Blog
By Aziz Huq – 06/05/07
*Cross-posted from The Huffington Post
Yesterday, judges
in the military commissions established by the 2006 Military
Commissions Act at Guantánamo dismissed charges against two detainees
charged with "war crimes" -- Omar Khadr and Salim Hamdan. According to the Times,
the rulings, which were both on highly technical grounds, threw the
commissions into "turmoil." In fact, the Government can circumvent the
rulings relatively easily and without dealing with the many, deeply
serious problems implicated by the military commissions -- and the
whole question of Guantánamo.
Speed bumps are
nothing new for President Bush's military commissions. The White House
first issued rules for the commissions in November 2001,
but trials didn't follow quickly. Detainees began arriving in
Guantánamo only two months later. And the government did not move
expeditiously to identify war criminals and to charge them. Lead
defendant Salim Hamdan -- who was accused of being Osama bin Laden's
driver -- was not even found eligible for trial by the President until
July 2003, and was not even charged until July 2004.
(Incidentally, in between these dates the military kept Hamdan into
solitary confinement and so putting him under not-so-subtle pressure to
cop a plea). Thanks to phenomenal lawyers, Hamdan fought the
president's military commissions, and in June 2006 won: The Supreme
Court, in the now landmark case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the commissions as beyond the President's authority.
The White House's response was swift and furious -- and took the
form of the Military Commissions Act of September 2006, which
reinstituted a system of "military commissions," or trial courts that
are only for cases related to terrorism and that only operate at
Guantánamo.
But even these new congressionally-authorized bodies have floundered. Proposing the new law, Bush proclaimed "The need for this legislation is urgent," but it wasn't for months before the first prosecutions were brought.
In the first case before the new commissions, Australian detainee
David Hick entered a plea bargain. On the surface, this was a coup for
the government because it could finally -- after more than five years
-- proclaim a victory. But look more closely and the government's
victory slips from view. Hicks was convicted of "material support" for
terrorism (which, incidentally, is a federal crime first legislated in
the early 1990s--it is not now and never has been a "war crime").
But Hicks' plea agreement stipulated a sentence of not more than nine
months. By point of comparison, a person can be sentenced up to five
years if they lie to a federal officer (a point to remember the next
time you're bringing unpasturized French cheese through U.S. customs
....) -- and eight years if the lie has some connection to terrorism.
Stated otherwise, Hicks got just more than a tenth of the sentence he
could have received had he lied in the course of a counter-terrorism
investigation.
Hicks entered his deal after five years' in Guantánamo, and after
his military lawyer conducted a magnificently effective public
relations campaign in the United States and Australia. Especially in
Australia, the John Howard came under heavy fire for its failure to
intervene in Hicks' case (see, for example here).
And, rather conveniently, Hicks will be unable to speak to the press
until well after the next Australian election. The Hicks sentence, in
short, is little more than convenient cover for an international
political embarrassment.
Yesterday's rulings are further evidence of how compromised the
military commissions are. The ruling did not address the real and
substantial concerns raised by the structure of the military
commissions, or the summary bodies (called "combatant status review
tribunals" or CSRTs) that declare individuals to be enemies of the
nation. Rather, both rulings rested on a relatively minor, but telling,
procedural point.
The point is worth describing in brief: A detainee is first
classified as a properly detained by a CSRT. Only then can he be
brought before a military commission. The Military Commissions Act (in
10 U.S.C. §948(c) for those of you want to follow along) says that any
"alien unlawful enemy combatant" can be tried by a military
commissions, and the statute (in 10 U.S.C. §948(a)) defines "unlawful
enemy combatant." So far so good, right?
Well, no. The problem arises because the CSRTs function under a set of Defense Department Rules
that long predate the Military Commissions Act. Those Defense
Department rules do not use the term "unlawful enemy combatant." They
talk about "enemy combatant" -- and they define this slightly
differently from the terms used in the Military Commission Act
(Professor Robert Chesney has an excellent and detailed explanation here).
What happened yesterday was that the military commissions noticed
the mismatch between the CSRT definition and the military commissions
definition -- and stopped the trial until the two defendants were
properly re-classified.
The government now has a couple of options. It could do a new CSRT
(although this would mean also issuing new CSRT rules). Or it could ask
the commission itself to make a finding that the Khadr and Hamdan are
"unlawful enemy combatants." The latter would get the trials back on
track relatively quickly. Yesterday's events would end up being yet one
more hiccup in the rough road that the military commissions have been
traveled.
So what's the broader significance of yesterday's events? It's not
so much that these developments will derail the commissions. Nor is it
that the rulings yesterday address the larger, structural issues raised
by the commissions. Khadr, for example, is being denied the counsel of
his choice because they happen to be Canadian and not American. (A
silly and arbitrary rule). Moreover, Khadr was only fifteen when he was
seized. Under international law and the military's own rules -- enacted
into law in the Uniform Code of Military Justice -- he cannot be held
culpable for his acts. This sort of systemic problem won't be solved by
this kind of technical glitches and slip-ups of the kind we saw
yesterday. For that we need a broader remedy -- most importantly the
restoration of habeas corpus and the reimposition of the rule of law on
the "law-free zone" that is Guantánamo.
Aziz Huq: "Finding a Remedy for Gitmo" (pdf)
Tags: Justice, Liberty & National Security, Detention & Habeas Corpus
By Laura Klein Abel – 04/11/07
*Cross posted from TortDeform.com
Sometimes, complex, intractable problems require complex, expensive
solutions. So it’s particularly frustrating when government refuses to
adopt a free, simple and proven method to address an important social
issue.
That’s the case in New York City, where social services officials
are struggling to get public assistance benefits to the people who need
them most. A recent report
by the grassroots group Community Voices Heard shows that people with
disabilities continue to have a hard time getting the help they need,
despite a city program dedicated to helping them.
According to the report, one of the program’s failures is its
inability to ensure that people with disabilities receive the
information and support that they need to navigate the complicated
public assistance application process, which involves multiple
appointments in various locations.
We feel the City’s pain. It’s not easy to provide the millions of
New Yorkers eligible for public assistance with all of the specific
information they need about the many different rules governing public
benefits programs. The task is made harder by the many different
languages spoken in the city, and by the fact that a substantial
proportion of the people needing public assistance have a low level of
literacy.
That’s why it’s particularly surprising that the city is placing
obstacles in the way of non-profits that want to help get information
to the people who need it. Since the Giuliani Administration changed
the city’s welfare policy, New York City has forbidden advocates from
setting up help tables in the government offices where people apply for
benefits. Groups literally left out in the cold include the New York City AIDS Housing Network, which wants to get benefits information to HIV positive people, and Make the Road by Walking,
which wants to let people with limited English proficiency know about
their right to an interpreter. The result is incomplete applications,
and families left without Food Stamps, Medicaid, and other
life-sustaining benefits, solely because they don’t find out what they
need to know to submit effective applications for those benefits.
Advocates will help to ensure that there is less error in the
distribution of public benefits, which benefits low-income families,
city agencies, and the general public.
Now, the New York City Council is
considering a bill,
the Ready Access to Assistance Act, that would require the city to
allow advocates to set up help tables in the public areas of benefits
offices. It shouldn’t take a piece of legislation to require such a
common-sense measure. But since that seems to be the only thing that
will move the bureaucrats to let a little sunshine in, we hope it
passes, and soon.
* Laura K. Abel is Deputy Director at the Brennan Center Strategic Fund.
Tags: Fair Forums
By Erika Wood – 04/09/07
*Cross-posted from The Huffington Post
Florida, the scene of infamous election-day chaos and massive voter
purges during the 2000 presidential election, took an important step
towards resolving its democratic crisis yesterday. With the stroke of a
pen, Governor Charlie Crist issued new Rules of Executive Clemency that
restore voting rights to potentially hundreds of thousands of Florida
citizens who had been permanently disenfranchised as the result of a
felony conviction.
Governor Crist's bold
action was just the latest in a national movement that has gained
significant momentum in the past year. Across the country, states are
moving to reinvigorate our democracy by removing the last of the Jim
Crow-era barriers to the ballot box--the laws that disenfranchise
people with felony convictions, even after they have been released from
prison and are living, working, paying taxes, and raising families in
our communities.
Florida's voting ban was one of the harshest in the nation,
disenfranchising more people than any other state. Over 950,000
Floridians, including one in three African-American men, remained
permanently disenfranchised even after they had served their entire
sentence. The Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
challenged the state's voting practices in a federal lawsuit--Johnson
v. Bush, which helped focus national attention on Florida's criminal
disenfranchisement scheme.
Florida's old clemency rules required everyone with a felony
conviction who wanted to vote to apply individually to the Governor and
the Clemency Board. The burdensome process took years, and even then
there was no guarantee that one's rights would be restored. In fact,
former Governor Jeb Bush denied over 200,000 applications during his
tenure.
Unlike his predecessor, Crist seems to understand that increasing
access to the polls only strengthens our democracy. But even with the
new rules, Florida's felony disenfranchisement laws lag far behind most
of the country. Large numbers of would-be voters are still required to
navigate a slow, complicated, and expensive bureaucratic process and be
subject to the whim of the Clemency Board. The new rules also condition
the right to vote on an applicant's ability to pay restitution. And
there is no easy way for people who finished their sentence long ago to
have their rights restored.
Crist's actions come just one week after legislators in Maryland
took a better route to reforming their complicated felony
disenfranchisement scheme. Last week the Maryland General Assembly
passed a simple bill that would take voting rights away from those
convicted of only the most serious crimes, and will streamline the
process by which people get their voting rights restored once they have
served their sentence. The bill now awaits Governor Martin O'Malley's
signature.
Maryland law disenfranchises anyone who has been convicted of an
"infamous crime" - an archaic legal term that is as hard to apply as it
is to understand. Until the current bill is signed into law, Maryland
was one of only six states that took voting rights away from those
convicted of misdemeanors, and one of only two states in which someone
could lose the right to vote even if he never spent a single night in
jail. A complicated series of qualifications and waiting periods
created needless barriers to people regaining their voting rights even
after they had served their entire sentence. All this will be
simplified by the Assembly bill.
While it would be better if Florida's law were more like Maryland's,
it's a step in the right direction. Five years ago, Maryland changed
its law, from a lifetime ban to the complicated system it now has in
place. But the new law proved difficult to understand and administer,
and the frustration with it helped build momentum for this year's
change. No doubt as the Florida Executive Clemency board applies its
complicated rules, it too will begin to see the wisdom of a simple and
fair restoration process.
But the larger point remains: in the 2000 election, both Florida and
Maryland had lifetime felon voting bans. In the 2008 election, neither
will. Lawmakers are truly beginning to understand the fundamental
unfairness of banning persons with criminal convictions from the ballot
box. And it is not just lawmakers that have come to this understanding.
The American public is overwhelmingly in favor of welcoming voters back
into the political process. A 2002 Harris Interactive poll found that
eighty percent of Americans favor returning voting rights to citizens
who have completed their sentences.
This public support was confirmed this year in Rhode Island. For the
first time in history, voters went to the polls on Election Day and
cast a vote in favor of reenfranchsing persons with criminal
convictions. The voters of Rhode Island amended their state
constitution to restore the right to vote to their fellow citizens as
soon as they are released from prison. A coaltion of Democrats,
Republicans, law enforcement officials, religious organizations, labor
unions, affected communities and civil rights and advocacy groups
banded together to place the measure on the ballot to let the people
decide who should participate in voting. And they chose to invite
people who had paid their debt back onto the voter rolls.
In the last ten years, seventeen states have reformed their laws or
policies to reduce barriers to voting for people with criminal
convictions. Dozens of states, including Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Iowa, New York, and Washington are currently considering new measures
to bring more voters back to the polls. The time has come for Kentucky
and Virginia, the only states that continue to permanently ban all
people with felony convictions from voting, to join Florida and the
rest of the country by bringing people into the democratic process, not
shutting them out.
Tags: Democracy, Voting After Criminal Conviction, Voting Rights & Elections
By Jonathan Hafetz – 04/05/07
Co-authored with Susan Lehman
*Cross-posted from The Huffington Post
Khaled el-Masri was vacationing in Macedonia when he was abducted
by local police. Mr. el-Masri was then beaten, drugged, and
interrogated at gunpoint in a Skopje hotel room. After 23 days of
incommunicado captivity, Mr. el-Masri was taken to the airport and
turned over to masked CIA rendition agents. He was shackled and also
diapered, and flown to a CIA-run secret prison near Kabul, Afghanistan.
Once Mr. el-Masri was in Afghanistan, CIA officials soon realized they
had made a mistake: Mr. el-Masri was not the man they were looking for;
nor was there reason to suspect he was a terrorist. The U.S.
nevertheless secretly jailed Mr. el-Masri for five months before
deciding to deposit him, without explanation, on a hilltop in Albania.
During six years of
the so-called "war on terrorism," we have grown disturbingly used to
stories like this one. What is most frightening about Mr. el-Masri's
ordeal, however, is not the news that U.S. officials may have conspired
in torturing and imprisoning an innocent man for months on end.
Instead, it is the news from a federal appeals court in Richmond,
Virginia, last month that U.S. officials cannot be held accountable for
engaging in such conduct.
In a unanimous decision, the appeals court ruled that Mr.
el-Masri's case had to be dismissed before a hearing took place. The
court found that merely requiring the United States to respond to Mr.
el-Masri's claims that the CIA had masterminded his illegal kidnapping,
abuse, and wrongful imprisonment could jeopardize national security by
leading to a "cascading" of disclosures about the CIA's "extraordinary
rendition" program. The fact that the existence and details of this
program have already been made public was deemed irrelevant. The bottom
line consideration remained: US national security would be compromised
if questions about the government's possible complicity in wrongful
detention and torture of Mr. el-Masri were allowed in open court..
Mr. el-Masri's is not an isolated case, but it is part of a now
familiar pattern. Time after time, the present administration has put
itself above the law by carving out a series of exceptions to the
essential liberties of our Constitution.
Maher Arar is another victim of these un-American practices. Mr.
Arar, a Canadian, citizen, was catching a connecting flight through New
York's JFK International Airport in 2002, on his way back to Montreal
after a family holiday in Tunisia. Mr. Arar was detained by airport
security who questioned him about terrorist ties, and then taken to a
federal jail. Ten days later, Mr. Arar was sent to Syria, where he was
held in a dark, rat-infested cell that resembled a grave. Mr. Arar was
beaten on palms, hips, and lower back with a two-inch-thick electric
cable and threatened with electric shocks. He was released after almost
a year. No charges were ever filed.
Like Mr. el-Masri, Mr. Arar sought to hold the United States
accountable. He filed a lawsuit claiming that the United States had
deliberately conspired to render him to Syria for torture. But a
federal judge in Brooklyn dismissed the case last year without even
requiring the government to so much as answer the allegations. Any
inquiry into the U.S. government's complicity in Mr. Arar's illegal
rendition, the court explained, could compromise national security by
"embarrassing" the United States. To summarize: the more egregious the
governmental wrongdoing, the more reason to prevent public exposure.
This is the modus operendi of autocracies, not democratic governments committed to individual liberty and accountability.
Canada, notably, responded differently, mounting a full-scale
investigation into Mr. Arar's case. A specially appointed commission
compiled a 1000-page report, which described Canada's role in Mr.
Arar's detention, cleared Mr. Arar of any terrorism connections, and
compensated him $9 million for the grave harms he endured. The United
States, meanwhile, refuses even to apologize.
Then, there is Guantánamo, the living symbol of a prison beyond the
law. Since September 11, the United States has detained more than 700
people at Guantánamo without due process or habeas corpus. Many of
these individuals have been abused. Indeed, the treatment of one
detainee was so bad, the Wall Street Journal recently
reported, that a military officer refused to prosecute him for
terrorism because interrogators had wrung his confession through
measures that were both illegal and morally repugnant.
How does the United States justify Guantánamo? With more legal
loopholes. It argues that Guantánamo detainees have no rights because
they are foreign nationals held outside the sovereign territory of the
United States. The fact that the United States has exercised complete
and exclusive jurisdiction over Guantánamo for a century is irrelevant
to this self-serving calculation. Remarkably, a federal appeals court
in Washington, D.C., recently agreed with the government, finding that
Guantánamo detainees lack even the most basic human rights, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case at this juncture.
Such end-runs around the Constitution present grave threats to the
cornerstone principle that no one is above the law. Once we start
finding that the normal rules do not apply, secret jails, torture, and
prolonged detention without charge become a fixed and permanent part of
our legal landscape.
American Exceptionalism once signified the values that made this
country a beacon of liberty. Since 9/11, this phrase has come to mean
something very different: a series of Kafkaesque carve-outs to the
Constitution that tarnish the image of a country founded upon a
commitment to justice and the rule of law.
Tags: Justice, Liberty & National Security, Checks & Balances, Detention & Habeas Corpus, Domestic Counterterrorism
By Jonathan Hafetz – 04/04/07
*Cross-posted from Balkinization
The Supreme Court this week narrowly declined to hear the habeas appeals of the Guantánamo detainees. The detainees had sought review of the D.C. Circuit's decision detainees in Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, upholding the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). In a joint statement respecting the denial of certiorari, Justices Stevens and Kennedy explained that the detainees should first exhaust their remedies in the D.C. Circuit available under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). It is too early to assess the long-term impact of the certiorari denial and, as Marty Lederman points out in his excellent summary similar challenges are expected to reach the Court through DTA petitions. Still,
the Court's refusal to hear the cases provides a window into some
troubling legacies of the Guantánamo detainee litigation.
Nearly three years have passed since the Court handed down Rasul v. Bush,
ruling that Guantánamo detainees have the right to habeas relief and
directing district courts to consider their petitions in the first
instance. Though the Court also suggested in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, decided the same day as Rasul,
that a lawfully constituted military tribunal might provide this
inquiry in the narrow circumstances of a traditional combatant captured
on an actual battlefield (citing, for example, standard hearings
provided under U.S. army regulations), where no such process was
provided, habeas was expected to fill in the gap. Yet, Rasul has become an increasingly distant memory: as much time has passed since Rasul as between Rasul and the arrival of Guantánamo's first prisoners in January 2002. And still no detainee has had anything approaching his day in court.
It is difficult to see a principled basis for exhaustion, especially after more than five years of detention without charge. As the dissent
from the certiorari denial explained, the D.C. Circuit has already held
that the detainees have no constitutional rights, period. So,
until that ruling is reversed by the Court, the underlying Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process that the D.C. Circuit reviews
under the DTA need not comply with basic constitutional safeguards,
including the right to see the government's evidence, to the assistance
of counsel, to be free from detention based on evidence gained through
coercion, and to compel production of exculpatory evidence.
The
Court's refusal to hear the detainee cases highlights the continuing
absence of meaningful review in the new system of indefinite executive
detention that has taken root in the so-called "war on terror." The CSRT, recall, was concocted nine days after Rasul to help avert district court hearings. It
is so deeply flawed that it would pose a challenge for any court to
uphold under even a crimped due process analysis. (Since the D.C.
Circuit found the detainees had no Fifth Amendment rights, it was
relieved from having to try.). The DTA and MCA, in turn, sought to eliminate the basis for those hearings under the habeas statute, described in Hamdi as providing a "skeletal outline" for adjudicating the factual and legal basis for a prisoner's confinement. What
habeas provides – and what the administration most fears – is the
possibility that a federal judge will examine whether a detainee is
actually an "enemy combatant" (even under the CSRT's virtually
limitless definition), an inquiry that, in many cases, would require
assessing whether any statements were wrung by coercion from the
petitioner or from another detainee.
The Court's refusal to hear appeals in Boumediene and al Odah, then, marks
merely the latest chapter in the United States' ongoing failure to
provide a fair and lawful process to those it imprisons. It
is this failure that has made Guantánamo a lightening rod for criticism
and prompted calls for its closure at home and abroad. (Matters reached
a new low in recent weeks with the nakedly political deal struck in the David Hicks case,
the first "conviction" by Guantánamo's military commission, and by the
release of CSRT records redacting allegations of torture in the name of
"national security"). To be sure, the courthouse doors still remain open to the Guantánamo detainees. But it is difficult to see what it is to be gained by subjecting detainees to more delay and to a process intended, as one MCA supporter put it, to "get the lawyers out of Guantanamo." Guantánamo was designed by the Executive to create a prison beyond the law. The
record of the other two branches in coming to grips with the fall-out
from this ill-advised decision has been disappointing at best,
resulting in the human rights debacle that Guantánamo has come to
symbolize.
Jonathan Hafetz: "Further Thoughts on the Court's Refusal to Hear the Guantanamo Detainee Appeals" (PDF)
Tags: Justice, Liberty & National Security, Detention & Habeas Corpus
By James Sample – 04/03/07
Stating "I believe in my heart that everybody deserves a second chance," Florida's Republican Governor Charlie Crist is hoping to announce
this week that Florida will restore voting rights for most people with
felony convictions who have completed their criminal sentences.
Restoration is a long-overdue reform. Nationally, it is also a reform
on which the left and the right increasingly agree.
Still, the relic of disenfranchisement is not entirely without
defenders. In order to effect the change in Florida, Governor Crist
needs the support of two other members of the four-member Board of
Executive Clemency. One of those cabinet members is state Attorney
General Bill McCollum, who took to the op-ed pages of the St. Petersburg Times
yesterday in a misguided attempt to perpetuate the myths and
half-truths propagated by supporters of the status quo. For example, in
a glaring non sequitur allegedly supporting his position, he states
that "more than 70 percent of arrestees test positive for drugs, and studies show that drug traffickers live lives of violence." (emphasis added).
McCollum emphasizes concerns about recidivism but he completely
elides -- or simply misses -- the contradiction of his lamenting that
ex-offenders "would be able to acquire a state-licensed job, whether as
a household pest exterminator, residential building contractor or alarm
system installer." Just as restoring the right to vote reintegrates
individuals into a participatory society -- and thus helps reduce
recidivism -- removing overly-broad barriers to gainful employment
serves democracy and criminal justice alike.
Governor Crist's proposal accelerates a trend that already has
momentum. Since 1997, sixteen states have reduced barriers to voting by
people with criminal records. Leaders embracing the trend span the
political spectrum. Ten years ago then-Texas Governor George W. Bush --
hardly known as soft on crime -- signed a bill into law that restored
voting rights to people who completed their sentences. Likewise, the
bipartisan Carter-Baker Commission on Federal Election Reform, which
last fall released its report, "Building Confidence in U.S. Elections,"
agreed that re-enfranchisement of ex-felons is a voting-rights issue,
not a punishment issue, and that states should restore voting rights to
persons who have completed their sentences.
On the left, Iowa Governor Thomas Vilsack issued an
Independence Day Executive Order in 2005 restoring the right to vote to
tens of thousands of Iowans who had completed their sentences. And last
week, the heavily Democratic Maryland legislature passed a bill
restoring the right to vote to 50,000 Maryland citizens, which Maryland
Governor Martin O'Malley is expected to sign into law soon.
Politicians' efforts to restore voting rights have been
surpassed by the political rank-and-file. Last November a majority of
Rhode Island voters approved a ballot measure amending the state
constitution and restoring the right to vote to 15,000 of their fellow
citizens as soon as they are released from prison--even prior to the
completion of supervised release.
The United States is the only democracy in the world that
disenfranchises people who have completed their criminal sentences. By
comparison, in most European nations, some or all prisoners
are entitled to vote. Although the practice of disenfranchisement
predates the Civil War, many states enacted or modified their felony
disenfranchisement laws in the Jim Crow era as a way to suppress the
voting power of black citizens. Make no mistake; the laws continue to
have that effect. Nationwide, 13% of black men are disenfranchised
because of a felony conviction, a rate that is seven times the national
average. In Florida that figure is a startling 18.8%.
It is the role of the criminal justice system, not the
electoral process, to punish individuals based on the severity of their
crime. The durations of criminal sentences reflect agreed-upon societal
norms, and when those sentences are fully completed we should encourage
participation in one of society's most constructive acts. Yet many
states have complex, multi-tiered restoration schemes that predictably
lead to confusion, chilling effects, intimidation, manipulation and
delay. In short, recall Katherine Harris and Florida's "voter cleansing" program
immediately prior to November 7, 2000--a program marked by incompetence
on a Katrina-esque scale and driven by nefariously partisan purposes.
Americans overwhelmingly oppose the political chicanery and
disenfranchisement such systems produce. A 2002 Harris Interactive poll
found that eighty percent of Americans favor returning voting rights to
citizens who have completed their sentences for felony convictions. In
other words, Governor Crist is marching in lockstep with
Americans--liberals and conservatives--who believe in the redemptive
value of second chances.
Restoring voting rights to people who have completed their
sentences is a goal that conservatives and progressives can share. And
to that point, the Sunshine state may soon be a shining example.
Tags: Democracy, Voting After Criminal Conviction
By Aziz Huq – 04/02/07
*Cross-posted from The Huffington Post
The Supreme Court this morning said that it would not review the
case of the Guantánamo detainees. Three Justices (Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg) voted to grant the detainees a hearing. But you need four
votes for a case to be heard (and five votes to win). Justices Kennedy
and Stevens issued a statement saying there was no reason to set aside
traditional rules that require "the exhaustion of available remedies as
a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ
of habeas corpus." What this means is that the detainees--many of whom
have been detained for more than five years without any form of
independent review--have been denied an opportunity to expeditiously
vindicate their constitutional rights.
Generally, when the
Court decides not to hear a case, this has little consequence. That is
not the case here. The Court's decision not to hear this case is a
major blow to human rights values. It leaves on the books a wretchedly
bad (and intellectually dishonest) opinion from the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, and rewards the Administration's deeply nefarious strategy
of delay and obfuscation around Guantánamo.
Readers who haven't been following the rather complex chain of
litigation around Guantánamo may find some background helpful. The
first group of Guantánamo detainees arrived in Cuba in January 2002.
Some had been picked up off the battlefield in Afghanistan, but many
others had been handed in by Afghan or Pakistan allies, keen for the
$5000 bounty offered by the United States. None of them had been
screened through the battlefield hearings required by the laws of war
and the Geneva Conventions.
The Center for Constitutional Rights and a small group of private
lawyers filed habeas suits on the detainees' behalf, arguing that they
had a right to challenge the factual and legal basis of their detention
in federal court. The government, perhaps aware that many of its
detention decisions could not be defended, threw up a series of
barriers, arguing principally that Guantánamo lay outside the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In 2004, the Supreme Court rejected
this argument, and it looked like the detainees would get their day in
court.
But the Government hadn't emptied its quiver. In short order, it
managed to finagle the passage of first the Detainee Treatment Act and
then the Military Commission Act, both of which purported to strip the
federal courts of power to hear the cases. In February this year, the
Court of Appeals in Washington DC held that the Military Commissions
Act had indeed done so. In an opinion that rested on a distorted and
partial view of history, the D.C. Circuit held that the Guantánamo
detainees had no constitutional rights. Hence, it dismissed their
five-year-old case.
That was the decision that the Supreme Court could have taken for
review. But didn't. The result? The detainees can have recourse to a
narrow and arguably insufficient channel of review left open by the
Detainee Treatment Act: But they must start from scratch with no
guarantee that the channel of review available will be meaningful--or a
sham.
(The question of how future challenges will proceed is complex. The
government successfully argued that review be confined to an appellate
court, which lacks the power to find facts and depends on the Army for
building a record. The best case scenario might be that the
Court of Appeals requires the military to restructure their
fact-finding procedures. But this is a long shot).
This is bitter news. It is deeply unfair and inflicts grave harms
today on the detainees. Five years after their first detention, many of
the detainees, I am told, are at the end of their psychological
tethers. There have been multiple suicide attempts. Given the endless
and the uncertainty of their confinement, this is hardly surprising.
Detention without end, often for no reason at all, is a kind of torture
(even if it doesn't meet the strict legal definition of that term).
I'm happy to field questions about the decision.
Aziz Huq: "Supreme Court Rewards Administration's Delay and Obfuscation Strategy on Guantanamo" (pdf)
Tags: Justice, Liberty & National Security, Detention & Habeas Corpus
By Aziz Huq – 03/22/07
*Cross-posted from The Huffington Post
We all stand on the shoulders of giants. And few giants loom larger
in the study of "executive prerogatives" than Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,
that great American historian--and that great American--who recently
and sadly passed away.
Let's pause and ponder for a moment what Schlesinger has to say about this notion of "executive privilege" in his magnum opus The Imperial Presidency, and what this means for the subpoenas just authorized (but not issued) today by the Senate Judiciary Committee against Karl Rove and other presidential advisors.
According to Schlesinger--and I am unaware of anyone who has proved
him wrong--the term "executive privilege" can be dated to precisely
1958, when a new Attorney General William P. Rogers used the term for
the first time in American history. As Schlesinger explains at pp.
156-59 of the Mariner Books edition: "What had been for a century and a
half sporadic executive practice employed in very unusual circumstances
was now in a brief decade hypostatized into sacred constitutional
principle."
What light does Schlesinger's wisdom cast on today's subpoenas and
the looming Congressional battle over information, especially
concerning what went on within the White House?
Notice that Schlesinger does not say that it was unknown for
presidents to keep information from Congress, or to claim that they
could information from Congress. Presidents from George Washington have
claimed the power to do so. Their claims have, however, rarely been
tested in a court of law. Rather, as several commentators have noted,
they are played out in the court of political contest between the
branches.
In fact, presidents' power to keep information from Congress is more
uncertain than the President's supporters claim. There are few
definitive judicial opinions on the matter. And, for the most part,
courts have bent over backward to avoid any definite solution to the
conflict. In the most recent high-profile case,
the challenge to the Vice President's secretive "energy taskforce"
(remember when that was the most scandalous thing about this
Administration ?!), the Supreme Court expressly declined the
Government's invitation to dismiss out of hand the effort to cast
sunlight on the task force. Certainly, the Court showed great deference
to the Administration, but there was no suggestion that courts have no
role in determining the balance of secrecy--or that the say-so of the
President or a close colleague is sufficient to end the story.
But the judicial opinions that do exist are fairly clear on a couple of points.
First, presidents can invoke a presumption that some documents can
be kept secret, and this presumption is especially strong in case
involving advice being given to the President. This is the principle
the President relied on in his speech this week.
Second, even when these documents involve communications from the
president himself (or perhaps one day, herself), this privilege
dissipates when the need on the other side of the ledger is
sufficiently great. And there is no requirement of an absolute
privilege short of allegations of criminality. (To the contrary, the Supreme Court in 2004
eschewed such an absolute rule in favor of the executive branch,
explicitly declining to dismiss a civil suit against Cheney for
information).
What does this mean for any subpoenas that may be issued by Leahy, or, for that matter Conyers?
For a start, it is far from clear here that there has been no criminal conduct here, as explained by Marty Lederman here.
Certainly, there is sufficient to justify the kind of careful probing
both Conyers and Leahy suggest. Whether there is enough to warrant
appointment of a Special Prosecutor is a separate and harder question.
Even if there were no suspicion of possible criminal conduct, there
is still reason to query whether the protection of advice to the
President really does justify an absolute privilege against Congress.
Without question, we want executive branch advisors to be candid.
But we also want executive branch advisors to remain within the law.
And we want everyone on the federal payroll to feel some loyalty not
only to the Administration of the day, but to the vision and values of
the U.S. Constitution.
It is, moreover, simply not the case that a presidential advisor has
be assured that his or her counsel will never come to light. No one can
absolutely control the documentation that they provide while working in
the federal government. Criminal investigations can result in the
disclosure of presidential communications. And as the Supreme Court held
in 1977, even former Presidents do not yield an unfettered veto over
what happens to their non-personal papers. That means that advisors in
fact must - and indeed should - operate according to the principle that
their words might one day filter into the public domain.
In fact, the President's justification of executive privilege--which
is the standard justification that the executive branch has given for
fifty years--is surprisingly weak. Perhaps, in other words, we ought to
be recalling Schlesinger's advice, and asking whether we indeed need
this "sacred constitutional principle," or whether we are better of
with more ad hoc and finely tuned devices to manage the flow of
information between the President and Congress.
Incidentally, in the "is-it-funny or scary" category, I note that
President Bush in his address commented that U.S. attorneys are "decent
people. They serve at our pleasure." Having just finished a
book arguing that this Administration has unhealthy inclinations toward
the less savory habits of the British royals, I'm tickled to see Mr.
Bush confirm his monarchical identity.
Now all we need are some corgis.
Aziz Huq: "Subpoenas and the Exercise of 'Executive Privilege'" (pdf)
Tags: Justice, Liberty & National Security, Checks & Balances
Page 23 of 27 pages « First < 21 22 23 24 25 > Last »
0 comments | Permalink