timesbloggingheads segment, the Brennan Center's Faiza Patel, author of the recent report Rethinking Radicalization, discussed law enforcement's attempt at understanding terrorism and how these theories of radicalization come into play. Arun Kudnani of the Open Society Institute joined the conversation.
Since 9/11, the FBI's power to investigate and collect information about Americans, often without any indication of wrongdoing, has expanded on several occasions. Now, according to the New York Times, the FBI is once again poised to extend its authorities by issuing a new version of the rules governing its domestic investigative activity. The changes represent another significant and troubling expansion of power, approved not by Congress or the Attorney General, but apparently by the Bureau itself.
Modifications to the FBI's rules governing agents' undisclosed participation in groups, such as religious congregations or political activists, are perhaps the most problematic. Current rules governing the FBI's monitoring of groups already cause serious concern because they are not even public, leaving us with no idea what constraints are in place or if they are sufficient. Now, the proposed changes allow FBI agents to attend five group meetings before those rules even apply. But what of the information gathered during those five sessions? Does a list of attendees make its way into a government database? Does a political activist opposed to U.S. policy find herself on a watchlist?
New rules regarding searching commercial or law enforcement databases also seem to invite abuse. They permit agents to search these databases without making any record of the search. Will an agent be able to resist the temptation of searching for information about neighbors, ex-girlfriends, or celebrities, knowing that he will not be asked to account for the search because no record of it exists?
Agents may also search an individual's trash for the purpose of finding material that might pressure him into becoming a government informant. Reports that federal agents use potential informants' immigration status or that of their family members for this purpose are already rampant. Now, agents will also be able to threaten a husband that they will show his discarded pornography to his wife, or threaten to bring criminal charges against someone whose trash contains traces of marijuana.
The FBI should of course have the power to follow every lead. But agents can do that without using the highly intrusive tools permitted by the current rules, much less the even-more-liberal impending rules — this is not an all or nothing issue.
An agent can respond to a tip about a suspicious-looking car with no license plate by going to look at the car to determine if it poses a threat — such as whether it contains some sort of explosive device. The current regulations, however, would allow that agent to look at the car; follow its driver 24-hours per day documenting all of his activities; interview his neighbors under the pretext of being someone else; and send an informant into his place of worship to find out what his rabbi, priest, or imam preaches. And the new rules add to that list the ability to go through the driver's friends', coworkers', or neighbors' garbage, looking for leverage to use to get them to spy on him.
These most recent changes also raise what is perhaps a broader, more systemic concern: One can infer from the New York Times article's statement that the FBI "does not need permission to alter its manual" that the FBI itself took the lead in formulating these new rules. This is problematic.
The very purpose of this set of rules is to ensure that the FBI's investigative activities are limited in scope, never more intrusive than necessary, and subject to proper oversight. They safeguard Americans' civil liberties against law enforcement activities that, absent sufficient regulation, could result in unwarranted intrusions into people's lives. But even the most well-intentioned FBI officials are likely to craft rules that err on the side of permitting agents to act aggressively. Thus the fox is not only guarding the henhouse — he is also determining how high the fence that surrounds it and how thick the walls will be.
A continuing trend — one that started years ago but accelerated rapidly after 9/11 — is to increase federal law enforcement power while cutting back oversight of how that power is used. This trend has eliminated many of the measures implemented to avoid the now notorious Hoover-era abuses resulting from the consolidation of too much power within a domestic intelligence agency. In light of these many recent changes, it is time that Congress and the American people take a closer look at the FBI's investigative powers, consider whether they may have grown too broad, and act to re-establish meaningful limits on the ways the Bureau carries out its mission.
As House Homeland Security Committee Chair Peter King (R-N.Y.) is set to hold his next hearing on the "radicalization" of American Muslims — this time focusing on prisons — it is instructive to see what his last two hearings accomplished.
King's March hearing on "The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community's Response" failed to establish that "radicalization" was a problem. To the contrary, it prompted a number of law enforcement and government officials to come forward and attest to the constructive role American Muslims had played in thwarting terrorist plots, undermining the hearing’s basic premise.
At last month's hearing on "Threats to the American Homeland after Killing Bin Laden," some Congressmen tried to push the view that American Muslims are a security problem. During the hearing’s Q&A, Representatives Dan Lungren (R-Calif.) and Joe Walsh (R-Ill.) pointedly asked their handpicked witnesses whether radicalization was prevalent among American youth. While Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation skirted the issue, both Fran Townsend (former President Bush's counter terrorism advisor) and Evan Kohlman (a cable TV commentator and self-proclaimed counterterrorism expert) were quick to declare that radicalization among American Muslims was a "fact" and that any attempt to deny it was simply political correctness.
What both of Rep. King's hearings failed to consider is what we mean when we say "radicalization." The term can cover a range of behavior and activities, only some of which are appropriately of concern to our government. "Radicalization" can refer not only to the preparations for and execution of terrorist acts, but also to the espousal of beliefs that are outside the mainstream. The theory embraced by several law enforcement agencies suggests that one naturally leads to the other — i.e., that there is a sort of "religious conveyor belt" — a consistent and predictable progression that begins with evincing a conservative or radical understanding of Islam and ends with acts of violence. Both Rep. King and his counterpart in the Senate, Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), buy into this theory.
But the religious conveyor belt theory is simply not supported by evidence. Decades of research by governments and social scientists demonstrate that there is no single path to terrorism and no single profile of a terrorist. Rather, as a recent study by professors Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko explained, there are many different paths to terrorism, some of which "do not include radical ideas or activism on the way to radical actions, so the radicalization progression cannot be understood as an invariable set of steps or 'stages' from sympathy to radicalization."
Acceptance of the flawed religious conveyor belt theory by Congressional leaders and law enforcement agencies has enormous negative consequences. It undergirds the view that our national security is served by monitoring the religious views of American Muslims to identify potential terrorists. An example of this theory is a recent FBI presentation in which agents reportedly urged Muslim community leaders to inform on religious behavior, such as asking women to cover their heads when entering a mosque. FBI agents apparently considered this to be a sign of religious extremism, although it is common practice in Islam and other religions. These types of tactics undermine core Constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and the freedom to worship. They have caused deep rifts with the very American Muslim communities with whom the FBI and local police departments have sought to build trusting relationships in order to advance our counterterrorism efforts.
So how should we address the issue of how people become terrorists? First, we should stop talking about "radicalization" as a problem. The problem is violence. Whether people commit violent acts in the name of Islam or in the name of some other belief system, our government’s role must be focused on the act, not the ideology. The Department of Homeland Security and the White House have taken important steps to recognize this and now focus on "violent extremism" rather than radicalization. An excellent next step would be to characterize the problem as extremist violence so that the emphasis is squarely on the source of the concern — violence — rather than on beliefs.
Second, the federal agencies that dole out counterterrorism dollars and the state and local police departments that consume them must be vigilant in vetting the content of the training given to FBI agents and local cops. Since 9/11, a cottage industry of self-anointed experts on Islam and terrorism has mushroomed. Many of these "experts" have little understanding of the subject matter and provide training that paints all Muslims as potential terrorists. For example, a recent class of NYPD recruits was shown the virulently anti-Muslim film, The Third Jihad, in the course of their training. The film seeks to incite fear of ordinary Muslims and their motives, declaring that various mainstream American Muslim organizations have a secret agenda to impose "Shariah law" over the United States, and frequently displays a black-and-white Islamic flag billowing over the White House.
Finally, we need to move beyond paying lip service to the idea of building trust with communities to taking concrete measures. The guidelines developed for the Department of Justice’s initiative for Building Communities of Trust identifies some important steps that we can take in this direction. At the core of these guidelines is the principle that "Police officers, crime analysts, and intelligence analysts cannot use race, ethnicity, national origin, or religious affiliation as factors to support suspicion and trigger investigations." The guidelines recommend training, transparency, and audit mechanisms to ensure implementation of this principle. This is a far more productive direction for government policy to take than tracking peoples’ religious and political views based on an incorrect theory of "radicalization."
The Obama administration is requiring Guantánamo detainees’ lawyers to treat the documents setting forth the government’s erstwhile assessment of the detainees as they would treat any other classified documents – even though the documents were recently made public by virtue of an unauthorized disclosure to WikiLeaks. In other words, according to New York Times reporter Scott Shane, the lawyers “are obligated to treat the readily available files ‘in accordance with all relevant security precautions and safeguards’ – handling them, for example, only in secure government facilities.”
This isn’t the first time George Orwell has paid a visit to this country’s information security system. As Shane reports, “[O]nly a document that is properly declassified loses its protections.” Accordingly, despite the widespread availability of the various documents obtained and released by WikiLeaks in recent months – not to mention the public’s familiarity with their contents after a steady stream of news reports – the following restrictions on their use have been proposed or implemented:
In December, Columbia University warned international relations students that commenting on the documents disclosed by WikiLeaks online or linking to them might endanger their chance of getting a government job. The same month, the United States Agency for International Development told workers that viewing the documents on an unclassified computer at work or home could violate security rules that govern their employment. In February, an Air Force unit cautioned that employees and even their family members could be prosecuted under the Espionage Act for looking at the WikiLeaks documents at home. . . . A Times reporter who appeared with a State Department official on a recent panel was advised not to show leaked cables as slide – the official was prohibited from looking at them.
The policy of requiring government employees and authorized clearance holders to ignore the public availability of leaked documents is not merely ridiculous (although it is that); it is a pernicious abuse of the classification system. The executive order that governs classification allows officials to classify information only if its disclosure could reasonably be expected to harm national security. Needless to say, there is no national security justification for attempting to control information that is already squarely in the public domain. To the extent our enemies can use the information, they already have it; the only people who are inconvenienced by the government’s policy are the government’s own employees and others with authorized access, who must play along with the pointless fiction that the information remains secret.
The government’s justification for this nonsensical state of affairs, as described by Professor Peter J. Spiro in Shane’s article, is as follows: “[I]f the government ruled that classified documents disclosed to the public were automatically declassified, that would simply create a more powerful incentive for disgruntled employees to leak.” But the justification is itself nonsensical. Whistleblowers and others who leak government information want that information to become front page news; they couldn’t care less whether authorized clearance holders are officially prohibited from viewing or discussing those news stories.
A far more plausible explanation for the government’s policy – one that is grounded in bureaucratic politics rather than national security considerations – is the government’s desire to retain control over how certain information is used and portrayed in the public domain. For example, as one of the detainees’ lawyers pointed out, decisions about what to do with various detainees (such as the Uighurs) have been influenced by public pressure as much as by legal standards. Accordingly, “it’s important to be able to use these documents to shape and inform the discussion the public square.” The government’s policy prevents the detainees’ lawyers from using the information revealed by the documents to appeal to the public.
This explanation is all the more plausible when one considers what lay behind the decision to classify many of these documents in the first place. At least 150 of the detainee assessments concluded that the detainees were not “enemy combatants” or otherwise suspected of anti-U.S. terrorist affiliations. Far from relying on sensitive intelligence sources or methods to reach this conclusion, dozens of these assessments found that there was simply “no reason recorded” for the individual’s transfer to Guantánamo. There is no legitimate national security justification for classifying such information. It was classified so that the government could continue arguing that Guantánamo contained “the worst of the worst,” without the inconvenience of having to address the evidence to the contrary. Like so many other classified documents, it was classified to prevent public discourse from becoming an obstacle to government policy.
The government should never be allowed to classify information, or prevent its declassification, for any reason other than to protect national security. The President should amend the executive order governing classification to require immediate and automatic declassification of any classified information that has entered the public domain, regardless of how it gets there. More generally, the classification system must be reformed to require more careful consideration of classification decisions and to implement a measure of accountability for officials who misuse the system. The administration should focus its resources on this problem – not on “protecting” information that is available to anyone with a newspaper subscription, television, or internet connection.
In the post-9/11 world, law enforcement officials are increasingly charged with a new mission. They are no longer merely crime-fighters, tasked with investigating crimes that have happened or are underway. They are also intelligence-collectors, tasked with gathering information in order to stop the next terrorist attack before it happens. Last week's event brought together an array of perspectives to discuss the implication of this new role. Speakers included John O. Brennan, President Obama's chief counterterrorism advisor, and Rep. Bennie Thompson, Ranking Member on the House Homeland Security Committee. See recent Brennan Center reports on this topic: Rethinking Radicalization and Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks.
In a speech to roughly 100 attendees, Brennan outlined the current state of America’s counterterrorism and national security strategies, both at home and abroad, emphasizing their complex nature. He also addressed the intersection of intelligence gathering and law enforcement.
Law enforcement and intelligence are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they can and must reinforce one another. Intelligence is absolutely critical to identifying and disrupting terrorist networks. It empowers law enforcement, informing their operations and enabling them to identify and disrupt plots before they are carried out. … Law enforcement is equally indispensable. Through aggressive investigations, we have been able to identify members of terrorist networks and detect their plots. The tools available to law enforcement allow us to act swiftly to disrupt the plots we uncover, and to incapacitate dangerous individuals through successful prosecution and conviction.
Brennan spoke at length about the Obama administration’s policy on Guantanamo Bay, reiterating its commitment to close the military detention facility. His also strongly endorsed the administration’s policy on holding civilian trials for terrorist suspects whenever possible, while reserving the right to use military commissions when necessary.
Because of the reforms passed by Congress, we succeeded in bringing the military commission system in line with the rule of law, and with our values. Today, both systems—the federal courts and military commissions—can be used to disrupt terrorists’ plots and activities, to gather intelligence, and to incapacitate them through prosecution. But, we must let the facts and circumstances of each case determine which tool we use. That is the only way to ensure we achieve the result that best serves the safety and security of the American people.
Finally, Brennan discussed interrogation policy, noting that the administration has unequivocally banned the use of torture and other abusive techniques.
The symposium, and Brennan’s appearance, received considerable coverage in the media. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reported on Brennan’s remarks concerning the ongoing situation in Libya. The Associated Press, ProPublica, and Politico wrote that Brennan reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to civilian trials for terrorist suspects. Agence France-Presse and Adam Serwer of the American Prospect also wrote about Brennan’s comments at the symposium.
Shahid Buttar, Executive Director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, who participated in one of the symposium’s panels, also wrote a detailed blog post recapping the event.
In a speech to roughly 100 attendees, Brennan outlined the current state of America’s counterterrorism and national security strategies, both at home and abroad, emphasizing their complex nature. He also addressed the intersection of intelligence gathering and law enforcement.
Law enforcement and intelligence are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they can and must reinforce one another. Intelligence is absolutely critical to identifying and disrupting terrorist networks. It empowers law enforcement, informing their operations and enabling them to identify and disrupt plots before they are carried out. … Law enforcement is equally indispensable. Through aggressive investigations, we have been able to identify members of terrorist networks and detect their plots. The tools available to law enforcement allow us to act swiftly to disrupt the plots we uncover, and to incapacitate dangerous individuals through successful prosecution and conviction.
Brennan spoke at length about the Obama administration’s policy on Guantanamo Bay, reiterating its commitment to close the military detention facility. His also strongly endorsed the administration’s policy on holding civilian trials for terrorist suspects whenever possible, while reserving the right to use military commissions when necessary.
Because of the reforms passed by Congress, we succeeded in bringing the military commission system in line with the rule of law, and with our values. Today, both systems—the federal courts and military commissions—can be used to disrupt terrorists’ plots and activities, to gather intelligence, and to incapacitate them through prosecution. But, we must let the facts and circumstances of each case determine which tool we use. That is the only way to ensure we achieve the result that best serves the safety and security of the American people.
Finally, Brennan discussed interrogation policy, noting that the administration has unequivocally banned the use of torture and other abusive techniques.
The symposium, and Brennan’s appearance, received considerable coverage in the media. The New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reported on Brennan’s remarks concerning the ongoing situation in Libya. The Associated Press, ProPublica, and Politico wrote that Brennan reiterated the Obama administration’s commitment to civilian trials for terrorist suspects. Agence France-Presse and Adam Serwer of the American Prospect also wrote about Brennan’s comments at the symposium.
Shahid Buttar, Executive Director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, who participated in one of the symposium’s panels, also wrote a detailed blog post recapping the event.
Hundreds of violations of laws, executive orders, and other regulations. A two-and-a-half year delay between when a violation was committed and when it was reported. Failure of private entities, such as phone companies and internet service providers, to insist on valid legal justification before turning over customer records. Incorporation of improperly acquired information into government databases.
These are just some of the findings of an Electronic Frontier Foundation study of nearly 2,500 pages of FBI documents from 2001 to 2008. The documents report violations of the rules governing FBI investigations to the Intelligence Oversight Board — a commission charged with overseeing the Intelligence Community's compliance with the Constitution and other applicable laws.
If the report's findings sound familiar, that's because it is just the latest in a series of reports documenting the many ways in which the FBI, particularly when engaged in conducting intelligence investigations, works outside the bounds of its authority. Taken together, these reports send an unmistakable message: the existing safeguards to ensure that the FBI complies with all of the applicable laws, rules, and regulations simply are not up to the task.
Not only is the story familiar, it is also entirely predictable. For years the Bureau has struggled to abide by its own rules. The response? Change the rules. Since 1976, when the Justice Department first adopted guidelines to regulate the FBI's investigative powers, those guidelines have become more and more lax in four distinct ways. The FBI's domestic-intelligence-collection and analysis role has expanded, the standards required to engage in investigative activity have been relaxed, limits on the intrusiveness of investigative techniques have been curtailed, and oversight and supervisory approval requirements have been rolled back.
The result is a domestic intelligence agency collecting information about U.S. citizens with only minimal restrictions on its behavior and with insufficient oversight. In such a situation, it is no wonder that FBI agents — acting with the best of intentions — often stray beyond the limits of their powers.
This must change. It is time for the Bureau to recognize its own tendency for excessive zeal in intelligence collecting and to undertake a serious effort to reform its practices. It is time for the Justice Department to hold the Bureau to a higher standard. It is time for Congress to take a more active role in policing the boundaries of FBI power, and in ensuring that violations of existing rules have consequences.
And determining whether the rules are being followed should be only part of the inquiry. The rules themselves must be examined to ascertain whether they make the FBI more effective or whether their costs outweigh their benefits. The FBI, the Justice Department, and Congress should be asking: How frequently are particular authorities used? How frequently has their use led to meaningful intelligence? Are there any authorities that would be more effective if they were used more (or less) frequently?
To be sure, intelligence collection is an important part of the FBI's mission, and it is particularly crucial to terrorism prevention efforts. But strengthened oversight would actually aid in effective counterterrorism efforts, in at least two ways. First, it would indicate which methods work and which ones don't, allowing the FBI to make better decisions about when and how to use its authorities. Second, subjecting itself to increased oversight — and the accountability that comes with it — will help the FBI shed the stigma of abuse. This will allow it to repair its strained relationships with the communities it polices, creating a more cooperative (and more fruitful) investigative environment.
We need to take our counterterrorism efforts seriously. This means not only training, equipping, and deploying law enforcement officers. It also means employing meaningful evaluation mechanisms to prevent abuses and to determine which of the FBI's existing authorities are effective, which ones are unnecessary, and which ones lead to an unacceptable number of civil liberties violations.
Yesterday, Rep. Peter King’s (R-NY) hearing to examine “radicalization” of American Muslims created a media circus. But lost in the shuffle is an issue that requires our attention. Terrorism is a serious issue, and it requires a serious response. King’s hearing, based largely on anecdotes and stereotypes, missed the point. What we need is an evidence-based approach — one that looks at the research available and helps law enforcement agencies find the best way to spot potential terrorists.
On Tuesday, the Brennan Center’s Faiza Patel released the report Rethinking Radicalization, which studies the theories of radicalization and offers this kind of evidence-based analysis. Throughout the week, Ms. Patel offered her expertise to media outlets across the country. Here is a roundup of her appearances.
She was also interviewed for Free Speech Radio News where she “made recommendations to the federal government suggesting how it could recalibrate its approach to radicalization.”
On the Hill’s Congress blog, Ms. Patel detailed the questions Peter King should have asked:
Rep. King should also ask these expert agencies — and others with specialized knowledge in the field — to explain what their years of research have taught us about the path to terrorism.
The FBI, for example, posits a model of “radicalization” that begins with a religious epiphany, moves on to acceptance of an extremist mindset, and eventually leads to violence. The Bureau is determined to intervene early in this process, where the only signs of incipient terrorism are linked to religious behavior that also characterizes thousands, if not millions, of peaceful citizens. The National Counterterrorism Center, on the other hand, has explicitly rejected such a model. Its website clearly states that there are no visible signs of radicalization short of participation in terrorist networks or plots.
Where does the truth lie? Does available research support looking at religious behavior as a “marker” of terrorism, or is this simply another example of stereotyping of the sort that has brought us opposition to mosques around the country?
Whether an ordinary US Muslim becomes a violent extremist cannot be determined by the length of his beard or how often he goes to the mosque, experts say, urging Americans to avoid stereotypes.
On the eve of controversial congressional hearings on radicalization that have raised the ire of US Muslims, New York University's Brennan Center for Justice published a report deconstructing the "simplistic theories" that may have led Republican Congressman Peter King to launch the inquiries.
"Rethinking Radicalization" delves into the possible origins of the homegrown extremism whipping up growing panic in the United States after a string of attacks or attempted acts of terror led by Americans.
…
"A thinly sourced, reductionist view of how people become terrorists has gained unwarranted legitimacy in some counter-terrorism circles," noted the Brennan center's Faiza Patel, a civil liberties specialist.
"Given the piecemeal and contradictory information that is publicly available, an outside observer can hardly evaluate who is right in this ongoing discourse."
She focused her criticism on the FBI and the New York Police Department, who have suggested law enforcement agents can stop radicalization by looking for the "right signs," contrary to federal government and social science research.
"The innocuous nature of many of the signatures identified by the NYPD -- such as growing a beard or becoming involved in community activities -- means that they are likely to be found in a large segment of the American Muslim population," she said.
Such theories may have led King -- who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee -- and other Congressmen to suspect the community as a whole.
Adam Serwer at the American Prospect has also been all over the King hearing, as well as Ms. Patel’s report. On Thursday, he wrote an article on the similarities between the Obama administration and Republicans on counterterrorism.
The Obama administration kept the Bush-era FBI investigative guidelines, which are more lax on matters of racial and ethnic profiling. The rules allow FBI agents to initiate surveillance without suspicion of criminality, allow domestic intelligence gathering in religious spaces, and even allow agents to gather information on "concentrated ethnic communities." A report by the Brennan Center titled "Rethinking Radicalization" suggests the guidelines have encouraged law enforcement to monitor entire communities rather than suspicious individuals.
"When you have such broad discretion, you increase the likelihood of ethnic or religious profiling," says Faiza Patel, co-director of the Brennan Center's Liberty and National Security Program and author of the report. "This tends to alienate the very communities whose support and information we need to fight real terrorist threats."
Finally, Newsday (subscription-only) wrote an article on the hearing and quoted Ms. Patel.
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